The author of this article is Dr. Cyril Widdershoven
The unexpected success of Syria’s anti-government militias and extremists currently seen in major regions of Syria, currently concentrating on Aleppo-Hamas-Homs, could have significant geopolitical and energy-related implications in the coming months. With the onslaught of extremist and fundamentalist militias on Syrian government strongholds in Aleppo (2nd largest city) and historically known opposition centers Hama and Homs, it seems that not only is the Assad regime struggling to counter these forces but also currently looking at a fledgling support basis in future. Assad’s prominent supporters, Russia and Iran, are not very proactive, as their capabilities are already overstretched due to the ongoing wars in Lebanon and Ukraine.
The so-called “Lebanon Butterfly effect” is in place, showing that Tehran-Moscow’s Axis of Resistance, formerly seen as a significant asset to project power in the region, is now the Achilles Heel for all parties involved.
Israel’s war in Lebanon has not only removed an essential part of the Iranian-backed Hezbollah militia’s military infrastructure and capabilities but also has broken off a firm power base to be used in Syria. Assad’s power position, which has been under immense pressure over the last few years, was saved by the tremendous direct and indirect military support given by Moscow, Tehran, and Lebanon’s Hezbollah militias. Not only was the Lebanon situation part of the overall strategy, forcing Israel to stay out of a full-scale war with Iran and Hezbollah until October 7, 2023, but it also opened up major logistical options for Russian-Iranian and other parties to supply the Assad regime with all it needed.
Since the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon and its continuing destruction of Hezbollah’s infrastructure and missile capabilities, while removing the fundamentalist leadership, the position of the Lebanese group has been weakened. While fighting the Israeli army and air force in Lebanon, Hezbollah has not been able to take a very active role inside Syria. At the same time, Israel has been pounding Hezbollah-Iranian logistics and arms transport inside of Syria with high accuracy, leaving part of the Shi’a Crescent structures in shambles. While removing Hezbollah threats in Lebanon and Syria, Israel has also been able to actively diminish Iran’s domestic military capabilities, as shown by the IAF attacks on the country’s air defenses and nuclear research facilities. Iran’s hardcore IRGC military structures have also been hit repeatedly inside of Lebanon, Syria, and at home. By fighting Israel’s military, Hezbollah and Iran are currently weakened and even threatened to be removed. For Syria’s Assad regime, the situation has been debilitating, as even Russia is not able to remove the current advance of extremist militias, which also seem to have international support, such as Turkey.
While the world is watching Damascus-Tehran or Beirut, the real casualty at present could be Russia. Moscow’s only stronghold in the Middle East, Syria, is weakened or even looking at a significant power shift. The first signs that Putin’s military is worried about the future are statements by independent observers that Russia’s only East Med naval base, Tartus, is not only threatened if the city of Hama falls but also that several Russian naval vessels have already left the port. Military sources, based on satellite images, have stated that Russia is moving vessels from its naval base in Syria. The latter is much more critical than some media acknowledge. For Moscow, this is the 2nd time in 2024 that Russian naval resources have been moved from a Russian base. In early 2024, Moscow removed a vast part of its Black Sea Fleet from Crimea, Ukraine. The latter was put in place after Ukraine stepped up its attacks on Russian naval resources with success.
The current immense pressure on Russia in Syria, as shown by Tartus, is putting Moscow in a corner. For over 50 years, the Syrian port has been Russia’s main asset not only in the East Mediterranean, threatening directly possible NATO moves in the Middle East and Southern Europe, but also as a central logistical hub towards North Africa and the African continent. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Tartus has become Moscow’s main non-Russian asset. The port is now the base for two Russian Gorskhov class frigates, one Grigorovich class frigate, two auxiliaries, and an Improved-Kilo class submarine. Based on satellite information, Moscow has removed most of them in the last few days.
Until now, even when looking at the Ukraine war, Russian naval assets have been able to move freely in international waters. Based on the Montreux Convention, however, which is enforced by Turkey, the latter prevents Russian warships from passing through the Turkish straits. If the Syrian port of Tartus falls into the hands of the extremist militias, Moscow is expected to redeploy the vessels to its bases in northwestern Russia and Kaliningrad. Both bases are, however, in the Baltic Sea, a central maritime area surrounded by NATO countries.
A possible move by the Russian navy to leave Tartus is not only a real blow to Moscow’s overall geopolitical power projections but also could be a sign that Putin is not willing or able to send in reinforcements to back Assad.
If this is reality, the future of the Assad regime is in peril. How far the anti-Assad militias will be able to take over Syria is, however, still unclear. Looking at possible support from GCC countries (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar) or even Egypt, Assad could play the anti-fundamentalist or extremist card. It is also unclear how far Israel will be willing to have an IS-extremist regime on its borders at present. The cards being dealt in Syria are all very weak, possibly leading to a re-emergence of the civil war without real power players controlling the narrative.
The position of Russia in the whole problem is, however, of more importance. Since the start of the Syrian civil war, Putin has been backing Assad, not only by reinforcing the regime but also by being an active part in countering the insurgency, as shown by the bombardments of Aleppo in 2016. Even in the last few days, the Russian Air Force has been targeting Islamic militias again. The overall support has been very weak or cautious. Some military analysts have already stated that, at present, Russia’s air power is too occupied in Ukraine. If Moscow sent in additional air force units to Syria, it would have a significant negative impact on ongoing engagements in Ukraine. The Ukraine war has weakened Russia’s capabilities to support its allies outside of the European arena, while the Lebanon war has removed logistics options for others.
Without being able to take a peak in the minds of the Putin elite, some could, however, still want to regain Syria as a Russian asset. Without taking potential military resources from the Ukraine theatre, Russia still holds a significant investment: its so-called Africa Corps. Looking at the possible loss of its Tartus port access and several other military bases and airfields, Moscow could direct some of the Africa Corps units to Syria.
The need to remove the threat to a significant lifeline for Moscow’s East Med/MENA and even Africa strategy is clear, as a loss of Syria will not only weaken possible interests in Africa (as a whole) but also show an unexpected weakness for its potential Arab allies and Iran.
The need in the Moscow-elite and military’s minds to have the capability to project power outside of the Russian arena (former USSR) is leading. The loss of Syria is cutting the strings held in Africa for sure. Logistically and militarily, Syria plays a significant role in this. Even though Moscow is looking at Algeria, Libya, or Sudan as a potential naval base, Syria takes precedence. Moscow’s Syria policies are also crucial for its ongoing military-economic alliance with Iran. Losing Syria means to the Mullah regime of Khamenei and its IRGC cohorts a potentially lethal blow to its Shi’a Crescent strategy, forcing it to reassess its support for Moscow’s military moves in Ukraine and elsewhere.
On December 3, Ukraine‘s Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) already claimed that Russia may redeploy Africa Corps units to Syria. These reinforcements could be heading to Russia’s two primary military bases, Hmeimim Air Base near Latakia and Tartus. These moves would not be surprising as Moscow also redeployed the Africa Corps unit to quell Ukraine’s incursion into Russia’s Kursk Oblast in August 2024. If, however, this takes place, it would diminish the overall Russian force’s deployment in Africa, such as Burkina Faso, Libya, or Mali.
As stated before in an article published on Oilprice.Com (https://oilprice.com/Geopolitics/Africa/Libya-a-New-Instrument-in-Moscows-European-Strategy.html), the North African oil and gas producer is seen as a Russian hub for Africa Corps personnel and heavy equipment. In March 2024, Russia deployed around 800 troops to the Libyan theatre, bringing Russian forces to around 3500 units. The Polish Institute of International Affairs reported that Russia had roughly 1,800 troops across Libya as of May 2024. Still, the end of the access to Tartus would also push Russian logistics to the limit. Removing part of the Russian troops in Africa would put Russia’s hold on Mali, Burkina Faso, or Niger at risk.
At the same time, a change to the East Med assets for Russia will also push Moscow’s capabilities to have a direct say (or threat) to the Mediterranean, NATO’s soft Southern Belly, or major waterways (Gibraltar, Suez Canal, and Horn of Africa) at risk. Keep in mind that Russia has been extensively building up its Tartus assets since the invasion of Ukraine. The first moves were even made before the invasion of Ukraine; the Africa or Syria theaters blindsided analysts, but now understand that Moscow was preparing with doomsday scenarios in the Black Sea already.
Another theater to watch is the lifelong dream of Russian strategists to have direct access to a naval base in the Red Sea. The latter has been pursued via discussions with Egypt (unsuccessful), Sudan (still open for progress), and Horn of Africa countries. Even though a Red Sea base is pursued officially by Moscow to have a resupply and stopover base, all littoral parties and NATO understand the possible real target, the Russian navy projecting power in the Red Sea (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Sudan, Egypt, China).
In another reaction to the Syria-Russia Tartus dilemma, former US Army Europe commander Mark Hetling indicated that a loss in Syria would also put military threats in place to other Russian naval assets, such as the Black Sea and the Baltic.
Hetling reiterated that Russia faces major geopolitical power problems without naval power projection capacity. Tartus is Russia’s Mediterranean power projection base, while the Black Sea and Baltic target European threats.
As Hetling stated, “Putin is truly cornered”. In the coming weeks, Syria will be a significant priority for Moscow’s strategic and military policymakers. Without taking pressure off Ukraine, Russia is forced to start fighting a multi-layered war. If not, the focus on Kyiv could be more costly than it already is. In the long run, the Syrian theatre will weaken Russia and Iran and could lead to some discussions inside the Chinese leadership. The position of the Russian strongman Putin is already showing some strains, but a Syrian debacle could wake up some significant concerns about the future of Dragon-Bear cooperation. Why should Beijing be worried or enticed to cooperate without Russia’s power base in Africa? Without having Russian naval forces pose threats to NATO and the EU, why is Moscow still an asset?
Without any Russian reaction to the Syrian developments, in whichever way they unfold, Moscow’s position in the world is under pressure. Not only is Syria logistically of immense importance to Russia’s geopolitical and economic ambitions, but a weakening of Assad and lack of Russian involvement in countermeasures will remove the guarantor status Russia until now has had inside of the Middle East, North Africa, and with dictatorial regimes such as Iran, North Korea or Venezuela. A dictator/strongman only survives if he seems to be invincible. When, however, power erodes due to external and internal developments, opposition to the same power will increase exponentially. The fact that extremists and fundamentalist militias have seen the unfolding power vacuum or weaknesses is already a sign of decay. Until now, it is not clear if these anti-Assad forces are being instructed or supported by 3rd parties, such as Turkey and others, but all are gaining from the current onslaught. Contrary to statements by pro-Assad forces, Israel is not happy at all. Until now, Israel has kept out of the anti-Assad struggle, as a stable Assad regime, even supported by Russia, is much more an advantage than an Islamic extremist regime. The Golan Heights have never been as quiet as the last years. A removal of Assad would also bring in Israel with a new front to deal with.
NATO military analysts have already reiterated that if Russia loses Tartus, the significance of Russian naval power in the Mediterranean is very low. The only other option, as stated before, is to increase its role in Libya while expanding its maritime presence in the General Haftar LNA forces region of East Libya. Since the last few years, the Russian navy presence in Libya has increased, as Moscow already decided to spread its risks. Russian naval visits to ports in Cyrenaica, particularly Tobruk, have increased. Tobruk is a central logistics hub for Russian military and Africa Corps members, either for Libyan operations or Africa. East Libya could also be a significant focus area for Russia’s Air Force.
NATO should take a very cautious but prudent course here. A build-up of Russian naval and air force in Libya is not only a destabilizing factor in the country itself but also puts Russian military assets much closer to NATO. From Libya, the distance to Europe is extremely close and threatens the waters between North Africa and Italy, the main option for NW-European maritime trade and navies to sail to the East Med (and China).
The next weeks will be crucial for all involved. With Russia having to make hard and long-term choices, Moscow’s navigation options are becoming meager. It will take a change of heart in the upcoming Trump Administration, but having Russian power projections under pressure should be a major opportunity to monetize. Western interests are currently at risk, but Syria could be an asset in any discussion on Ukraine. Even Moscow’s war economy cannot support fighting a multi-prong war on several continents. The additional focus should be on Africa; Russia losing power could be, in the long run, to the advantage of Western economies, too.