An article by Jerome Vitenberg
Online seminar held on September 20, 2024
Disclaimer
This abstract primarily discusses recent turmoil in the region referred to by the International Hydrographic Organization (IHO) as the “South China Sea.” This terminology is used solely to designate a geographical area and does not imply recognition of the rights of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) over any disputed parts of the sea. Other nations in the region sometimes use different terms, such as the Luzon Sea (Philippines), North Natuna Sea (Indonesia), and more. Some official administrations from the region are instructed to use only their alternative national terminology. Similarly, the term “Yellow Sea,” used by the IHO, is sometimes referred to differently by other nations (e.g., West Sea, Korea). The IHO terminology is used here only for clarity.
Rationale
The South China Sea is of paramount importance, with a third of the world’s trade, including half of China’s exports, transiting through the region. It accounts for around 50% of Vietnam’s economy and is a significant hub for the Philippines’ energy production. For the entire world, as well as for regional countries, it is a geostrategic asset crucial for maritime traffic, regional security, energy production, rare minerals exploitation, and the fishing industry.
Recently, boundary disputes between the PRC and its neighbors have escalated into military clashes, the militarization of artificial islands and coastal projects, multinational security arrangements, and assertive rhetoric from both sides. The Chinese Coast Guard has increasingly confronted the Philippines in the Spratly Islands, notably around the Sierra Madre Navy ship, using aggressive tactics that have resulted in injuries to Filipino service members. China has also constructed military facilities in the area and rejected international arbitration, prompting heightened US Navy readiness and joint military exercises with regional partners.
In the Yellow Sea and Sea of Japan, China has conducted joint military drills with Russia and North Korea, built military with ultra-modern warfare systems on artificial islands, and threatened UN monitoring personnel, further escalating tensions.
In both regions, China’s military activities outside its legitimate sovereign space, alongside economic ventures and territorial claims – specifically, the 124th Meridian East with South Korea and the 9-dash map with the Philippines and other Southeast Asian states – are a cause for concern.
In the South China Sea, the PRC does not recognize international arbitration and invokes the “9-dash line” map, its perceived historical rights, and opposition to what it calls Asia’s “NATOization.” In the Yellow Sea, it asserts its sovereign rights on the western side of the 124th meridian east based on historical agreements, including its 1962 agreement with North Korea and the Northern Limit Line (NLL).
On September 20, 2024, Strategy International organized a closed online conference to discuss the latest events in the Yellow Sea and the South China Sea, and their potential consequences for the region and the world at large. Four main topics were selected for discussion: International arbitration and regional cooperation, the impact of regional frictions on world trade, security and military strategy, and geostrategic and political dimensions, with a focus on Taiwan.
The experts
Two experts were invited to discuss the above topics:
For the guest expert seat, Strategy International was honored to welcome Dr. Aries Arugay, Professor and Chairperson of the Department of Political Science at the University of the Philippines Diliman. Dr. Arugay is Editor-in-Chief of the academic journal “Asian Politics & Policy” and a Visiting Senior Fellow and Coordinator of the Philippines Studies Program at ISEAS – the Yusof Ishak Institute (Singapore).
Dr. Arugay’s research interests include civil-military relations, comparative democratization, security sector reform, and international relations of Southeast Asia. In 2014, he obtained his PhD in Political Science from Georgia State University in the US. He frequently appears on international TV channels to analyze Manila’s foreign policy, as well as internal dynamics within Philippine society and politics.
He co-edited the book “Games, Changes, and Fears: The Philippines from Duterte to Marcos Jr” (ISEAS Publishing, 2024), in which he contributed a chapter analyzing the “Change and Continuity Narratives in the Philippines from Duterte to Marcos Jr”.
For the Strategy International expert seat, we featured Prof. Dr. Francis Schortgen, a Senior Scholar at Strategy International and an expert in International Business & Security in Asia. Dr. Schortgen is the Associate Dean of Faculty at the University of Utah Asia Campus in Incheon, South Korea. More of his biographic data is available here.
Dr. Schortgen recently co-edited (among others, with Professor Michael Grossman, a Strategy International Senior Scholar on National Security) “The Legacy of the Trump Administration: A Disruptive Presidency” (Palgrave-Macmillan, December 2024), part of the book series “The Evolving American Presidency”, following the 2022 publication on President Obama’s achievements and legacy.
Chapter One: International Arbitration and Regional Cooperation
Before discussing about the current escalation of the conflict between China and its neighbors, we sought to examine whether peaceful solutions still exist that could prevent the present situation from degenerating into a more intense armed conflict in both the South China Sea and the Yellow Sea. Beyond conflicting claims, international arbitration and regional cooperation have been taking place between the PRC and its neighbors. The “bamboo policy” followed by Thailand and Vietnam with the PRC (e.g., Paracel Islands, Beibu Gulf joint patrols) illustrates potential peaceful paths to reducing the intensity of territorial conflicts in the area. Could the ongoing skirmishes with China end without conflict?
A few days before this Strategy International discussion, PRC’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with the president of South Korea-China Parliamentarians’ Union Kim Tae-nyeon. They spoke about friendship, cooperation, free trade, peace and stability. Three months earlier, the leaders of South Korea, China and Japan held their first trilateral meeting in nearly five years, discussing peace, a denuclearized Korean peninsula, and increased trade.
We asked Dr. Schortgen to guide us through this “Peace and Love in the Yellow Sea” process.
“While not experiencing a level of tensions as high as prevalent in the East China Sea, the East Sea (or Sea of Japan), or the South China Sea”, Dr. Schortgen says, “the Yellow Sea is certainly not immune to geopolitical tensions, particularly along the disputed “Northern Limit Line”, a maritime demarcation line between South and North Korea, and periodic combined Sino-Russian naval exercises, etc.
The Sino-Russian “no limits partnership” – announced in February 2022 on the eve of Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine – certainly features prominently in the strategic calculus in the Yellow Sea region but needs not come at the expense of Chinese efforts to seek closer ties with Seoul. Rhetoric notwithstanding, strategic realities serve as a reminder of the limits of the Sino-Russian partnership. Despite shared interests in countering U.S. influence around the world and aiming to usher in a new era of great-power relations, China and Russia have divergent national interests and priorities when viewed from a regional perspective. Whereas Russia’s focused on Ukraine and NATO’s decades-long creeping expansion into Russia’s Near Abroad, China’s priorities center on Taiwan and the South China Sea.
From the perspective of geoeconomics and geostrategy, China’s rapprochement with South Korea is heavily anchored in economic interdependence and efforts to counterbalance the U.S.-South Korea alliance, all the while hoping to counter the new trilateral security cooperation between South Korea, Japan, and the United States, and to prevent South Korea from aligning too closely with what China perceives as U.S.-led containment efforts”.
“Overall, the China-South Korea cooperation remains subject to the volatility of regional geopolitics and security concerns, including most immediately the persistent threat perception of a nuclear-armed North Korea, Russia’s evolving relationship with both China and North Korea, and above all the unfolding great-power rivalry between China and the United States” concludes Dr. Schortgen.
From the Philippines’ perspective, after moving into China’s orbit during President Duterte’s administration, President Marcos Jr. has revitalized the security alliance with the US while also pursuing rapprochement with China in January 2023. Given these foreign policy shifts, Manila appears to be seeking a strategic balance between its military dependence on the U.S. and its economic ties with China. Is a “Bamboo diplomacy – Manilla style” possible?
Dr. Arugay answers that “the Philippines’ foreign policy towards China has shifted significantly between the Duterte and Marcos Jr. administrations. Under Duterte (2016-2022), the Philippines pursued a friendlier, more accommodationist approach, hoping for economic benefits from China, particularly through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). However, only 10% of the promised projects were completed, and despite avoiding publicizing Chinese aggression in the South China Sea, the benefits failed to materialize.
Under Marcos Jr., this approach has been reassessed. For example, when Marcos Jr. sought permission from China to explore gas reserves in the Reed Bank, Xi Jinping rejected the request, despite the area’s location within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone as per a 2016 arbitral ruling. This led to a shift in policy, with the Marcos Jr. administration adopting a more transparent stance, revealing Chinese bullying that had previously been concealed.
While Marcos Jr. still seeks balance, avoiding direct confrontation with China and not fully aligning with U.S. military involvement, his administration recognizes the need for security partnerships with like-minded states to reduce vulnerability to Chinese economic coercion. Despite this, the Philippines cannot fully hedge its position due to its mutual defense treaty with the U.S. and its past legal action against China, which positions it as more aligned with American interests in China’s eyes”.
Chapter Two: Impact of Conflict on World Trade
If the conflict between China and its neighbors were to escalate, it could easily lead to the militarization of the Malacca Strait and potentially result in its blockade. Given that the South China Sea is a critical artery for global trade, this would have severe regional and global consequences, in addition to the existing challenges in the Suez Canal, which has been partially obstructed by the Houthis in Yemen.
There are imperfect alternatives to the Malacca Strait. Routes through the Sunda and Lombok Straits are frequently mentioned as potential substitutes, though they would increase overall freight cost by about 20% and extend shipping time by roughly a week. Beyond trade, energy exploitation, the fishing industry, and passenger transport would also be affected.
To address its “Malacca dilemma”, China is exploring alternative routes, including the Kra Canal – or the Kra Landbridge – in Thailand. It is also increasing direct energy imports from Russia and Kazakhstan, and the Pakistani port of Gwadar, part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, is theoretically ready for use. In the future, a fully operational Chinese BRI could enable China to reduce its reliance on the Malacca strait.
We asked Dr. Arugay how he assesses the potential consequences for the Philippines, the region, and the world if the Malacca Strait were “out of service”.
“If a direct military confrontation were to occur in the South China Sea between China and other claimants – or even involve additional parties in the disputes – it would have catastrophic global consequences. At the very least, trade would be severely impacted; at worst, global security could be at stake. The world cannot afford this right now, given the ongoing conflicts in Ukraine, Middle-east and other areas.
Such a conflict would likely escalate beyond a regional issue due to the U.S. alliance system that spans from Korea to Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and beyond. It would also have disastrous effects on supply chains, as seen during the COVID-19 pandemic, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and conflicts in the Middle East. Currently, the only optimistic aspect is that a conflict in the South China Sea over territory would be irrational for all parties involved. Although China has maintained an aggressive stance, it has not yet involved its military. However, this is debatable, as the Chinese coast guard, often referred to as the “maritime militia of China,” is considered part of the Chinese Navy.
Even if the Strait of Malacca remained open, any disruption in the South China Sea would have devastating consequences due to the volume of maritime traffic, including energy tankers bound for South Korea and Japan. These vessels pass through the Strait of Malacca before entering the South China Sea. A conflict would have negative global consequences, not only for trade but also for security, potentially drawing numerous parties into the fray. This is why many, including ASEAN countries, emphasize the need for rational and sober actions to prevent any incidents that could escalate into a military conflict.
Additionally, China is currently facing economic challenges and would be hesitant to engage in a war from a position of weakness. Along with economic constraints, it is also dealing with tensions on its eastern border and skirmishes with India in the west. Fighting on multiple fronts is not a viable option, so China must exercise restraint. The militarization of the South China Sea has had fewer consequences for China than entering a direct conflict would entail.”
“The economic and trade fallout of a conflict in the South China Sea would be far-reaching for South Korea”, Dr. Schortgen analyzes, “given its critical reliance on import-export trade flows, particularly with regard to energy imports (oil and natural gas, ores) and the Korean government’s launch of a New Southern Policy in 2017, aimed at enhancing the ASEAN – South Korea partnership. At the moment, a spate of escalating tensions between China and the Philippines over the Second Thomas Shoal and Sabina Shoal in recent months have significantly raised the prospect of a South China Sea conflict, which would invariably impact the Malacca Strait, a critical maritime chokepoint in the South China Sea. Such a scenario would force South Korea (and Japan) to reroute energy import shipments through the Sunda or Lombok Straits, leading to delivery delays and increased shipping costs.
Additionally, South Korea’s export-driven economy would be adversely affected, leading to a severe trade slowdown, production bottlenecks, and painful economic losses. For its part, a closure of the Malacca Strait would also serve as a powerful reminder to China of its energy supply vulnerability, and prompt a redoubling of efforts by China to avoid its “Malacca dilemma” (first coined in 2003 by then-Chinese President Hu Jintao) – with regional infrastructure projects such as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) or the Funan Techo Canal (that will connect Phnom Penh, Cambodia, to the Gulf of Thailand).
The regional trade impact of a conflict in the East China Sea, meanwhile, would be felt most acutely by China and South Korea, with potential disruption of both sides of the intra-Asian trade flows.
Overall, potential conflict in the East China Sea and/or South China Sea will have a highly disruptive impact on global supply chains and regional production networks and send economic ripple effects throughout the global economy.”
Chapter Three: Security and Military Strategy
In the event of a widespread conflict in the region, evaluating its security and military impacts is crucial. As in any conflict, the consequences of preemptive strikes, retaliations, and broader military strategies among the actors would unfold within the unique geopolitical and strategic dynamics of the area. Western influence in effectively restraining China would be a major concern, as well as the global implications if a conflict in Asia coincided with wars in Ukraine and the Middle East.
We asked Dr. Arugay to assess the effectiveness of the diplomatic and military alliances with the Philippines and the role of ASEAN regarding the South China Sea issue. According to Dr. Arugay, “at the moment, Filipino-Chinese relations are not at their best because of the Duterte administration’s previous policies with China, which have been contrasted by the Marcos Jr’s rapprochement with the US and western powers, making China unhappy. This translated, among others, by Manilla allowing US forces on its soil, with a US missile system placed on Filipino territory, technically capable of projecting missiles towards mainland China.
However, Manilla, being still economically depending on China like other Southeast Asian countries, is prevented from pursuing an absolute anti-China policy, if this was ever planned. Moreover, the Filipinos are not naïve in their relationship with the US, and are careful not being “used” by the US and by the West as a pawn.
Indeed, this is the Chinese narrative: The Philippines are a pawn of the US and of the West. China’s perception of the Philippines is that it has no mind of its own, no specific strategy and that Manilla could never distance itself from the West – unless it allows itself to become a province of China.
This is far from being the reality. For the Philippines knows how to deal with the US better than the PRC knows how to deal with them, due to the history of the relations between the Philippines and the US. Manilla knows how to tell the US when their help is needed – or not. For example, recently, the Marcos Jr administration has refused help from the US, when those volunteered to escort the Filipino boats in their mission to resupplying the 2nd Thomas Shoal or the Sabina Shoal.
Although being bullied by China, the current Filipino administration evaluates that it can deal with it by itself for now. The mutual US-Philippines defense treaty would be invoked only in case of a Filipino casualty, or if some form of direct military force was exerted against Manilla’s coast guard or to the dock ship BRP Sierra Madre.
Otherwise, the Philippines’ perception of the US’s role is mainly to improve Manilla’s deterrence power, its military capability, and to continuously maintain its maritime domain awareness. Beyond those roles, anything beyond could start down a slippery slope.
The Philippines is sober enough not to be an instrument of possible US-China confrontation in Southeast Asia.
There’s also the dimension of the Philippines’ membership in ASEAN which plays an important role in the security picture of the region.
ASEAN has always allowed its members to foster better relations with other countries. In addition, Japan, Australia, India, even the European Union, are dialogue partners of ASEAN and are somehow relating to ASEAN’s regional security architecture.
Therefore, the bilateral relations of the Philippines, and by extension of other ASEAN countries, are complementary to the ASEAN membership. Defense arrangements, similar to the US-Filipino mutual Defense Treaty, can be seen for instance with the defense memorandum between Australia and Indonesia.
The Chinese narrative portraying a mutual exclusivity agreement between the US and the Philippines is not true, nor it is that a close relationship between ASEAN countries and the West brings instability to the region.
It’s true that seen from China’s narrow core security interests, the Philippines is a major potential obstacle, as with Taiwan, it is the only country that stands between the first island chain and the second island chain.
Marcos Jr’s administration, by allowing US forces to have rotational presence for the first time since the Philippines kicked out US bases in 1992, was a game changer for China after they got used to a friendly Filipino administration with Duterte.
The contrast between Duterte and Marcos Jr spoils China’s current geopolitical calculation, especially so close to the Taiwan Strait.
In regard to a conflict around Taiwan, and potential US intervention, Manilla would consider US help mainly for humanitarian reasons. There are some 200,000 Filipinos living and working in Taiwan. In a worst-case scenario, their repatriation could not be organized by the Philippine’s government – but a couple of US warships could do the job.”
We then asked Dr. Schortgen for his perspective on the military and diplomatic alliances in the South China Sea and the Yellow Sea, and to highlight any similarities or differences between them.
Dr. Schortgen noted that “in recent years, we have witnessed stepped-up efforts to strengthen diplomatic and military alliances concerning the South China Sea and the broader Indo-Pacific region. The U.S. has been instrumental in spearheading efforts at collective pushback against Chinese claims in the South China Sea. These include the QUAD – “Quadrilateral Security Dialogue” involving the U.S., Australia, Japan and India; AUKUS, a trilateral partnership between Australia, the U.K. and the U.S., the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity, the U.S.-Japan-South Korea Trilateral Partnership, etc.
Despite China and Russia drawing closer and making it a point of conducting regular maritime and air patrol drills in the recent years, the core U.S. alliances in the Asia-Pacific region remain generally strong. If there is a ‘weak’ link in the efforts to counter Chinese claims on the South China Sea, it is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a regional organization that remains fundamentally divided on the question of the South China Sea, given its members’ varying degrees of trade dependence on China. Moreover, within certain U.S. bilateral alliances, the degree of cooperation has fluctuated over time, alternating between closer alignment with the U.S. and increased engagement with China. These shifts are often driven by domestic political factors, as seen in the Philippines, or by dynamics between U.S. allies, such as Japan and South Korea. These realities present potential, though by no means debilitating vulnerabilities that could be exploited by China to its advantage.
There are obvious differences in the alliance structures and dynamics in the South China Sea and Yellow Sea. In the former, U.S. regional allies (e.g., South Korea, Japan) assume a largely supporting role in a potential conflict. Among Southeast Asian partners, the Philippines is the outlier as it is the only regional player with a bilateral defense treaty with the United States. In the Yellow Sea, the primary concern of Northeast Asian U.S. allies (Japan and South Korea) has been North Korea. That being said, China’s rising assertiveness will invariably prompt these countries to pay closer attention to the broader Chinese strategic challenges”.
Chapter Four: Geostrategic and Political Dimensions with Taiwan as a central parameter of the equation
Beyond the regional geostrategic maritime disputes, the PRC’s regime and the Western regional countries (and allies) are political adversaries. We wondered whether the disputes between the PRC and its regional neighbors mask a deeper cultural and political conflict, with the Republic of China (ROC) – Taiwan – as the central strategic factor opposing the PRC to its neighbors in maritime conflicts.
More precisely, we asked Dr. Schortgen whether the PRC perceives the South China Sea, the Yellow Sea and the Sea of Japan primarily as ways to secure access to Taiwan’s coasts. In this hypothesis, Taiwan would be the real and principal focus of Beijing, while the PRC’s broader activities in the regional seas would aim at preventing any pro-ROC disruption in case of a potential PRC invasion. This would render the other regional disputes mere distractions from the PRC’s primary goal: to occupy the ROC. In parallel, China’s South China Sea movements could foreshadow a more significant confrontation over Taiwan.
According to Dr. Schortgen, “China’s activities in the South China Sea (SCS), Yellow Sea, and Sea of Japan are best seen as closely intertwined and mutually contributing to the pursuit of a comprehensive strategy to establish regional dominance and pursue or protect its national interests. Taiwan features undeniably as a central focus – if not the central focus- judging by the Chinese leadership statements on the Taiwan question over the years – “Taiwan issue cannot be postponed indefinitely” (Jiang Zemin, 2002). “We should not allow this problem to be passed down from one generation to the next” (Xi Jinping, 2013); “External interference cannot stop the historical trend of reunion of the country and family” (Xi Jinping, 2004). Viewed through the nationalistic lens of the “Century of Humiliation” (Bainian guochi, 百年国耻) and “China Dream” (Zhongguo meng, 中国梦) narratives, reunification with Taiwan will represent a critical milestone for Xi Jinping’s call for the “great renaissance of the Chinese nation” (Zhonghua minzu weidade fuxing 中华民族伟大的复兴)
China’s rising assertiveness and stepped-up power projection in maritime East and Southeast Asia fueled a set of strategic calculations and considerations. These include: 1) adopting an ‘Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2AD) strategy to effectively prevent or deter foreign military intervention in areas of national strategic interest, 2) establishing control in the waters surrounding Taiwan to secure operational access and supply routes for the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), and 3) acquiring the capability to break through the first island chain (Kuril Islands, Japan, Ryukyu islands, Taiwan, Philippines, Indonesia).
While regional disputes may appear as potential distractions, China’s militarization of the South China Sea is in fact an integral part of a broader strategic objective of shaping the regional security and military environment to China’s advantage by complicating U.S. intervention in the early days of a potential Taiwan scenario. Put differently, China’s maritime grey-zone tactics in the South China Sea can (and should) be viewed as a stepping stone to a potential conflict over Taiwan.”
We also asked Dr. Arugay how he envisions ASEAN’s role in preventing further escalation in the region and what his policy recommendations would be to manage the crisis in the Western Philippines Sea, promoting both peace and prosperity while protecting the national interests of the Philippines.
Dr. Arugay stated, “First, ASEAN, founded in 1967, is almost 60 years old. It’s the engine of growth in the Indo-Pacific, covering the world’s most economically dynamic region with a population of more than half a billion people.
Regardless of the criticisms against this organization, the mere fact that there is no direct war in Southeast Asia, the longs years of peace and stability (sometimes shaky, but still), is credit to be given to ASEAN. So, it can’t be left completely out of the crisis analysis towards a solution.
Regarding three policy recommendations, the first is that there must be a recalibration of the transparency policy. So far, the Marcos Jr administration still thinks that it is the be all and end all of strategy, although some see this policy more as a tactic than a strategy.
A transparent policy will allow to leave some room for the PRC not to be pushed into a corner.
The second is that the Philippines must settle or at least strike a consensus on its current South China Sea disputes with the other claimants apart from the PRC. The Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and others haven’t settled their maritime disputes with one another in the South China Sea. And this helps the PRC’s policy of “divide to rule”. There are already initial steps taken, for instance between Vietnam and the Philippines to somehow manage their South China Sea issues; they’ve worked towards an agreement towards a bilateral code of conduct, a step in the right direction.
Finally, the Philippines must be clear in what it expects from the United States. Hopefully, the US will not just leave the area and cease its commitment to improve the defense and maritime domain awareness of the Philippines if Donald Trump, for example, was to return to the White House at the next elections.”
Conclusion
In addition to the legitimate desire of any country to expand its economic and trade influence, the PRC’s actions in the region appear focused on two main objectives: ensuring access to Taiwan from all directions, including from the south, and counterbalancing U.S. influence in the area. In addition, coercive and illegitimate actions against neighbors may occur without any link to these two main goals.
The hypothesis of a more intense conflict does not seem probable for now, as both the PRC and its neighbors would face significant economic penalties from the closure of the Malacca Strait.
ASEAN emerges as a dominant cultural junction in the region, fostering a culture of balance, consensus-building, and quiet diplomacy. Trust in the U.S. is not automatically guaranteed by all local actors, and cooperation with the U.S. fluctuates depending on the government in power. Some regional states may prefer to maintain a balanced approach within the U.S.-China rivalry rather than countering China by aligning too closely with the U.S. Local cultures, socio-economic and political customs, and historical backgrounds may also make China no less attractive than the US.
Post-Scriptum
In addition to strengthening military partnerships whenever possible, it seems essential for the U.S. to reinforce its cultural appeal to local populations in order to support the trust of its military allies. This effort may be necessary to attract those who hesitate or fear choosing the U.S. over China or who prefer to remain neutral.
For the U.S. to gain more economic, political, and military influence in the region, considerable work remains to be done at the cultural level, and trust should not be taken for granted. It is the right moment for U.S. analysts in all branches of cooperation to incorporate an Asian holistic dimension into their methodology, sometimes customized to the specific countries they are called to engage with.