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Cyprus, Türkiye and the Failure of Strategic Appeasement

Cyprus remains divided by foreign military occupation. Fifty-two years later, sovereignty, international law and European principles demand reunification, accountability and an end to the occupation.

Cyprus remains partially occupied. An occupation is an occupation. This day for the last 52 years, Cyprus does not simply commemorate the events of 1974. It continues to live with their direct political, legal, demographic and humanitarian consequences. 52 years after the Turkish invasion, a sovereign European Union member state remains divided by foreign military force. Approximately 200,000 Cypriots were displaced from their homes, thousands were killed or wounded, and the fate of many missing persons remains unresolved.

This is not merely a historical disagreement between two communities. It is an unresolved international issue involving invasion, occupation, forced displacement, property rights, demographic alteration and the violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus.

There is only one Republic of Cyprus. It is the sole internationally recognised state on the island, a member of the United Nations and, since 2004, a full member of the European Union. Its constitutional and international legal personality did not disappear because Türkiye occupied part of its territory or because an unrecognised entity was subsequently proclaimed in the occupied areas.

The United Nations Security Council settled this fundamental legal question decades ago. Resolution 541 of 1983 considered the attempted secession in the occupied areas legally invalid and called upon states not to recognise any Cypriot state other than the Republic of Cyprus. Resolution 550 of 1984 reiterated that position, condemned further secessionist actions and treated attempts to settle Varosha by persons other than its lawful inhabitants as inadmissible.

These resolutions have not expired. They have not been replaced by Ankara’s preference for two states. They remain part of the binding international framework under which the Cyprus problem must be addressed.

Türkiye’s policy is no longer defensive

For many years, some western governments attempted to present Türkiye’s Cyprus policy as a legacy security position arising from the circumstances of 1974. That interpretation is increasingly impossible to sustain. And some western ones play political games and this period on the level of industry and defense. Not viable nor correct to continue to sustain. And I wonder, where is the solidarity of the Europeans? Do we hold double standards on cases?

Ankara is no longer simply defending the status quo. It is actively seeking to consolidate partition, deepen the political and economic dependence of the occupied territories, and obtain international acceptance of a two-state outcome that directly contradicts United Nations parameters.

Türkiye has repeatedly supported the international recognition of the self-declared entity in the occupied areas. It has backed unilateral actions in Varosha and has promoted a settlement based on two sovereign states rather than a bicommunal, bizonal federation with one sovereignty, one international legal personality and one citizenship.

“The European Parliament has condemned Türkiye’s illegal activities in Varosha, called for the withdrawal of Turkish troops, demanded that the area be transferred to its lawful inhabitants under United Nations administration, and urged Ankara to abandon actions that entrench permanent partition. It has also opposed recognition of any state on the island other than the Republic of Cyprus.“

In June 2026, the European Parliament stated again that Türkiye continued to violate the sovereign rights of European Union member states, including Cyprus and Greece. In July 2026, Parliament adopted a further resolution addressing the consequences of the 1974 invasion for Cypriot women and girls, including crimes attributed to Turkish forces, and called for accountability and meaningful support for survivors.

The conclusions are therefore clear. The problem is not a lack of legal findings or European declarations. It is the persistent absence of political enforcement.

Europe cannot defend legality selectively

The European Union increasingly describes itself as a geopolitical union founded on rules, sovereignty, democratic values and territorial integrity. Yet the continuing occupation of part of Cyprus exposes a deep contradiction between European language and European policy.

“The Union has imposed extensive costs on other states for breaches of sovereignty and territorial integrity.”

In the case of Türkiye, however, repeated violations are frequently separated from the broader relationship. Migration management, trade, NATO considerations and regional security are used to postpone consequences.

This approach has not moderated Ankara. It has taught the Turkish leadership that pressure works and that European objections can be managed through negotiation, delay and geopolitical bargaining.

Türkiye remains a NATO member and an important regional power. This reality cannot be ignored. But importance is not immunity. Membership in NATO does not legitimise the occupation of an allied European state’s territory, unilateral actions against Greece and Cyprus, or policies that undermine the regional order.

Europe must stop politically “petting” Türkiye whenever Ankara presents itself as indispensable. Strategic engagement is necessary; appeasement is not. A relationship without conditions rewards escalation and weakens European credibility.

A pattern toward Christian communities

It is necessary to be precise. To note that it would be inaccurate and diplomatically irresponsible to claim that every Turkish citizen or every Turkish institution is anti-Christian. Türkiye contains historic Christian communities, and many Turkish citizens defend pluralism and religious coexistence.

The concern however, is the documented pattern of governmental restrictions, political symbolism and administrative actions affecting Christian institutions and clergy.

The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom has reported systematic and ongoing religious-freedom violations in Türkiye and has recommended that the country be placed on the State Department’s Special Watch List. Its findings include restrictions on the legal status of religious minorities and obstacles to establishing or maintaining places of worship.

The commission also documented a multi-year campaign involving immigration restrictions, residence cancellations, entry bans and deportations affecting at least 100 long-term resident or expatriate Protestant Christians. Christian clergy and their families were reportedly assigned restrictive security codes and, in some cases, treated as national-security risks despite long periods of lawful residence.

The continuing closure of the Halki Seminary remains another major symbol. The institution, essential to the training of Orthodox clergy and the future of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, has remained unable to function as a theological school for decades.

The conversion of Hagia Sophia and the Chora museum into mosques also carried political meaning far beyond domestic religious administration. These monuments represent layers of Christian, Byzantine, Ottoman and global heritage. Transforming their status was widely interpreted as part of a nationalist and religiously majoritarian political agenda.

In occupied Cyprus, religious and cultural heritage has also suffered. Churches, monasteries, cemeteries and Christian sites have experienced damage, looting, neglect, conversion or restricted access. Such actions form part of the wider consequences of occupation and demographic transformation.

The evidence therefore supports a serious charge: the current Turkish political system has increasingly privileged majoritarian religious nationalism while weakening the practical security and institutional continuity of some Christian communities.

Antisemitic rhetoric and support for Hamas

Criticism of Israeli government policy is not increasingly antisemitic. States and citizens are entitled to criticize military operations, settlement policy or any alleged violation of international humanitarian law but not to make extreme and antisemitic references.

A different line is crossed when political rhetoric demonises Jewish identity, excuses terrorism, denies Israel’s right to security, or provides legitimacy and political support to an organisation responsible for the deliberate murder and abduction of civilians.

Following the Hamas attacks of 7 October 2023, Türkiye did not align itself with its NATO allies in unequivocally condemning Hamas. And still does not. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan publicly described Hamas not as a terrorist organisation but as a liberation movement. Ankara has maintained political relations with Hamas representatives and has presented itself as their diplomatic interlocutor.

European Parliament material prepared in 2026 noted that Türkiye had not condemned the 7 October attack and continued to support Hamas. European parliamentary research also observed that Türkiye’s response to the Hamas terrorist attack damaged the tentative improvement in EU-Türkiye relations.

This is not a minor diplomatic disagreement. Hamas carried out mass killings, hostage-taking and deliberate attacks against civilians. A NATO government cannot credibly present itself as a stabilising force while politically legitimising such an organisation.

Furthermore, President Erdoğan’s rhetoric toward Israel has repeatedly gone beyond criticism of a government. Comparisons invoking Nazi Germany, sweeping accusations against Israel and language portraying the conflict in civilisational or religious terms risk encouraging hostility not only toward the Israeli state but toward Jewish people more broadly.

Türkiye’s Jewish community is historic and must be protected. The state has, at times, provided police security to synagogues and Jewish services. That fact should be acknowledged. Yet governmental protection at the physical level does not erase the damaging impact of inflammatory political rhetoric from the highest office.

The appropriate conclusion is not that Türkiye as a society is inherently antisemitic. It is that elements of the state’s political discourse and its relationship with Hamas have contributed to an environment in which antisemitic narratives can gain legitimacy.

Undermining the emerging Middle Eastern order

Türkiye’s policies must also be assessed within the wider Middle East.

Over recent years, several states have attempted to develop a more connected regional architecture based on energy, trade, maritime security, infrastructure, defence cooperation and pragmatic diplomacy. Relations among Greece, Cyprus, Israel, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and other partners have expanded within this environment.

Ankara has often viewed such partnerships not as opportunities for inclusion, but as hostile alignments designed against Türkiye. This interpretation has encouraged coercive diplomacy, maritime disputes, military interventions and aggressive rhetoric.

Türkiye has objected to cooperation among Cyprus, Greece and Israel; challenged energy and maritime arrangements in the Eastern Mediterranean; intervened militarily in Syria and Libya; supported Hamas politically; and maintained an ambiguous relationship with Iran, Russia and Western institutions.

In this sense, Türkiye is not literally attempting to “kill the Middle East.” It is, obstructing the development of a more stable regional order whenever that order does not place Ankara at its centre. No matter what is projected at this instance.

The Cyprus illegal invasion and occupation lies at the heart of this behaviour. Cyprus represents a test of whether Türkiye accepts sovereign equality and international law, or whether it believes regional status should be determined through military power and coercion.

A firm but diplomatic response

The objective should not be permanent confrontation with Türkiye. Türkiye is a major state, a NATO ally and an unavoidable regional actor. Its citizens are not the enemy, and dialogue remains necessary.

But dialogue without consequences has failed.

The European Union must connect progress in EU-Türkiye relations to measurable conduct: recognition of the Republic of Cyprus, compliance with United Nations resolutions, reversal of illegal actions in Varosha, cooperation on missing persons and property rights, respect for religious freedom, and abandonment of the two-state agenda.

European funding, customs-union modernisation, political engagement and defence cooperation should not proceed as though occupation and violations are unrelated matters.

“Cyprus also must act more strategically. It should deepen in practice and on a tight timeline alliances with Greece, Israel, Egypt, France, the United States, India and the Gulf states; expand defence and intelligence cooperation; protect maritime infrastructure; document violations systematically; and internationalise the humanitarian, legal and religious dimensions of the occupation.“

The message should be direct but diplomatic: Cyprus reunification, not domination. But peace cannot be built upon permanent military occupation, and diplomacy cannot require the victim to accept the results of force. And arguments such as “we interfered or invited” by the Turkish side should be immediately dismissed.

“There is one Republic of Cyprus.“

Its sovereignty is not negotiable. Its European identity is not provisional. Its occupied territory is not another state.

Europe must decide whether its principles apply everywhere—or only where enforcement is politically convenient.

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