INTRODUCTION
During World War II, German command operated under a critical assumption: the Enigma cipher remained secure. Decisions, movements, and strategies unfolded under that belief. The cipher had in fact been broken, yet the perception of secrecy endured.
Information dominated the battlefield. Perception decided the outcome.
At the time, perception largely rested in human judgment.
Today the landscape looks different. Modern warfare unfolds through technological systems that increasingly stand between events and the people interpreting them. Sensors observe. Algorithms process. Satellites position. Networks transmit. Before information reaches a human decision-maker, it has often already passed through multiple machines.
Perception, in other words, may no longer belong entirely to the human observer.
How much, then, has warfare actually changed over time?
MAIN ANALYSIS
It would be interesting to analyze real examples of the latest technological–perceptual attacks observed repeatedly in recent wars between Ukraine, Israel–Hamas, and the broader Middle East, including the most recent Iran–USA–Israel escalation in 2026, in order to identify the patterns that emerge from them.
- The “aircraft perceived as the enemy” pattern with a twist: In the current Iran escalation, three U.S. F-15E jets were mistakenly shot down by Kuwaiti air defenses. Sensor confusion was enough for a friend to become an enemy during a high-traffic air war environment. An investigation has been publicly admitted, as there are concerns about possible electronic interference contributing to the sensor confusion. Therefore, a classic example of perception failure inside kinetic war.
- Weakest chain OSINT harvesting: A network of fake social-media accounts attempted, with success, to lure Israeli soldiers into unknowingly revealing units, timing, and locations through manipulated social interaction. One catfish profile on social media and the creativity of a hacker was enough to compromise phones and potentially compromise operations without complexity, high cost, lengthy preparation, or extensive resources. Human attention and trust shortcuts become a reconnaissance channel.
- The blind spot of overloading attack scenarios: When security experts draft risk scenarios, they usually overlook cases in which both the primary system and the backup system are overwhelmed at the same time. I have seen this gap even in high-security environments with millions invested in multi-level protection resources. Israel’s Iron Dome air defense system was designed to intercept short-range rockets; however, it was not built to sustain extremely large rocket salvos within very short time windows. The interception capacity rose to its limit, and some rockets got through. It is well known that multi-axis attacks can overload the defense “decision queue.” Simple math: time, inventory, and prioritization logic.
- Your eyes lie parade: If you think perception is only mistaken by people involved in cyber warfare or defense systems, this is not the case. Hacking media channels to inject reality-bending narratives is a growing trend. In March 2022, a deepfake video of President Zelenskyy telling Ukrainians to surrender circulated and was linked to hijacked media distribution channels. AI makes “I saw it on TV” unreliable faster than institutions can respond.
- The precision war: GPS use is so common today for navigation. So common even in war operations. In several recent conflicts, GPS and other satellite navigation systems have experienced widespread interference, affecting military platforms and civilian aviation and maritime traffic. The pattern is clear: navigation itself has become contested space. In modern conflicts, adversaries do not necessarily need to hack satellites to disrupt precision. Instead, they interfere with navigation signals at the local level by creating distortion, confusion, or false positioning data. The objective is not always to destroy an incoming system. It is often to degrade accuracy, redirect trajectories, or cause misalignment with intended targets. This represents a shift in warfare logic. You no longer need to penetrate a defense ministry’s servers. You can manipulate the signal environment around a battlefield. When positioning data becomes unreliable, precision becomes probabilistic. And when precision becomes uncertain, decision-making slows, hesitates, or fails.
- Breaking the nervous system, not the muscles: Information and communication are essential in wars, not only for military coordination but also for public trust. A destructive cyberattack (the Viasat KA-SAT attack) disabled satellite modems around the opening of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, causing wide communications outages with spillover beyond Ukraine.
- Make the map lie: During the recent escalation around the Strait of Hormuz, more than a thousand vessels reported GPS disruption. Ships appeared inland on tracking systems. Others “jumped” coordinates. Aircraft reported unstable positioning. Even though they didn’t move, their signal created ghost positions which are false digital locations caused by interference with satellite navigation signals destabilizing physical and cognitive coordinates without hacking satellites or penetrating systems. When the map lies, trust becomes the first casualty.
LESSONS TO BE LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS
If we observe closely the examples provided above, several recurring patterns start to emerge. Perception warfare increasingly operates through four principal avenues:
- the manipulation of machine perception, where sensors and technological systems interpret reality incorrectly (e.g., sensor misperception, distortion of navigation signals, or “ghost” positioning phenomena)
- cognitive and social engineering schemes targeting human perception, where trust, curiosity, or routine interaction become channels for intelligence gathering or operational compromise
- the saturation of defensive systems, overwhelming decision queues and response capacity through coordinated, high-volume attacks
- the manipulation of narratives and media channels, where deepfakes, hacked broadcasts, and distorted messaging create uncertainty about what is real
“These four patterns suggest the emergence of what could be described as a perception layer of warfare.
Beyond the physical battlefield and the cyber domain, modern conflicts increasingly unfold within a layer where reality itself becomes contested.
Modern war is not only fought to destroy capabilities. Instead, it is fought to destroy certainty.
“Perception attacks are the power tool to collapse trust and steer behavior. Human beliefs are the penetration target, and we are all in a cognitive war.”
“Modern conflict depends on the ability to shape what others believe to be true.”
“Understanding perception attacks must now be part of strategic risk frameworks and defense planning;”
beyond traditional cyber or kinetic doctrines.
What that means practically is:
- Risk assessments must include perception-layer scenarios and countermeasures
- Electronic Warfare and information operations must be integrated into doctrine
- Critical infrastructure defense must include navigation resilience
- Security foresight scenarios must anticipate how perception will be systematically weaponized in future conflicts
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Traveling back in time, we return to the war between Greece and Troy.
For ten years, no decisive progress was made. Then Odysseus chose not force, but perception. The wooden horse was not a weapon of destruction. It was a weapon of belief. It carried the illusion that the Greeks had retreated.
Troy did not fall to strength. It fell to certainty misplaced.
“Modern warfare increasingly seeks to manufacture that misplaced certainty.”
Perception has always been a power tool in warfare.
What is different today is scale and speed.
“Technology has amplified perception into an operational domain.”
Signals can be distorted. Maps can lie. Broadcasts can deceive. Decisions can be manipulated in seconds.
So how much has warfare actually changed over time?
At first glance, warfare today may look radically different. New technologies have expanded the battlefield far beyond traditional confrontation. A single click can now unleash destruction that once required hundreds of thousands of soldiers. If we look closer, however, the underlying logic of conflict does not appear entirely new. On the contrary. War has never been only about force. Results and resourcefulness have often proven more decisive over time. It has also been about shaping perception, confidence, and the decisions that follow.
REFERENCES
[1] Three US fighter jets accidentally shot down by Kuwaiti air defenses, military says:
Haley Britzky & Helen Regan & Eyad Kourdi & Isaac Yee & Teele Rebane & Lucas Lilieholm, CNN, March 2, 2026, Three US fighter jets accidentally shot down by Kuwaiti air defenses, military says | CNN.
[2] Deepfake of President Zelenskyy in the Ukraine War:
Matthew Holroyd and Fola Olorunselu, “Deepfake Zelenskyy Surrender Video Is the ‘First Intentionally Used’ in Ukraine War,” Euronews, March 16, 2022, Deepfake Zelenskyy surrender video is the ‘first intentionally used’ in Ukraine war | Euronews
[3] AI and deepfake technology in information warfare:
Hitoshi Nasu, “Deepfake Technology in the Age of Information Warfare,” Lieber Studies in Information Warfare, March 1, 2022, https://lieber.westpoint.edu/deepfake-technology-age-information-warfare.
[4] Social media and conflict communication research:
Emily Chen and Emilio Ferrara, “Tweets in Time of Conflict: A Public Dataset Tracking the Twitter Discourse on the War Between Ukraine and Russia,” arXiv (March 14, 2022), [2203.07488] Tweets in Time of Conflict: A Public Dataset Tracking the Twitter Discourse on the War Between Ukraine and Russia; Zaur Gouliev, “Propaganda and Information Dissemination in the Russo-Ukrainian War: Natural Language Processing …,” arXiv (June 2, 2025), [2506.01807] Propaganda and Information Dissemination in the Russo-Ukrainian War: Natural Language Processing of Russian and Western Twitter Narratives; Yelena Mejova et al., “Narratives of War: Ukrainian Memetic Warfare on Twitter,” arXiv (September 15, 2023), [2309.08363] Narratives of War: Ukrainian Memetic Warfare on Twitter.