Following the conflict between Israel, Us and Iran the question has switched from “Who is the dominant regional power that organizes the regional order and system?”, to “Which state performs which function in the regional order?”. The region appears to be developing into a functional regional order, in which influence derives from occupying indispensable roles rather than exercising comprehensive dominance. The principle challenge for the upcoming decade will not be balancing between well-established international powers, but managing a regional environment in which relationships become simultaneously more important a more difficult to reconcile.
“An increasingly fragmented Middle East, influence belongs less to states that choose sides, than to those capable of navigating between them. However if the Middle East is no longer organized by hierarchy, what is the organizing principle of the emerging regional order?“
During different periods Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey were all considered potential regional leaders. This perspective assumed that regional order, stability, and politics depended upon a single state and had a specific epicenter. Today this assumption increasingly fails to explain regional dynamics, a shift that reflects broader changes in the international system. The Gulf has undergone a profound structural transformation since the 2011 Arab uprisings, moving towards a polycentric regional system. Following a rise in conflicts the geography of Middle East security has expanded and the region’s geopolitical terrain has been reshaped. The resilience of the “Axis of Resistance”, the shifting US and Gulf dynamics, the centrality of the Palestinian questions, the Syrian power vacuum, the strengthening of the importance of middle powers and the emergence of a new regional bloc define the new regional order.
The region now features the Saudi-Emirati axis, the Qatar independent trajectory, Oman and Kuqait as mediators, and Iran as a permanent regional power. Saudi Arabia is becoming the political center, increasingly defining the region’s political agenda. The UAE is becoming the network state, connecting the Middle east to global markets. Its departure from OPEC underscores economic as well as political fragmentation, weakening traditional coordination mechanisms in global energy markets and complicating efforts to manage price volatility. Qatar’s influence is based on access, maintaining working relationships with different states and bodies, and acting as a unique diplomatic intermediary. Efforts to balance different camps showcase an increasingly transactional, oriented diplomacy, rather than bloc politics. Libya functions as a strategic corridor and sits at the intersections of strategic systems such as European migration policy and Mediterranean security, North Africa stability, Turkish influence, Emirati investments and energy exports, influencing the Mediterranean’s geopolitical balance. Egypt’s influence fluctuates economically but remains structural important because of the Suez Canal and the Arab political legitimacy, its demographic scale and military capacity, as well as the mediation in Gaza. Turkey’s role becomes more military-technological than ideological, increasingly specializing in warfare, expeditionary capabilities, Black Sea access and Caucasus connectivity, along with the mediation between Europe and Asia. Lastly, African states are not passive arenas, rather they are leveraging competition among Gulf states and international powers to diversify their partnerships and expand their autonomy. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Turkey, Qatar, and Iran are expanding their footprint across Sudan and Libya, the Red Sea, the Horn of Africa, the Nile, and the Sahel. Those strategies combine to produce a new regional system.[1]
The American security umbrella faces new questions about its credibility and the protections it offers.[2] At the core of the old order was a simple bargain; bases and arms purchases, in exchange for an effective American shield. The war in Palestine and in Iran punctured that belief. Perception has shifted as deterrence looks contingent, contested, and potentially overstretched between Europe, the Gulf, and the Indo-Pacific.[3] China has stepped in again.[4] Gulf states are exploring Chinese drones, missile systems, and security cooperation alongside deepening economic integration through ports, energy, and technology investments. At the same time a critical dimension of the evolving order is the triangular relationship between China, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. Russia, constrained by other theaters, but tied to Iran, benefits from higher energy prices and opportunities to coordinate with Tehran. Militarily and economically, Iran absorbed a strategic blow; political and strategically, though, the regime survived, demonstrated an ability to shut down a vital energy chokepoint, and showed it could impose costs on global actors and superior militaries.[5] For Israel, the campaign validated the effectiveness of the Israeli Forces, yet the political objective remains unrealized, as Tehran has proven its resilience and positioning in the international chessboard.[6] Tel Aviv emerges with deepened alignments and widened gaps.
“The emerging picture is a contested, multipolar arena in which actors diversify and probe for advantage under heightened uncertainty, and reflects deep structural changes at both the global and regional levels. The Gulf is becoming the first region built on competitive resilience.”
Resilience requires diversity, modularity, and dispersion.[7] Unlike traditional balance-of-power systems, Gulf states increasingly compete across economics, technology, investment and diplomacy while simultaneously cooperating to preserve regional stability.[8] Competition and cooperation no longer represent mutually exclusive dynamics but complementary components of a more flexible regional order.[9] A key dimension of this transformation has been the fracturing of the Gulf Cooperation Council. The 2017 blockade of Qatar exposed that the rise of a zero-sum mentality eroded the pragmatic flexibility that had previously allowed the GCC to manage internal disagreements.[10] Smaller Gulf states have demonstrated remarkable competitive resilience by adopting hedging strategies, while they vary considerably in their positioning. An overlooked dimension of the polycentric turn lies beyond the traditional boundaries of the Middle East itself, as the Red Sea, the Horn of Africa, along with Sahel and other parts of Africa have become integral components of regional strategic competition. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Türkiye and Iran are simultaneously expanding their diplomatic, economic and security footprints across the continent through investments, infrastructure, ports, mediation initiatives and military cooperation.[11]
Functional multipolarity, as the structure of the regional order, describes the emerging regional structure in which multiple states perform specialized strategic functions instead of competing for comprehensive dominance. Competitive resilience, explains the mechanism that allows states to compete without undermining collective stability. Sectoral or functional hedging captures the foreign policy strategy employed by middle powers, whereby states maintain differentiated partnerships across political, economic, and security sectors. Cross-regional integration reflects the geographic dimension, linking the Middle East, the eastern Mediterranean, the Red Sea, North Africa, the Horn, and the Info-Pacitifc into a single strategic space. These – proposed – frameworks move beyond explaining the aftermath of one – peripheral – war. They provide a basis for understanding how the region is being reorganized in an era where influence increasingly derives from connectivity, accessibility, and adaptability.
“The emerging Middle East, defined as an arena of selective cooperation, differentiated influence and hybrid sovereignty, is a structural transformation driven by the deterrence of US influence, the fragmentation of the GCC, the rise of Asian powers, and the shifting configurations.“
The region’s power dynamics have shifted toward a pragmatic, multi-aligned system were states build issue-focused coalitions. This landscape requires moving beyond simple narrative of chaos and instability, as countries are prioritizing defense capabilities and regional connectivity to mitigate economic and trade disruptions, and sustainable security cannot rely on traditional top-down frameworks but must address the shifting balance between Israeli expansion and Iranian asymmetric pressure.[12] The Palestine war and the spillover effects in Jordan, along with the Israel-Us-Iran conflict did not create this transformation, rather it acted as a critical juncture that accelerated existing trends and verified the turn towards building strategic autonomy, pivoting into functional specialisation, and strengthening multidirectional diplomacy. The Middle East is becoming functionally interdependent because no state can perform all the strategic roles required to sustain the regional order, as stability depends on the interaction of specialized regional actors whose roles are complementary overlapping and occasionally competitive.
Rana Mazid. “Flexibility Marks Strategic Reshuffle in Middle East”. China Daily. June 29, 2026. https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202606/29/WS6a41c32ca310986e2b46258d.html. Natasha Lindstaedt. “Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt and Saudi Arabia Emerge as a New Regional Power Bloc amid Iran War”. The Conversation. April 08, 2026. https://theconversation.com/pakistan-turkey-egypt-and-saudi-arabia-emerge-as-a-new-regional-power-bloc-amid-iran-war-279782. Leonardo Del Piccolo. “Regional War, Forgotten Crisis: Gaza Spirals Deeper”. ISPI. April 02, 2026. https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/regional-war-forgotten-crisis-gaza-spirals-deeper-234360. Ali Bakir. “Lessons Learned by GCC States in the 2026 US-Israel-Iran War”. Middle East Council on Foreign Affairs. July 14, 2026. https://mecouncil.org/publication/lessons-learned-by-gcc-states-in-the-2026-us-israel-iran-war/. Renad Mansour, Hayder Al-Shakeri, and Haid Haid. “The Shape-shifting ‘Axis of Resistance’”. The Royal Institute of International Affairs. March 6, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55317/9781784136369. ↑
Khalid Al-Jaber. “The Iran War and an Emerging Geopolitical Order”. Middle East Council on Foreign Affairs. May 10, 2026. https://mecouncil.org/publication/the-iran-war-and-an-emerging-geopolitical-order/. Renad Mansour, Hayder Al-Shakeri, and Haid Haid. “The Shape-shifting ‘Axis of Resistance’”. ↑
- Scott Lucas, Andrew Thomas, Chris Ogden, Jessica Genauer, and Kristian Coates Ulrichsen. “How Will the Iran War Change the Middle East? We Asked 5 Experts”. The Conversation
April 05, 2026. https://theconversation.com/how-will-the-iran-war-change-the-middle-east-we-asked-5-experts-279652. ↑
- Khalid Al-Jaber. “The Iran War and an Emerging Geopolitical Order”. ↑
Thomas Juneau. “Iran and the New Persian Gulf Equilibrium.” Chatham House. June 15, 2026. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/06/iran-and-new-persian-gulf-equilibrium. ↑
Scott Lucas, Andrew Thomas, Chris Ogden, Jessica Genauer, and Kristian Coates Ulrichsen. “How Will the Iran War Change the Middle East? We Asked 5 Experts” ↑
Shangzhi Mu . “Regional Economic Resilience and Sustainable Development: Does Industrial Diversity Matter?” PLoS One. February 13, 2026. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0342488. ↑
Khalid Al-Jaber. “The Iran War and an Emerging Geopolitical Order”. ↑
Bristow, G. “Resilient Regions: Re-’place’ing Regional Competitiveness”. Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society 3, no. 1. 2010. https://doi.org/10.1093/cjres/rsp030. ↑
Coates Ulrichsen, Kristian. “The Regional Implications of the Gulf Crisis”. Journal of Arabian Studies. 2020. https://doi.org/10.1080/21534764.2020.1848614. Rashid Al-Mohanadi. “Gulf States Can Contain the Threat from Iran and Israel. But They’ll Need Help”. Chatham House. June 17, 2026. https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/the-world-today/2026-06/gulf-states-can-contain-threat-iran-and-israel-theyll-need. ↑
Institute for Economics & Peace. Global Peace Index 2026: Special Supplement, Global Conflict Systems, Sydney, June 2026. http://visionofhumanity.org/resources ↑
Dr. Shehab Al-Makahleh. “How The War With Iran Forged A Multipolar Middle East – OpEd”. Eurasia Review. July 14, 2025. https://www.eurasiareview.com/14072026-how-the-war-with-iran-forged-a-multipolar-middle-east-oped/. Rana Mazid. “Flexibility Marks Strategic Reshuffle in Middle East”. ↑
