In the past two decades, social media has shifted from a peripheral communication tool to a central arena of political life. From the Arab Spring uprisings in 2011 to the spread of disinformation during the COVID-19 pandemic, platforms such as Twitter (now X), Facebook/Meta, TikTok, and WatsApp have reshaped how political actors intervene in real time. As Europe advances landmark laws like the Digital Services Act (DSA) and Digital Markets Act (DMA)to assert digital sovereignty and resistance from U.S. authorities, including lobbying and diplomatic pressure, showcases how contested online governance has become. Platforms are not just tools but the field of political projection, where algorithmic visibility, narrative control, and institutional trust are actively shaped. Moreover, the dispute between Meta and European authorities over the DSA highlights how Social media platforms are reshaping political power, while Malaysia’s recent summoning of TikTok executives over delays in addressing viral disinformation illustrates how governmental bodies are taking a more active role in regulating social media.^[1] These developments are not isolated. Instead is within this evolving regulatory tension that digital politics, state authority, and algorithmic visibility are being actively renegotiated.

The current model of online politics turns the focus on election interference, disinformation, and information asymmetry, and is driven by business models that prioritize user engagement and generate societal risks. At the same time, governmental bodies themselves have increasingly turned to social media as a tool of direct communication, narrative-setting, and even soft-power diplomacy. Meanwhile another dimension lies in digital datafication; the increasing reliance on surveillance technologies, biometric tracking, and algorithmic categorization to sort, profile, and govern populations. These practices deepen state and corporate power, while simultaneously raising urgent questions about consent, equality, and political freedom.

Social media, as a real-time intervention tool, compresses time, breaks distance, and monetizes attention. This combination allows for immediate coordination and narrative formation, direct communication between leaders and citizens without editors and institutional filters, and enables programmable visibility. Movements such as Black Lives Matter, #MeToo, MarchForGaza, or activism demonstrate its power to amplify perspectives. During disasters and conflicts, platforms route aid, and verified updates faster than broadcasting. In authoritarian contexts, encrypted messaging applications, communities and diaspora networks help bypass censorship and share information freely. Politicians increasingly use these platforms, as well, to intervene directly bypassing gatekeepers, shaping narratives before newsrooms can respond.

The same immediacy that informs citizens as well as empowers parties and activists also enables malicious actors, facilitates disinformation, manipulation, superficial engagement, and algorithmic amplification of urgency.

Disinformation, troll farms, and deepfake campaigns distort democratic processess. AI lowers the cost of persuastion attacks with synthetic personal and cloned voices, eroding trust and influencing voters. States and non-state actors exploit platforms for surveillance, censorship, and cross-border influence. Omce seen a tool of liberation, social media are increasingly weaponized to counter civilian interventions or manipulate foreign public opinion.

The debate around slacktivism complicates digital participation. Critics argue that it represents a spectrum of both legitimate forms of social and political action, and the form of “clicktivism”.^[2] Either way, users navigate blurred boundaries between politically and non-politically driven context. Platforms are not neutral intermediaries as algorithms promote emotional material, shadow-ban profiles, and govern visibility, shapimg political life, not just reflecting it. Nonetheless, when we consider social media as a tool of political intervention, we should clarify that it is neither liberating, nor manipulative, but its effects is conditional, unstable, and often paradoxical. Its effectiveness depends on the political context (democratic or authoritarian), the actors involved (states, activists, corporations, or foreign entities), and the regulatory frameworks (or their absence).

In this context, social media platforms regulate reach while prioritize engagement over accuracy, and blur lines among journalism, propaganda, and advertising. Thus, they now function not only as communication tools, but also as substitutes for new media, filters of political discourse, and infrastructures of propaganda. If information is the driving force of politics, social media has become the arena where its flows are contested. Election manipulation, astroturfing, memes, curated content, and cyber operations exemplify how actors weaponize attention.

Political cycles now move at the pace of trending topics rather than parliamentary and legislative calendars, and trust migrates for parties and parliaments towards personalities and influencers making distinction between journalism and propaganda, fact and opinion, engagement and manipulation difficult.

The current state of online politics is shaped by business models, that prioritize engagement, while externalizing risks such as election interference and disinformation into society creating information imbalances. The EU’s DSA compels platforms to open up their data to vetted researchers, conduct systematic risk assessments, and be held accountable for harmful content.^[3] Moreover, the rise of general-purpose AI (text, image, video, voice) is turning every political actor into a media production and psychological operations studio. The EU AI Act sets global duties for high-risk and general-purpose AI systems, requiring transparency, incident reporting, security safeguards, and copyright diligence.^[4] At the global level, UN Global Digital Compact seeks to establish norms for digital cooperation and elevate platform governance, AI, and information integrity to a global, multilateral agenda.^[5] Complementary approaches strengthen resilience. Germany’s NetzDG enforces accountability on hate speech and illegal content; Finland has integrated media and information literacy curriculum; and Taiwan’s civic tech initiatives foster participatory governance and real-time fact-checking.^[6] Industry-led initiatives like the Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity, commissioned by Adobe, Microsoft, BBC News, Intel, and other companies, provides a transparent, cryptographically secure framework to establish content provenance, aiming to combat the spread of misinformation and manipulated content.^[7]

Therefore, social media can either enhance democratic participation or worsen societal problems. Its role is a reflection of the strength of the institutions and rules that govern it.

In the years ahead, platforms will function as both a battleground and governance tools, accelerating political cycles, reshaping citizen-state relations, and enabling hybrid forms of influence.

The presence and centrality of social media have radically altered how citizens consume information, engage with politics, and even conceptualize democracy itself. The central challenge for democracies is to reconcile their potential with their corrosive effects. Societies should develop the institutional resilience, regulatory frameworks, and civic cultural needs to channel its strength toward a democratic end. Unless regulated, platforms risk destabilizing – mainly democratic – political systems through algorithm-driven urgency and disinformation, and erosion of institutional trust.

In this environment, it is advisable for governmental bodies and international organizations to foster cooperation, embed accountability standards, and support transparency initiatives that balance security, democratic participation, and the integrity of political discourse. It is equally important for public institutions to develop adaptive and resilient frameworks that safeguard democratic integrity while preserving digital freedoms. Transparency requirements could serve as a cornerstone, with platforms disclosing algorithmic criteria, moderation practices, and political advertising sources. Given that social media companies often operate trans-nationally, regulatory cooperation at the international level appears crucial to prevent exploitation of disparities and inefficiencies, as well as companies’ utilization of lenient jurisdictions. At the domestic level, investment in digital literacy education to equip citizens with skills to critically assess content, and distinguishbetween propaganda, disinformation, and legitimate activism. Mechanisms to address foreign interference, through coordinated cybersecurity measures, joint attribution of attacks, and sanctions where necessary, could further protect electoral integrity. Moreover, it is advisable for democratic systems to avoid internal weaponization of these tools, and to ensure that oversight does not translate into censorship, but is grounded in regulatory framework. Incorporating civil society and independent organizations into governance can foster pluralistic oversight that prevents both state and corporate monopolization of information flows. The goal is not to suppress social media’s disruptive potential, but to channel it into a democratic infrastructure that strengthens trust, fosters deliberation, and protects citizens and institutions from manipulation without undermining their freedoms.

REFERENCES

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2. Chantal Piat, “Slacktivism: Not Simply a Means to an End, but a Legitimate Form of Civic Participation”, Canadian Journal of Family and Youth / Le Journal Canadien de Famille et de la Jeunesse, January 2019, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/334181736_Slacktivism_Not_Simply_a_Means_to_an_End_but_a_Legitimate_Form_of_Civic_Participation. ↑
3. European Commission, “The Digital Services Act”, n.d., https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/europe-fit-digital-age/digital-services-act_en. ↑
4. Foo Yun Chee, “AI models with systemic risks given pointers on how to comply with EU AI rules”, 19 July, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/boards-policy-regulation/ai-models-with-systemic-risks-given-pointers-how-comply-with-eu-ai-rules-2025-07-18/. European Commisssion, “AI Act”, n.d., https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/regulatory-framework-ai. ↑
5. United Nations, “Global Digital Compact”, n.d., https://www.un.org/global-digital-compact/en. ↑
6. The OECD DIS/MIS Research Hub, “Media Literacy Education System”, 20 February, 2023,https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/mis-and-disinformation_b00de6dc-en/media-literacy-education-system_d067f517-en.html. Huizhong Wu, “In Taiwan, Battling Fake News One Conversation at a Time — With a Focus on Seniors”, The Diplomat, 01 April, 2024, https://thediplomat.com/2024/04/in-taiwan-battling-fake-news-one-conversation-at-a-time-with-a-focus-on-seniors/. Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz – NetzDG, Network Enforcement Act: Regulatory Fining Guidelines, 22 March, 2018, https://www.bundesjustizamt.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/NetzDG/Leitlinien_Geldbussen_en.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3. ↑
7. Grant Hatchimonji, “What is the Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity (C2PA)?”, TechTarget, 14 January, 2025, https://www.techtarget.com/whatis/definition/Coalition-for-Content-Provenance-and-Authenticity-C2PA. Content Credentials, https://contentcredentials.org/. ↑