The security architecture of the Eastern Mediterranean is formed through the interplay of layered, overlapping frameworks of alignment. The region comes into NATO’s orbit through membership of both Greece and Türkiye, though the complicated relationship between the two remains a sensitive issue. Proximity to the highly volatile Middle East adds pressure, as the possibility of ripple effects and miscalculations lurks around the seemingly calm, by comparison, Mediterranean Sea. At the same time, energy cooperation folds into broader security calculations, shaping regional dynamics whilst also drawing global actors into the picture. In a contested environment, characterized by long-standing rivalries, unresolved disputes, and simmering antagonisms, the emergence of crystallizing forces of alignment represents an important geopolitical development. This article focuses on the cementing security axis of Greece, Cyprus and Israel, assessing relevant implications for security in the Eastern Mediterranean.
“The alignment of Greece, Cyprus and Israel has decisively moved beyond energy cooperation to incorporate an increasingly substantial military and defense dimension, pointing towards an emergent regional security axis.”
The evolution became particularly pronounced during the 10th trilateral summit of the three countries, held in Jerusalem in December 2025. In their Joint Declaration, the leaders of Greece, Cyprus and Israel expressed commitment to strengthening cooperation to enhance the security and resilience of their respective nations, reaffirming the relevance of the 3+1 cooperation format with the US. Whereas previous summits had primarily focused on energy cooperation and connectivity, this meeting explicitly emphasized “security, defense and military matters”, as stated in their Joint Declaration, specifically highlighting the importance of maritime security and the protection of critical infrastructure [1]. Moreover, recent defense procurement deals reveal the growing military association between the three actors, as Israel has become a key supplier of defense equipment for both Cyprus and Greece. For example, Cyprus acquired Barak MX air defense systems from Israel, to replace its ageing equipment [2]. Most recently, Greece and Israel concluded a landmark military deal, “Achilles Shield” – worth approximately €3.1 billion and scheduled to become operational within 35 months, the program will create a multi-layered defense shield over Greece [3].
The emergence of this trilateral axis comes at a time when Israel’s international position is highly contentious, due to its war in Gaza, its de-facto occupation of the West Bank, and the humanitarian crisis Israeli aggression has caused. Voices calling for a harder stance against Israel have been rising across Europe; earlier this month, the UK, France and Canada joined several other European countries in introducing a trade ban against Israel’s illegal settlements [4]. The deepening military alignment of Greece and Cyprus with Israel, therefore, sits somewhat uncomfortably with the predominant mood in Europe. That said, both Greece and Cyprus previously expressed opposition over Israeli activity in the West Bank. For instance, in May 2026 the two countries, along with Jordan, made a Joint Declaration in the context of their 5th Trilateral Summit, where they explicitly condemned “all illegal unilateral Israeli measures in the occupied West Bank”, called for the cessation of “all settlement activity, land confiscation, and the escalating settlers’ violence against Palestinians” and reiterated “rejection of all attempts and measures to annex the occupied West Bank” [5].
Given the above, the emergent security axis between Greece, Cyprus and Israel may be interpreted as a pragmatic alignment, based upon common interests and shared geopolitical concerns, rather than on ideological grounds and values-driven considerations – a trend that is arguably on the rise not only around the Eastern Mediterranean but across Europe and beyond. This view is reinforced by Greece’s insistence on acquiring access to the military system’s source code, in order to be able to independently operate, sustain and upgrade the equipment, ensuring thus that its “Achilles Shield” does not turn into an “Achilles Heel” in the future due to an embedded and profound dependency on Israel [6].
The core of Greek-Cypriot-Israeli convergence largely lies in their common perception of Türkiye as a geostrategic rival, and their shared concern over Türkiye’s growing influence in the region, especially in the light of Erdogan’s hegemonic ambitions. There is no doubt that Türkiye’s relations with all three aforementioned axis countries is, to say the least, strained: its relations with Greece are characterized by a long-standing rivalry, at times verging on active confrontation, including disputes over maritime boundaries, continental shelves and exclusive economic zones in the Aegean Sea; Türkiye also has a thorny relation with Cyprus due to the continued occupation of the northern part of the island, which goes back to 1974; and it is experiencing a rapidly deteriorating relation with Israel exacerbated by the latter’s violence in Gaza and its illegal settlements in the West Bank, as well as their clashing interests in Syria. Against this backdrop, Ankara views the deepening military cooperation between Greece, Israel and Cyprus with concern and suspicion, framing it as a potential threat to its national security.
“Regional actors in the Eastern Mediterranean are actively nurturing new strategic alignments, alongside established security frameworks, thus contributing to a more nuanced and layered geopolitical landscape.”
In fact, Türkiye is cultivating its own defense and security network with agility and flexibility. Its positioning on the global stage is highly complex as it simultaneously looks towards its NATO allies in the West, whilst also cultivating closer military ties with key Muslim actors in the East. It seeks to play a more active role in an emergent European security framework, pursuing closer military association with EU states and deeper integration in Europe’s defense manufacturing industry. For example, it reached an agreement with Spain for the use of Hürjets in Spanish military training programs [7]; and Turkish Baykar has partnered with Italy’s Leonardo for the joint development of drones [8]. Such developments, including Baykar’s acquisition of Italian firm Piaggio Aerospace [9], could potentially facilitate Türkiye’s indirect participation in projects funded by the EU’s SAFE instrument. At the same time, however, Türkiye is actively nurturing its connection to the Muslim world. For instance, it recently concluded a mutual defense agreement – the Mecca Pact – with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, on 7 August 2026 [10]. Taking a step back, the conclusion of both the Mecca Pact and the Achilles Shield point towards a regional trend towards the formation of new partnerships that go beyond established alliance frameworks.
As events continue to unfold, critical questions remain regarding the emerging security axes shaping the Eastern Mediterranean. The reaction of other regional actors, particularly Egypt, could prove important in determining the evolving balance of power. Egypt maintains close relations with both Greece and Cyprus, while simultaneously responding positively to Erdogan’s overtures for rapprochement. In other words, it is treading a carefully calibrated path of flexible cooperation with its Mediterranean neighbors, without committing itself exclusively to any emerging bloc. Iran remains relevant not only because of its geographical proximity, but also due to potential implications of continued US involvement in the wider region. Developments in adjacent Syria are also crucially intertwined, as the country has become an increasingly important theatre for the mounting antagonism between Israel and Türkiye. In this sense, events in the Middle East may easily reverberate across the Eastern Mediterranean. Finally, regarding Greek-Turkish relations, the balance between deterrence and escalation appears to be growing tighter, as both sides embark on ambitious paths of military build-up and strengthened security partnerships.
As the Eastern Mediterranean witnesses the formation of increasingly dense and overlapping cooperation mechanisms, the emergent security environment becomes multilayered; the boundary between deterrence and escalation becomes blurred; and regional rivalries intersect with shifting global dynamics. Overall, the pragmatic and flexible nature of engagement between countries in the area reflects a broader geopolitical trend, whereby partnerships are formed on the basis of strategic calculations – a symptom of a highly competitive and deeply fragmented world order.
References
[1] ‘Joint Declaration – The 10th Trilateral Summit of Israel, Greece, and Cyprus’, Hellenic Republic | Prime Minister. [Online]. Available: https://www.primeminister.gr/en/2025/12/22/37647
[2] ‘Cyprus takes delivery of Israeli air defence system, report says’, Reuters, Dec. 2024, [Online]. Available: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/cyprus-takes-delivery-israeli-air-defence-system-report-says-2024-12-05/
[3] S. Michalopoulos, ‘Greece, Israel signed landmark “Achilles Shield” air-defence deal’, Euractiv, Aug. 31, 2026. [Online]. Available: https://www.euractiv.com/news/greece-israel-signed-landmark-achilles-shield-air-defence-deal/
[4] ‘UK, France, Canada Ban Trade With Israel’s Illegal Settlements’, Human Rights Watch. [Online]. Available: https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/09/08/uk-france-canada-ban-trade-with-israels-illegal-settlements
[5] ‘Joint Declaration 5th Trilateral Summit between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the Republic of Cyprus, and the Hellenic Republic’, Hellenic Republic | Prime Minister. [Online]. Available: https://www.primeminister.gr/en/2026/05/06/38459
[6] ‘Israel Clarifies Achilles’ Shield Source Code Position’, tovima.com, Sep. 08, 2026. [Online]. Available: https://www.tovima.com/politics/israel-achilles-shield-source-code-to-remain-under-exclusive-greek-control/
[7] N. A. Potera, ‘Türkiye and Spain: The HÜRJET Program as a test of European defence cooperation’, Defence24.com, May 06, 2026. [Online]. Available: https://defence24.com/industry/turkiye-and-spain-the-hurjet-program-as-a-test-of-european-defence-cooperation
[8] ‘Leonardo and Baykar establish joint venture for unmanned technologies’, Leonardo. [Online]. Available: https://www.leonardo.com/en/press-release-detail/-/detail/16-06-2025-leonardo-and-baykar-establish-joint-venture-for-unmanned-technologies
[9] ‘Baykar completes acquisition of Piaggio Aerospace, setting stage for European expansion’, Defence Industry Europe, Jul. 01, 2025. [Online]. Available: https://defence-industry.eu/baykar-completes-acquisition-of-piaggio-aerospace-setting-stage-for-european-expansion/
[10] A. Bakir, ‘What Is the Mecca Joint Defense Pact—and What It Is Not?’, Middle East Council on Global Affairs, Aug. 2026, [Online]. Available: https://mecouncil.org/blog_posts/what-is-the-mecca-joint-defense-pact-and-what-it-is-not/
