PUBL0264 - Blog

Uzbekistan Matters More Than It Used To, Including to Europe

Uzbekistan is becoming central to Central Asia’s self-reorganization, corridor politics, and external competition, requiring Europe to treat it as a strategic political node.

The recent launch of the U.S.-Uzbekistan Business Council in Washington is not just a foreign-investment story.[1] It reflects Uzbekistan’s growing significance for the political ordering of Central Asia. For years, Uzbekistan was often treated as a reforming market, a demographic heavyweight, or a useful diplomatic venue. What is changing now is that Uzbekistan matters more directly to the way the region structures itself in response to its domestic and international environments.

Washington’s new attention is a sign of that shift, not its cause. Uzbekistan is emerging as the country most central to Central Asia’s efforts to reorganize itself. Kazakhstan remains important for its hydrocarbons and special place in the Russia–China adjacency story. But under President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, Uzbekistan is now claiming a more consequential place in the evolving structure of Central Asian politics.

Why Uzbekistan Is Important

Uzbekistan is the only Central Asian state that borders the other four republics as well as Afghanistan. This centrality is reinforced by demographic scale: as of January 1, 2026, its permanent population stood at 38,236,704, close to half of Central Asia’s population.[2] Geography does not by itself confer political weight, but in Uzbekistan’s case geography and scale combine in a unique way in the region.

Kazakhstan is larger in territory and remains more important in hydrocarbons, but Uzbekistan is arguably a greater intra-regional crossroads. Serious questions of connectivity, trade, water, borders, and Afghanistan-facing strategy sooner or later run through its territory or diplomacy. Its geography is now more politically central than even a few years ago.[3]

“Uzbekistan is becoming the field where Central Asia’s own efforts at self-organization meet the renewed competition of outside powers for influence.”

This is already evident in regional diplomacy. In November last year, Mirziyoyev described the March 2025 treaty on the junction of the borders of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, together with the Khujand Declaration, as “epoch-making.”[4] That judgment is justified, because the agreements marked a further step away from inherited post-Soviet frictions and toward a more coherent regional order.

The same tendency was in evidence at the first EU–Central Asia summit in April 2025, which he hosted in Samarkand and where the relationship was upgraded to a strategic partnership.[5] Tashkent shares credit for Central Asia’s recent diplomatic consolidation with others, but one should not miss the degree to which Uzbekistan has become one of the principal actors driving that consolidation.

Where the Competition Converges

Uzbekistan’s importance also emerges from the way corridor politics are beginning to converge through it. European discussions of Central Asian connectivity have often concentrated on the Trans-Caspian or Middle Corridor and therefore, understandably, on Kazakhstan. Uzbekistan expands the picture. In October 2025, Mirziyoyev argued that connecting the Middle Corridor with the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway and the Trans-Afghan corridor could create a “multi-route system of strategic corridors” across the wider region.[6]

What he points to here is the combination of east-west and north-south movement into a broader strategic logic. Termez, on the border with Afghanistan, adds another dimension: UNHCR integrated the Termez hub into its global stockpile network in 2025.[7] Uzbekistan is therefore positioning itself to connect several regional systems at once, rather than favoring one corridor over another.

“What is at stake in Uzbekistan is not merely access to a market, but influence over the routes, sectors, and alignments shaping Central Asia’s next phase.”

Competition among external powers in, around, and for Uzbekistan now carries strategic geopolitical meaning beyond tactical geoeconomic investment. The United States has paired the new business council with a critical-minerals push. In February 2026, the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation announced a Joint Investment Framework with Uzbekistan covering strategic sectors including critical minerals, infrastructure, and energy.[8] Uzbek officials separately reported a memorandum with Washington on reliable supplies in the extraction and processing of critical minerals and rare earths.[9]

Russia remains embedded in a different strategic sector altogether: Rosatom announced on March 24, 2026, that it had signed a new roadmap with Uzbekistan for cooperation in nuclear and related fields.[10] Gulf actors are not simply placing passive capital. AIIB’s approved financing for ACWA Power in Uzbekistan supports a 1,500 MW wind project with battery storage in Karakalpakstan.[11] Meanwhile, Masdar reached financial close in January 2026 on a 300 MW solar and 75 MWh battery project in Kashkadarya and described Uzbekistan as part of a portfolio exceeding 2 GW there.[12] These investments tie different outside actors to different sectors of the country’s state capacity over the long term.

What Europe Should Conclude

None of this makes Kazakhstan less important. Its geography still gives it a distinctive place in Eurasian politics, and it remains the region’s principal hydrocarbon-export story. It is also the only Central Asian state bordering both Russia and China, and those borders are long. Uzbekistan’s rise should therefore be framed not as a replacement story but as a differentiation story. While Kazakhstan remains central to hydrocarbon exports and to the Russia–China adjacency question, Uzbekistan is becoming more central to the intra-regional political story: border settlement, diplomatic consolidation, corridor junction, Afghanistan-facing access, and the strategic sectors through which multiple outside actors now seek durable influence.

For Europe, the implication is clear. The Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement signed in October 2025 was a serious step forward, and its provisional application from March 1, 2026, shows that Brussels has moved in the right direction.[13] But institutional follow-through remains thin. As of mid-April 2026, the Council treaty page showed ratification notifications only from Estonia and Hungary, while the European Parliament procedure was still listed as awaiting committee decision.[14]

Europe therefore risks lagging behind the geopolitical reality it now officially acknowledges. Uzbekistan is becoming more important to the internal organization of Central Asia. Brussels and key member states therefore need to approach it not just as a commercial partner, but as a strategic node in its own right. A serious European geopolitical policy toward Central Asia cannot treat Uzbekistan’s connectivity, strategic sectors, and political engagement as separate files.

References

[1] All hyperlinks were verified on 18 March 2026. Times of Central Asia, “The American-Uzbek Business Council Launches in Washington,” April 8, 2026, https://timesca.com/the-american-uzbek-business-council-launches-in-washington/

[2] National Statistics Committee of the Republic of Uzbekistan, “The Permanent Population of Uzbekistan Has Increased by 17.6 Million During the Years of Independence,” February 5, 2026, https://stat.uz/en/press-center/news-of-committee/66704-zbekistonning-doimij-a-olisi-musta-illik-jillarida-17-6-millionga-k-pajdi-4

[3] Government Portal of the Republic of Uzbekistan, “Territory,” last updated July 15, 2025, [https://gov.uz/en/pages/territory](https://gov.uz/en/pages/territory)

[4] President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, “Central Asia on the Verge of a New Era,” November 13, 2025, [https://president.uz/en/lists/view/8653](https://president.uz/en/lists/view/8653)

[5] Council of the European Union, “Joint Declaration Following the First European Union-Central Asia Summit,” April 4, 2025, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/04/04/joint-declaration-following-the-first-european-union-central-asia-summit/

[6] Government Portal of the Republic of Uzbekistan, “Address by the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev at the Summit of the Heads of State of the Organization of Turkic States,” October 8, 2025, https://gov.uz/en/news/view/91581

[7] UNHCR, “UNHCR Integrates Termez Hub in Uzbekistan into Global Stockpile Network,” February 18, 2025, https://www.unhcr.org/central-asia/en/news/unhcr-integrates-termez-hub-uzbekistan-global-stockpile-network

[8] U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, “DFC Leadership Lays the Foundation for Investment Partnership with Uzbekistan,” February 18, 2026, https://www.dfc.gov/media/press-releases/dfc-leadership-lays-foundation-investment-partnership-uzbekistan

[9] MiningMetals Uzbekistan, “A Memorandum Was Signed Between the Governments of Uzbekistan and the United States to Ensure the Reliability of Supplies in the Field of Extraction and Processing of Critical Minerals and Rare Earths,” February 2026, https://mining.uz/en/news/a-memorandum-was-signed-between-the-governments-of-uzbekistan-and-the-united-states-to-ensure-the-reliability-of-supplies-in-the-field-of-extraction-and-processing-of-critical-minerals-and-rare-earths

[10] Rosatom State Atomic Energy Corporation, “Russia and Uzbekistan Sign Roadmap for Cooperation in Nuclear and Related Fields,” March 24, 2026, https://rosatom.ru/en/press-centre/news/russia-and-uzbekistan-sign-roadmap-for-cooperation-in-nuclear-and-related-fields/

[11] Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, “Uzbekistan: ACWA Power Renewable Energy Loan,” January 23, 2025, https://www.aiib.org/en/projects/details/2025/approved/Uzbekistan-ACWA-Power-Renewable-Energy-Loan.html

[12] Masdar, “Masdar Achieves Financial Close for 300MW Solar and 75MWh Battery Energy Storage System Project in Uzbekistan,” January 15, 2026, https://masdar.ae/en/news/newsroom/masdar-achieves-financial-close-for-solar-and-battery-storage-project-in-uzbekistan

[13] European Parliament, “Basic Information 2024/0260(NLE): EU–Uzbekistan Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement,” January 13, 2026, https://oeil.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/en/procedure-file/pdf?reference=2024%2F0260%28NLE%29

[14] Council of the European Union, “Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement Between the European Union and Its Member States, of the One Part, and the Republic of Uzbekistan, of the Other Part,” accessed April 10, 2026, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents/treaties-agreements/agreement/?docLanguage=en&id=2025006

Author

DISCLOSURE

All written content of this article on this site is the exclusive copyright and property of Strategy International (SI) Ltd and the author who has written to It.

To note, the opinions stated do not necessarily reflect the official policies of Strategy International.

No prior use in part or in its complete form, written, words, maps, charts or statistical, numerical information can be made, unless there is a written prior request and consent by the author and Strategy International and its legal representative.

All requests should be directed at info@strategyinternational.org

error: Content is protected !