Russia’s war against Ukraine is a wider test of Europe’s security order, political cohesion, and societal resilience. For Eastern and Southeastern Europe, the war has revealed a strategic reality that policymakers cannot ignore: the battlefield is only one dimension of the conflict. The other fronts are diplomatic, informational, economic, and psychological.

“The battlefield is only one dimension of the conflict; the other fronts are diplomatic, informational, economic, and psychological.”

This does not mean that Ukraine is merely a pawn in a great-power game. Ukraine’s agency, sovereignty, and existential struggle remain central. Yet it is also mistaken to ignore the indirect great-power dimension of the conflict. Western military assistance, sanctions, intelligence cooperation, alliance signaling, and Russian strategic narratives have embedded the war within a broader confrontation over Europe’s future security order. The result is a qualified proxy-war dynamic: an essential lens for understanding its regional consequences. [1]

For Eastern and Southeastern Europe, this distinction matters. The way states interpret the war shapes defense investment, diplomatic positioning, and vulnerability to disinformation. Poland and the Baltic states see Russian aggression as an immediate threat and therefore advocate stronger deterrence, military modernization, and sustained support for Ukraine. Romania treats the Black Sea as a direct security theater. Moldova, outside NATO’s umbrella, faces hybrid pressure with fewer protective instruments. Bulgaria, Hungary, and Serbia show how domestic polarization, energy dependence, or historical-cultural ties to Russia can produce hesitation, hedging, or selective alignment.

This variation reflects three mechanisms that now define the regional impact of the war.

The first is securitization. For frontline NATO and European Union states, the war is interpreted as a test of deterrence credibility. If Russia succeeds in Ukraine, many in Warsaw, Tallinn, Riga, Vilnius, and Bucharest fear that coercion will not stop at Ukraine’s borders. This has accelerated defense spending, modernization, and demand for stronger allied presence. NATO’s eastern flank is no longer a peripheral concern. It is the central line of European deterrence.

The second mechanism is politicization. In states where energy dependence on Russia remains significant, or where domestic politics are deeply polarized, the war is often reframed as a conflict in which national leaders must avoid being “dragged in.” This language is politically powerful. It allows governments or opposition actors to present caution as sovereignty, neutrality as prudence, and selective alignment as realism. Hungary is the clearest example inside the EU and NATO. Serbia, while formally pursuing EU integration, continues to balance between Western expectations and its ties with Moscow.

The third mechanism is narrative transmission. Russia’s information strategy seeks to transform the geopolitical framing of the war into domestic political pressure. The Russian message is simple and effective: Ukraine is being used by the West. Sanctions are not tools of pressure against aggression; they are self-harm imposed by Washington. NATO is not strengthening deterrence; it is provoking escalation. These narratives need only create enough confusion, fatigue, and division to weaken collective resolve.

This is why the information domain is not secondary. Disinformation, historical revisionism, and conspiracy narratives are now part of the strategic environment. In the Western Balkans, pro-Russian narratives can exploit unresolved grievances and anti-NATO sentiment. In parts of the Black Sea region, they can amplify distrust toward institutions and question the costs of alignment with the West. Even in frontline states, they can contribute to war fatigue over time.

“In this environment, resilience is the main strategy.”

The policy response must therefore go beyond traditional deterrence. Tanks, missiles, and air defense matter, but so do energy diversification, cyber resilience, media literacy, election security, and crisis communication. Europe must treat hybrid resilience as a core component of defense policy, not as a communications afterthought.

For the Black Sea region, the priorities are clear: maritime security, air and missile defense, protection of critical infrastructure, military mobility, and secure logistics corridors. Romania and Bulgaria are not merely NATO members on the map. They are strategic gateways between the Black Sea, the Balkans, and the Eastern Mediterranean.

For the Western Balkans, generic calls for alignment will not be enough. The EU and NATO must address the structural vulnerabilities that make Russian influence attractive: energy dependency, unresolved disputes, weak institutions, media capture, and public distrust. Conditionality must be paired with credible incentives. Counter-disinformation campaigns must be locally rooted, not imported slogans.

For Moldova and other exposed partners, support must focus on institutional resilience, cyber defense, energy security, and protection from political interference. These states face the consequences of the war without the full protection of alliance membership. Their vulnerability is not peripheral to European security. It is part of it.

Finally, for intra-alliance dissenters, persuasion alone will not solve the problem. If hedging is made politically attractive by energy dependence, economic exposure, or domestic narratives of victimhood, then the answer must include reducing those dependencies. Strategic unity must be built through infrastructure, diversification, and political credibility.

The war in Ukraine has already changed Europe. But its long-term impact will not be determined only by events on the battlefield. It will also be determined by whether Eastern and Southeastern Europe can withstand uneven deterrence, selective cooperation, and persistent hybrid contestation.

The most likely future is not a clean return to pre-2022 stability. It is a prolonged period in which Russia tests Europe below the threshold of direct war, while European states struggle to maintain unity under political, economic, and informational pressure. Ukraine is fighting for its survival. Europe is being tested for its cohesion. Eastern and Southeastern Europe stand at the intersection of both struggles.

The lesson is clear: the region must prepare not only for military threats, but also for the political and narrative battles that will shape the next phase of European security.

REFERENCES

[1] Minas Lyristis, “The Russian Federation-Ukraine War as a Proxy Conflict: Security, Diplomacy, and Hybrid Threats in Eastern and Southeastern Europe,” Studia Securitatis Journal 20, no. 1 (2026): 6-24, https://doi.org/10.54989/stusec.2026.20.01.01.