The author of this article is Dr. Cyril Widdershoven
Russia’s oil and gas exports are again in the crosshairs of Western governments. After the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the USA, UK, and the EU have implemented a long list of energy sector-related sanctions on the Putin regime, trying to hit the Russian economy, which is mainly dependent on the export revenues of oil and gas, but also to dwindle the financial reserves available for the military onslaught on Kyiv. Without any doubt, the results have been relatively meager until now, as Moscow has been able to thwart some of the financial repercussions by bypassing international sanctions and setting up new markets in Asia and the Middle East.
At the same time, Russia has still been allowed to export natural gas to the European Union, mainly Hungary, Austria, and Slovakia.
Meanwhile, NATO members Turkey and Greece are actively involved in providing cover for Ship-to-Ship transfers of Russia’s Black Fleet. The European Union also still has a lot of butter on its head, as Russian natural gas and LNG exports are still heading to major European countries, such as Germany, Netherlands, and others, supporting the overall war economy of Moscow with billions of dollars.
At the same time, international action against Russia’s Black Fleet, which is crude oil and petroleum product carriers sailing under international flags or owned by Russian companies, not insured by Western insurers such as Lloyds, has been relatively minimal. In the last few years, Moscow has earned billions of dollars by using these vessels to supply crude oil, petroleum products, and natural gas/LNG to Asian and other customers. Most of them are sailing openly through either international waters inside the European Union (Baltic Sea, Mediterranean, North Sea) or are supplied and assisted in European and Asian waters.
After prolonged hesitation and political pressure, all cards are on the table.
Just before he stepped out of office, US President Biden has put in place the most extensive package of sanctions yet to quell Russia’s options to export oil and gas to its clients. With a new package presented by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), sanctions have been put on 183 ships, entailing 155 tankers.
At the same time, the Biden Administration is going after Russia’s energy giants Gazprom Neft and Surgutneftegas, including their respective affiliates and CEOs. OFAC has also put Russian shipping companies, such as Sovcomflot, and a series of dark fleet operators, on the list. To make things worse for Moscow, Russia-based marine insurers Ingosstrakh and Alfastrakhovanie are also targeted, removing a very big portion of the existing insurance options of dark fleet operators in one go. Chinese companies, such as Wison, have also been put on the list, and they have delivered modules to the Arctic LNG 2 project.
Even though the options for Moscow have been hit hard now, Russia will still be able to supply part of its clients, especially China and India. OFAC-sanctioned tankers have been transporting around 45% of all Russian crude products in 2024 and 7% of the country’s petroleum products exports. Data from shipbroker Braemar indicate that around 54 tankers on the OFAC list are currently laden, either in Russia or Malaysia. These vessels will need to be replaced very soon but will be hit by higher overall rates, putting pressure on the attractiveness of Russian export volumes. In the coming days or weeks, more additional sanctions are expected to be issued by the UK and EU, further constraining Moscow’s capabilities. On January 10 2025 media reports already have indicated that the UK has put new sanctions on Russia too.
Analysts, however, are still seeing immense room to block additional Russian oil and gas exports via sea. As most dark fleet tankers are relatively old, lacking sufficient insurance, or are in a debilitating state, environmental threats exist in every passageway or sea these vessels are taking. Based on the fact that most vessels are either going via the Baltic Sea, the Kattegat, or North Sea (northern route), or via the Black Sea and Mediterranean, littoral states, which are all Western countries or NATO members, could block the passage of these vessels under environmental law. By stopping and entering them, Russia’s maritime oil and gas exports would be removed almost totally. No international law or right of passage can counter such moves. Until now, European countries have, however, not been willing to take these drastic measures. However, a combination of the existing sanctions and possible environmental legal instruments could be done without delay. A possible blockade of the Baltic or the North Sea has popped up after Russian and Chinese vessels have been spying for Moscow. At the same time, some vessels have actively been engaged in destroying internet and power cables in the Baltic region. Military experts have already been calling for drastic measures, which would be killing more than two flies with one stone. At the same time, non-Russian parties are also being targeted. Based on OFAC reports and media sources, two UAE-based ship management groups, Fornax and Stream, are also hit. Both are linked to supporting Sovcomflot.
The so-called Black Fleet or shadow fleet was put in place by Russia and traders internationally to circumvent the loopholes of the G7 ‘price cap’ system in 2022.
Officially, the ‘price cap’ allows tanker owners worldwide to transport Russian oil, with access to the European insurance market (90% of all P&I cover), as long as the oil is priced below the $60 per barrel target. Since its inception, traders and tanker owners have sailed into foggy waters. To counter all, the US and the UK have been enforcing the system since 2023, including removing insurance. Moscow’s answer was clear; it needed the revenues and also the support of customers (China, India, etc.), resulting in the set-up of a ‘shadow fleet.’ Trading offices and Russian assets acquired the assets, mainly secondhand and flagged with low-enforcement registries. As no direct links are there with G7 countries, they are operating outside of the reach of the G7 price cap. Since 2023, hundreds of vessels in the shadow fleet carry around 80% of Russian oil exports.
To further damage Russia’s oil and gas sector, especially its upstream (production) and downstream (refining), the US has issued a determination “prohibiting the provision of US petroleum services to persons located in the Russian Federation,” which will take effect February 27, 2025. The US Treasury has also issued a general license authorizing certain wind-down transactions related to energy through March 11.
The effects of the new sanctions on Russian government revenue will be steep. The already struggling Russian war economy is still showing impressive growth figures, but the underlying fundamentals show a different and very worrying situation. Since the invasion of Ukraine by Russia, Western analysts have been taken by surprise by the resilience of the Russian economy. After the Russian invasion, financial analysts and economists expected a double-digit contraction, which has never materialized. Russia’s GDP grew by 3.6% in 2023 and an expected 4% in 2024. Putin’s economic record is impressive when only looking at GDP growth, household income, and low unemployment. Moscow also uses these figures to impress its allies in the Middle East, China, and Africa.
Still, when deep diving into the fundamentals of the Russian economy and the industrial-manufacturing capacity of the country, the situation is seen as being “a marathoner on fiscal steroids.” Moscow has been supporting the economy with its vast foreign reserves and the capabilities of its sovereign wealth funds. These steroids are, however, wearing off or are losing their effectiveness. The Special Military Operation (SMO), the Putin term for the Ukraine invasion, is putting immense human and financial pressure on the Russian economy. To keep inflation at bay and a strong ruble, the Kremlin is forced to inject every ruble or dollar earned.
Mainstream support for the Russian economy has come from its hydrocarbon export revenues, which have been hitting record levels. At the same time, Moscow has held on to its market-oriented economic structures and a robust banking system.
Major cracks, however, have appeared in 2024, as government spending went sky-high. Higher government budgets and state-subsidized loan programs have been key in keeping the position of Putin strong while continuing GDP growth. Still, in Q3 2024, GDP growth declined from 4.1% (Q2) to 3.1%. At the same time, defense-related industries also showed lower production growth. Moscow is also facing lower hydrocarbon revenues (lower exports, OPEC quotas, lower prices), while Russia’s food production is down too. The war efforts also hit labor markets, as 73% of industries report shortages. The growth of the defense industrial complex is also partly causing the latter, as higher wages are being offered. Still, unemployment levels are very low (2.3%).
Overall, the income generation of Russian businesses is also down. As already shown by the oil and gas sectors, which are putting Russian energy giants into the red, coal and metals are also down. Sanctions and lower global market prices are hitting Russian resources. Russian resources are currently being stretched, as sanctions and lower global prices have hit budgetary inflows. Sources have also reported that by November 2024, the liquid portion of the National Wealth Fund stood at just $31 billion, its lowest level since its inception in 2008.
For 2025, the situation looks even bleaker. The Russian federal budget is being dominated by military expenditure. Official figures show that defense and security spending will exceed 8% of GDP and account for 40% of total federal outlays. The latter is also the main driver for GDP growth, as the country has doubled its production of armored vehicles and increased ammunition output fivefold at certain facilities. A growing part of the defense and security budget is also for contract soldiers. The Kremlin’s armed forces require around 20-30,000 new soldiers monthly. Russian sources show that direct federal spending on recruits alone is estimated at 1.6-2.4 trillion rubles ($16-23 billion). The latter doesn’t include payments for wounded or dead soldiers. The whole focus on defense spending is reducing Moscow’s non-defense budgetary allocations. To counter this, the Kremlin is increasing taxes, up 73% in 2025, due to higher levies on businesses and households.
In the coming years or even months, the Russian government will need to counter inflation (9%) and interest levels (21%). If no solution is found, the instability of the Russian economy will increase. Increased domestic demand for products, which are increasingly imported, also is putting pressure on the Russian ruble. The new sanctions, especially on the primary revenue source, oil and gas, will put parts of the Russian economy and society under severe pressure in 2025-2026.
News sources, such as the British financial newspaper FT, have reported that Putin has taken control of the country’s banking system in a move to quell overall pressure. The move is made to force Russian banks to provide loans to government-selected companies on preferential terms. As a result, “a flow of loans at below-market rates for selected economic players” has emerged. The British financial paper stated that Russia is engaged in massive money printing through outsourcing, so it does not appear on the state’s balance sheet. If these loans turn sour, which is expected by most, a credit crisis will be hitting Russia. If international sanctions are strictly implemented soon, while Ukraine will get access to confiscated Russian assets in the West, the situation could be very debilitating for the Putin regime.
At present, 35% of the 669 dark fleet tankers shipping Russian, Venezuelan, and Iranian oil are now sanctioned by the US, UK, or EU; however, signs are that more is coming. In the next weeks, a new US president, Donald Trump, will be appointed, changing part of the current environment.
While Donald Trump expects no real decisions to remove sanctions on Russia, another country, Iran, is already preparing for disaster. Trump’s former presidency was entirely of anti-Iranian rhetoric and actions. It can be expected that Trump II will now act very quickly on the Ayatollah regime in Tehran, most probably by targeting the country’s economic Achilles heel, which is the oil and gas sector. Renewed and much stricter sanction regimes on exports, shipping, and financing of Iran’s revenue lifeline is for Trump a high priority. At the same time, putting Russia’s and Iranian oil and gas volumes under severe pressure also will put China in a corner where Trump would like to see Xi.