PUBL0153 Blog

Storm on the Horizon? Security Challenges and the Future of East Asia’s ‘Long Peace’

East Asia features several highly combustible flashpoints, ranging from the Taiwan Strait to the South China Sea to the Korean peninsula, that inject a high degree of volatility and strategic risk into the regional security environment. Each flashpoint is invariably contributing to an uptick in the region’s geopolitical alpha. How these risk factors will be handled in the foreseeable future––whether on a stand-alone or collective basis––will determine whether or not Asia’s post-WWII ‘Long Peace’ might have reached its peak in the 21st century.

At a time of rising geopolitical tensions, it was as surprising as it was concerning that foreign policy did not receive the level of attention one might have expected in a U.S. presidential election [1]. This relative lack of scrutiny stands in sharp contrast to the consequential geopolitical shifts that are shaping the 21st century international system. The often-quoted and loosely translated Chinese expression, “May you live in interesting times” (宁为太平犬,不做乱世人)––originating from Stories to Awaken the World (1627) by Feng Menglong––aptly captures the state of affairs of contemporary geopolitics that are rapidly being redefined by a shift away from great-power collaboration and cooperation and toward intensified competition and rivalry [2].

Speaking at the opening ceremony of the 16th BRICS summit, held in Kazan, Russia, from 22-24 October, Vladimir Putin touted “the dynamic growth of BRICS and the strengthening of its authority and influence in global affairs” [3] The new and potentially disruptive geopolitical forces, security challenges, and strategic realignments associated with this emerging multipolar world order, which Putin views as a “dynamic and irreversible process”, will influence the prospects for peace and stability in consequential ways. Key developments include the apparent deepening of the Sino-Russian ‘no-limits’ partnership, the rise of what some have labeled a new ‘axis of evil’, an ‘axis of upheaval’ and a ‘quartet of chaos’ (China-Russia-North Korea-Iran), and the unsettling possibility of the BRICS+ group attempting a concerted de-dollarization challenge. The latter has gained new traction with a recent proposal to create a BRICS Cross-Border Payment Initiative (BCBPI) and launch an alternative to the SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication) system.

Against the backdrop of a geopolitical new normal that combines Xi Jinping’s promotion of assertive nationalism and aggressive pursuit of core interests, and Vladimir Putin’s relentless revanchist (if not imperial) ambitions and ongoing assault on the concept of national sovereignty, the future of the rules-based international order appears increasingly fragile [4].

Asia’s Rising Geopolitical Alpha

The impending return of Donald Trump to the White House is generating significant concern among U.S. allies, manifested by feelings of trepidation, uncertainty, apprehension, and outright fear. A Trump 2.0 presidency heralds the possibility of a dramatic shift not only in foreign policy rhetoric, but also in concrete action. In Ukraine, a sense of profound uncertainty and foreboding is already taking hold, with similar unease likely to spread among regional allies in Asia. These concerns could hardly emerge at a more perilous time, intensifying the stakes for international stability and security. In response, U.S. allies appear to take concerted steps to safeguard their foreign policy from potential shocks and disruptions by formalizing nascent cooperative frameworks to address emerging geopolitical threats. One notable example is the U.S.-Japan-South Korea trilateral partnership that grew out of the August 2023 Camp David Meeting. Other nations, meanwhile, appear to embrace strategic hedging or (re-)alignment efforts. For instance, newly inaugurated Indonesian president Prabowo Subianto’s early foreign policy signals, including a surprise decision to join the BRICS club, and visits to China (Nov. 8-10) and the United States (Nov. 11-12), have already generated significant controversy and unease, raising speculation about a shift in the country’s long-standing non-aligned foreign policy.

East Asia features several highly combustible flashpoints, ranging from the Taiwan Strait to the South China Sea to the Korean peninsula, that inject a high degree of volatility and strategic risk into the regional security environment.

Each flashpoint is invariably contributing to an uptick in the region’s geopolitical alpha [5]. How these risk factors will be handled in the foreseeable future––whether on a stand-alone or collective basis––will determine whether or not Asia’s post-WWII ‘Long Peace’ might have reached its peak in the 21st century.

Taiwan Strait: A Perilous Crossroads for Peace in the Indo-Pacific

In a speech at the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China on October 16, 2022, Xi Jinping declared that the resolution of the Taiwan question and the realization of China’s complete reunification is the Party’s “unswerving historical mission” (矢志不渝的历史任务), that “Taiwan is China’s Taiwan” (台湾是中国的台湾) and that China will “never commit to renounce the use of force” (但决不承诺放弃使用武力) [6]. Two years on, stoking a combative nationalist rhetoric over the Taiwan question appears a particularly useful political tool to deflect from China’s expanding economies woes. Speaking at a reception celebrating the 75th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China on September 30, Xi Jinping described Taiwan as ‘China’s sacred territory” (中国的神圣领土) and, referring to China’s unbending commitment to reunify Taiwan with the motherland, ominously noted that “no one can stop the wheel of history!” (历史的车轮谁都无法阻挡!) [7]. Meanwhile, Taiwanese president Lai Ching-Te appeared to have drawn the ire of Beijing with his suggestion that the People’s Republic of China could not be considered the “motherland” (祖國) of the people of the Republic of China (Taiwan). In response to these remarks, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) launched a massive single-day military drill (Joint Sword-2024B) on October 14. This show of force follows a similarly large-scale, two-day drill (Joint Sword-2024A), held on May 23-24. Both drills are an unmistakable attempt at signaling China’s opposition to what it calls “separatist activities aimed at ‘Taiwan independence’” (“台独” 分裂行径) and “foreign interference” (外部势力干涉) in its domestic affairs.

The strategic risks hovering over the Taiwan Strait are further exacerbated by growing uncertainty surrounding the U.S. position. In recent years, mixed signals––some perhaps intentional, others stemming more from a naïve understanding of cross-Strait dynamics and U.S.-China relations more broadly––have fueled speculation about the future of Washington’s long-standing policy of ‘strategic ambiguity’ as a means to maintain the status quo. Adding to this uncertainty, Trump’s troubling and factually incorrect assertion on the campaign trail that Taiwan “stole our chip business…and they want protection” [8] raises concerns about the incoming administration’s inclination to conflate security commitments with economic grievances. The foreign policy kitchen is best served when cooks do not conflate different recipes when preparing a particular course, lest the outcome create unnecessary doubt and confusion among regional allies at a critical juncture.

North Korea: The Unpredictable Spark in Asia’s Powder Keg

Despite seventy years of precarious peace following the Korean War armistice of 1953, the situation on the Korean peninsula effectively remains one strategic misperception, provocation, or escalating crisis away from spiraling into renewed open hostilities, given recurring North Korean provocative behavior and fiery rhetoric.

In 2010, it was only South Korean restraint that prevented the crossing of an escalation threshold in the wake of two, unprovoked North Korean attacks––the sinking of the Republic of Korea (ROK) Navy frigate Cheonan on April 22 south of the disputed Northern Limit Line near South Korea’s Baengnyeong Island, and the bombardment of South Korea’s Yeonpyeong Island by North Korean artillery on November 23 in response to South Korean live-fire artillery drills in the surrounding waters. Meanwhile, Kim Jong-un’s rise to the pinnacle of power in North Korea in December 2011 temporarily prompted speculation of a course correction that might lead to a sustained commitment to economic reform. This hope was further undergirded by a subsequent rejection of a longstanding ‘military first’ (선군, Songun) policy in favor of a “parallel development” approach––commonly referred to as the ‘Byungjin Line’ (병진) that stresses the simultaneous development of nuclear weapons and the economy. However, hopes of Kim Jong-un possibly emerging as North Korea’s Deng Xiaoping, proved fleeting [9]. Over the next 13 years, Kim Jong-un aggressively stepped up missile testing and nuclear weapons development. According to the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) North Korea Missile Test Database, Pyongyang has conducted 272 tests of missiles capable of “delivering a payload of at least 500 kilograms (1102.31 pounds) a distance of at least 300 kilometers (186.4 miles)” since December 2011. Under Kim Jong-un’s leadership, this testing accounts for approximately 90% of all such missile tests conducted by North Korea since the first recorded test in April 1984. [10].

Between 2006 and 2017, North Korea also conducted six nuclear tests. On September 28, 2023, it enshrined nuclear weapons into its constitution, a year after a Supreme People’s Assembly meeting in 2022 when the regime authorized the pre-emptive use of nuclear arms and declared itself an “irreversible” nuclear weapons state. The Arms Control Association estimates that, as of January 2024, North Korea has assembled 50 nuclear weapons, and possesses enough fissile material to produce an additional 20 to 40 weapons [11].

Meanwhile, the deepening relationship between North Korea and Russia appears to be paying dividends for Pyongyang. According to comments by South Korea’s national security adviser, Shin Won-sik, on November 22, Russia has provided economic aid, including transfers of over a million barrels of oil since March 2024 in direct violations of existing UN sanctions. Additionally, North Korea has reportedly received military technology, including anti-aircraft missiles and other air defense equipment in exchange for 10,000 North Korean troops to support Russia’s war in Ukraine.

Meanwhile, a November 15 report by Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) that Kim Jong-un has called for the mass production of suicide attack drones comes in the wake of North Korean accusations that Seoul had been flying propaganda leaflet-filled drones over Pyongyang on several occasions in early October. In a statement on October 11, North Korea’s Foreign Ministry accused Seoul of having committed “a grave political and military provocation” (엄중한 정치·군사적 도발 행위를) and warned that “[I]f South Korea again commits a provocative act of invading the airspace of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea with a drone, there will be no more warnings like this and we will immediately take action” (대한민국이 또다시 무인기를 조선민주주의인민공화국 영공에 침범시키는 도발 행위를 감행할 때는 두 번 다시 이와 같은 경고는 없을 것이며 즉시 행동으로 넘어갈 것) [12].

Three words––“We Go Together”––have come to symbolize the enduring strength of the U.S.-ROK alliance, which has prevailed for the past seven decades. The April 2023 Washington Declaration signaled both sides’ commitment to deepen dialogue and information sharing to strengthen nuclear deterrence efforts on the peninsula in the face of persistent North Korean provocations. At the 56th Security Consultative Meeting in October 2024, U.S. Secretary of Defense, Lloyd J. Austin III underscored Washington’s enduring commitment to the defense of South Korea, noting that “[O]ur extended deterrence commitment remains ironclad. That commitment is backed by the full range of America’s conventional, missile defense, nuclear and advanced non-nuclear capabilities” [13].

And yet, the impending return of Donald Trump and his highly transactional inclinations and tendency to link security commitments and economic interests may prove an acid test for the future of the alliance. On the campaign trail, Donald Trump had suggested that the South Korean “money machine” pay USD10 billion a year, far exceeding the terms of the newly negotiated Special Measures Agreement on November 4, that would have South Korea contribute USD1.125 billion for 2026. With “The ‘America First’ Typhoon Coming” (‘미국 우선주의’ 태풍 닥쳐온다), as a headline in Hankyoreh, a South Korean daily newspaper, read on November 7 [14], doubts about Washington’s commitment to extended deterrence may yet rekindle the debate in South Korea about developing its own nuclear deterrent. Back in January 2023, South Korea’s president Yoon Suk Yeol, had weighed in by saying “[I]t’s possible that the problem gets worse and our country will introduce tactical nuclear weapons or build them on our own” [15].

Opinion polls already regularly show public support for a South Korean nuclear deterrent hovering around 70 percent. However, a scenario in which South Korea acquires a nuclear deterrent would significantly destabilize the regional security environment. Such a development would likely intensify a nuclear arms race, potentially prompting Japan and, possibly, Taiwan to pursue similar capabilities.

South China Sea: High-Stakes Battleground for Regional Power and Global Trade

China’s expanding assertiveness in and militarization of the South China Sea have heightened the risk of persistent tensions––especially between China and the Philippines over the Second Thomas Shoal and the Sabina Shoal in recent months–– escalating into a broader regional conflict. Such a scenario could potentially draw in the United States, given the U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty (dating back to 1951), and raise the specter of a great-power conflict. Speaking at the annual International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on May 31, Filipino President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. fueled such fears with the suggestion that the death of any Filipino sailor as a result of increasingly aggressive actions by China’s coast guard in disputed waters could trigger the Philippines to invoke the Mutual Defense Treaty.

Meanwhile, the economic and trade fallout of escalating tensions would reverberate across the region and the global economy, with particularly severe consequences for trade-dependent U.S. allies in Northeast Asia. A full-blown regional conflict would likely lead to a significant trade slowdown through the Malacca Strait, the region’s main maritime chokepoint, and possibly require rerouting trade through the Sunda or Lombok Straits, resulting in delivery delays and increased shipping costs. Additionally, it would highlight the expanding vulnerability of global supply chains to geopolitical tensions, and the need for a comprehensive and strategic approach to hedge against such scenarios.

At the same, balancing support for Southeast Asian allies without escalating tensions remains a complex task for any U.S. administration. In this context, it’s hardly encouraging that most Southeast Asian states appear inclined to free-ride off Northeast Asian states’ expanding commitment to defense and deterrence to maintain regional peace and stability [16].

Following the U.S.-China trade that began in 2018, regional economies benefited significantly from a wave of factory relocations. This trend may accelerate again in light of renewed tariff threats from Donald Trump as he prepares to return to the White House in January 2025. However, what once was a welcome economic boon for these regional economies may yet become a liability. Growing trade surpluses with the U.S. are bound to draw Trump’s ire.

In this scenario, it is conceivable that Trump might act on his inclinations to link economic grievances with security considerations as leverage in future negotiations. Such an approach, however, risks blowback, potentially driving a wedge between the US and Southeast economies, which China could exploit in pursuit of its strategic interests.

Conclusion:

The coming months may yet provide a clearer indication of what lies ahead, and serve as a harbinger of potential shifts in and challenges to the regional security landscape. Successfully adapting to the new realities will be essential to minimizing and mitigating challenges and ensuring regional peace, stability, and security.

Effective management of the evolving security realities will depend less on the ability of U.S. allies to adjust and embrace more burden-sharing and more on Trump’s willingness to adopt a cooperative course rather than one driven by unilateral, narrowly transactional inclinations.

The longstanding debates of whether the United States requires a new foreign policy and a coherent grand strategy remain as relevant as ever [17]. The answer is an unequivocal YES, with the critical caveat that this vision be grounded in the three C’s of effective foreign policy implementation: Consultation, Cooperation, and Coordination. A foreign policy vision shaped by a narrow ‘America First’ posture not only risks U.S. relative isolation but could augur an ‘America Alone’ scenario in the face of potential security realignments and national interest consideration by its allies. Such an outcome could well resemble the costs and consequences of American disengagement and economic protectionism during the interwar period in the first half of the 20th century, a historical cautionary tale of the costs associated with geopolitical short-termism, economic nationalism, and populist-driven foreign policy stance.

The future of East Asia’s ‘Long Peace’ requires a coherent, comprehensive, and compelling approach that integrates deterrence, engagement, and ‘constrainment’ while actively involving all regional stakeholders. Failure to sustain this balance risks the gradual erosion––if not irreversible unraveling–– of the stability, security, and growth that have defined the region for decades, with its ripple effects extending far beyond East Asia.

REFERENCES

[1]. For an interesting perspective on this, see Jeffrey A. Friedman and Andrew Payne, “The myth that foreign policy doesn’t matter in presidential elections,” Foreign Affairs, October 8, 2024, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/myth-foreign-policy-doesnt-matter-presidential-elections.

[2]. Thomas F. Lynch III, “The future of great power competition: Trajectories, transitions, and prospects for catastrophic war.” Joint Force Quarterly 114, 3rd Quarter (2024): 8-23.

[3]. “Restricted-format meeting of BRICS Summit,” October 23, 2004, https://brics-russia2024.ru/en/news/zasedanie-sammita-briks-v-uzkom-sostave/.

[4]. Walter Russell Mead, “The rules-based international order is quietly disintegrating.” The Wall Street Journal, 25 September 2023, https://www.wsj.com/articles/putin-co-tear-up-the-global-rule-book-international-affairs-world-order-b797ead4. See also David E. Sanger, New Cold Wars: China’s Rise, Russia’s Invasion, and America’s Struggle to Defend the West. New York: Crown, 2024.

[5]. For more information on this concept, see Marko Papic, Geopolitical Alpha: An Investment Framework for Predicting the Future. Hoboken: Wiley & Sons, 2021.

[6]. “(Authorized release) Xi Jinping: Hold high the great banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics and work together to build a modern socialist country in an all-round way – Report at the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China ((受权发布)习近平:高举中国特色社会主义伟大旗帜 为全面建设社会主义现代化国家而团结奋斗——在中国共产党第二十次全国代表大会上的报告, (Shòuquán fābù) xíjìnpíng: Gāojǔ zhōngguó tèsè shèhuì zhǔyì wěidà qízhì wèi quánmiàn jiànshè shèhuì zhǔyì xiàndàihuà guójiā ér tuánjié fèndòu——zài zhōngguó gòngchǎndǎng dì èrshí cì quánguó dàibiǎo dàhuì shàng de bàogào). October 16, 2022. http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/zt/xijinping1/202210/t20221026_12481813.htm.

[7]. “Xi Jinping: Speech at the Reception Celebrating the 75th Anniversary of the Founding of the People’s Republic of China” (习近平:在庆祝中华人民共和国成立75周年招待会上的讲话, Xíjìnpíng: Zài qìngzhù zhōnghuá rénmín gònghéguó chénglì 75 zhōunián zhāodài huì shàng de jiǎnghuà). September 30, 2024. http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/topone/202409/t20240930_12653768.htm

[8]. “On Trump claim that Taiwan stole U.S. chip sector, premier ‘disagrees’.” Focus Taiwan, October 29, 2024. https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202410290008.

[9]. For an analysis of the persistence of North Korea’s economic woes despite this policy shift, see Francis Schortgen, “The political logic of economic backwardness in North Korea.” North Korean Review 13, no. 2 (2017): 48-65.

[10]. For details, see “The CNS North Korea Missile Test Database.” https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/cns-north-korea-missile-test-database/

[11]. “Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: North Korea.”

https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/arms-control-and-proliferation-profile-north-korea

[12]. See “북 “한국이 평양에 무인기 침투해 삐라 살포”…군 “사실 여부 확인해 줄 수 없어” (North Korea: “South Korea Infiltrated Pyongyang with Drones and Distributed Leaflets”… Military: “Can’t Confirm Fact”).” KBS News, October 11, 2024. https://news.kbs.co.kr/news/pc/view/view.do?ncd=8079508.

[13]. Transcript: “Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III and South Korean Defense Minister Kim Yong Hyun Hold Joint Media Availability.” U.S. Department of Defense, October 30, 2004. https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3952030/defense-secretary-lloyd-j-austin-iii-and-south-korean-defense-minister-kim-yong/.

[14]. “Korea has gone all-in on alliance with US, but all bets are off under Trump.” Hankyoreh, November 8, 2024. https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/1166560.html

[15]. Choe Sang-Hun. “In a first, South Korea declares nuclear weapons a policy option.” The New York Times, January 12, 2023. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/12/world/asia/south-korea-nuclear-weapons.html.

[16]. Chong Ja Ian, “Northeast Asia is for deterrence and Southeast Asia is (mostly) for freeriding: Appreciating divergent East Asian approaches to order, uncertainty, and contestation.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 5, 2024.

[17]. On this issue, see Ben Rhodes, “A foreign policy for the world as it is,” Foreign Affairs 103, no. 4 (2024): 8-23; Robert C. O’Brien, “The return of peace through strength,” Foreign Affairs 103, no. 4 (2024): 24-38; Hal Brands, American Grand Strategy in the Age of Trump. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2018; Richard Haass, A World in Disarray: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Old Order. New York: Penguin Books, 2017; Henry Kissinger, Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001.

Author

DISCLOSURE

All written content of this article on this site is the exclusive copyright and property of Strategy International (SI) Ltd and the author who has written to It.

To note, the opinions stated do not necessarily reflect the official policies of Strategy International.

No prior use in part or in its complete form, written, words, maps, charts or statistical, numerical information can be made, unless there is a written prior request and consent by the author and Strategy International and its legal representative.

All requests should be directed at info@strategyinternational.org

error: Content is protected !