Since U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran’s leadership, which killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and dozens of senior officials, both President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu have repeatedly addressed the Iranian people directly in Persian-dubbed videos and statements. Trump’s message: “Finally, to the great proud people of Iran, I say tonight that the hour of your freedom is at hand […] When we are finished, take over your government. For many years, you have asked for America’s help […] Now you have a president who is giving you what you want.”;^[1] Netanyahu’s appeal: “You, the citizens of Iran, and the Iranian army, the Artesh. You are not our enemies, and we are not your enemies […] They are the ones who have degraded your wonderful country, brought it to the lowest point, and they are the ones who slaughtered you en masse […] this is your opportunity to establish a new and free Iran […] Help has arrived.”^[2]

Current and previous messages, such as those, are clear on their purpose. President Trump’s and Prime Minister Netanyahu’s language appeals to the Iranian people, portraying themselves as liberators urging regime overthrow, and illustrating a faltering narrative battle in the cognitive domain, where psychological outreach bolsters regime resilience. They emphasize respect for Iranian sovereignty, reject any occupation, and offer full support to the populace – particularly Millennials and Gen Z, who have driven recent protests. For years, both the U.S.-Israel alliance and Iran have invested heavily in cognitive and hybrid warfare capabilities, including narrative control through AI-driven tools and disinformation. Public signaling aims to fracture regime loyalty, incentivize defections, and bolster opposition forces. This tactic echoed in rhetoric during the 2019-2020 protests and resurfaced amid the brutal crackdowns of January 2026. However, the recent strikes represent a war of choice rather than necessity, framed under the pretext of imminent threats and risks that lacked urgency amid ongoing negotiations.

“Psychological patterns from the past decade demonstrate that such external overtures cannot deliver the authentic empowerment Iranians demand. Iran faces a rushed Supreme Leader succession, with no viable options emerging that could stabilize the regime, risking accelerating chaos, anarchy, or a more entrenched paranoid dictatorship.”

The respect and support strategy steps on three core psychological mechanisms: deploys identity-splitting tactics by separating “the regime” from “the proud Iranian people”; utilizes digital amplification while invoking generational aspiration among Millennials and Gen Z protesters; and leverages defection signaling. By using Persian messages and promoting internal resistance and opposition, Trump and Netanyahu try to mitigate nationalist backlash that crushed past protests and aim to frame their actions as supportive rather than invasive. In the meantime, offering explicit incentives, and clear, actionable pathways for defection, including promises of immunity and economic stability, is critical to eroding loyalty within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps mid-ranks and the security forces.^[3] Furthermore, target protesters who rely on both diaspora platforms and VPNs to bypass monitoring and blackouts, with endorsements intended to provide moral cover and transform symbolic acts like rooftop chants into widespread mobilization. In theory, this mirrors successful color-revolution messaging strategies, but in practice, in Iran’s context, marked by cohesive IRGC and a population scarred by external interventions, it has consistently failed.

“Nationalist youth, demanding dignity over theocracy, perceive overt savior rhetoric as paternalistic interference, echoing failures where external endorsements delegitimized organic movements. Such direct courtship overlooks Iran’s entrenched nationalism forged through historical grievances, triggers a “rally around the flag” effect and risks to unify even regime critics around national symbols.”

History confirms this through the 1953 coup memory, the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war, and sanctions since 2018 that have spiked regime support when foreigners directly address the people. The current demands focus on economic dignity, and an end to clerical absolute power.^[4] Still, there is no unified opposition, shadow government, or mass military defections on the scale of Tunisia in 2011. The IRGC retains control of Iran’s economy and major industries and maintains a stranglehold on military power.^[5] In a nation already reeling from January 2026 deaths, such messaging transforms grievances into perceived danger, escalating violence rather than resolution. Western rhetoric, far from empowering, equips the regime with a potent cognitive weapon, portraying protesters as foreign puppets. Iran’s AI-driven censorship, internet throttling, and deep-fake operations quickly repurpose these tactics into proof of foreign orchestration, and the very act of respect and support becomes the regime’s best recruitment tool, stifling organic dissent.^[6]

Parallel cases underscore that external backing often legitimizes chaos or new strongmen. Those include Libya in 2011, where NATO’s “we stand with the Libyan people” message produced warlords and not democracy;^[7] Syria in 2011, when Obama’s “Assad must go” rhetoric, together with public support for protesters, turned an uprising into proxy conflict and delivered 13 years of civil war;^[8] and Venezuela, where external messaging unified military loyalty around Maduro and against interference, quashing post-Chávez movements. In Iran, opportunity and support appear to superficially meet demands, but lack a unified opposition structure, a postwar plan, and eroded IRGC cohesion. These strikes do not foster organic transition mechanisms but rather they accelerate a power vacuum.

“This external outreach is inherently dangerous because it amplifies risks of repression, fragmentation, and long-term blowback. It risks contested nuclear sites, ethnic uprisings in Kurdistan and Baluchistan, and rogue proxies destabilizing hubs, corridors and the region.”

The dangers deriving directly from this approach are profound and multifaceted. IRGC hardliners, including the Mojtaba Khamenei faction, exploit foreign messages as pretexts for martial law, rebranding protests as “treason” and subjecting civilians to even harsher crackdowns. Ethnic peripheries like Kurdistan and Sistan-Baluchistan could ignite, with Western support messages inciting scattered, uncoordinated uprisings that mirror the Libya and Syria vacuums; millions could be displaced toward the Gulf and via Red Sea routes. This fragmentation would also trigger long-term cognitive blowback, where protesters internalize that Western “respect” is merely tactical theater. To pivot toward practical efficacy strategy must prioritize on mechanisms that genuinely empower Iranians, discreet diplomacy, and amplify diaspora networks without overt endorsements, foster economic coalition, as well as engage peripheries holistically, ensuring any vacuum enables transition rather than anarchy.

Iranians today are demanding what prior generation sought, dignity and self-determination. Yet, history proves that external “help” rarely delivers it. Without disciplined alliances and psychological understanding of youth resilience, this outreach risks delivering either anarchy with millions displaced, or a more paranoid dictatorship. Western policy has the room to shift from rhetoric and narrative to actionable mechanisms that actually put power in people’s hands.

1. Associated Press. “Read Trump’s Full Statement on Iran Attacks.” February 28, 2026. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/read-trumps-full-statement-on-iran-attack. ↑

2. Associated Press. “Read Netanyahu’s Full Statement on Iran Attacks.” February 28, 2026. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/read-netanyahus-full-statement-on-iran-attacks. ↑

3. Alemzadeh, Maryam. “IRGC and Terrorism-Related Sanctions: Why They Fail, What They Achieve.” Crown Center for Middle East Studies. September, 2024. https://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/middle-east-briefs/meb160.html. Rondeaux, Candace. “Europe’S IRGC Sanctions Show It’S Learning to Fight a Gray-Zone War.” World Politics Review. February 3, 2026. https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/eu-iran-irgc-sanctions/. ↑

4. Prayzler, Nitsan, Mora Deitch, and Raz Zimmt. “Iran from Within: Analysis of Protest Events and Regime Support.” Institute for National Security Studies. September 16, 2025. https://www.inss.org.il/publication/iran-inside-spotlight/. ↑

5. Kohlmann, Thomas. “Iran’s Economic Woes Expose Regime’s Tight Grip.” Deutsche Welle. January 20, 2026. https://www.dw.com/en/irans-economic-woes-expose-regimes-tight-grip/a-75567127. ↑

6. Itzchakov, Doron (Dr.). “Iran’S Statecraft: Shaping Identity and Cognitive Framing Amid Societal Cohesion Challenges.” International Institute for Counter-Terrorism. September 28, 2025. https://ict.org.il/irans-statecraft-shaping-identity-and-cognitive-framing-amid-societal-cohesion-challenges/. ↑

7. NATO. “Statement on Libya.” June 8, 2011. https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/official-texts-and-resources/official-texts/2011/06/08/statement-on-libya. ↑

8. Vukovic, Sinisa & Bernabei, Diane. “Refining Intractability: A Case Study of Entrapment in the Syrian Civil War.” International Negotiation. 24, 407-436. July, 2019. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/334723246_Refining_Intractability_A_Case_Study_of_Entrapment_in_the_Syrian_Civil_War ↑