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Generating a Spiral of Serenity

Israel’s last actions, from eliminating key adversaries to direct strikes on Iranian soil, aims reshaping deterrence. Are we heading towards a spiral of violence or towards a "spiral of serenity"?

An article by Jerome Vitenberg

Generating a Spiral of Serenity

As of this writing, more than two weeks have passed since the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, Hamas’s highest-ranking political leader, within a heavily guarded Iranian governmental compound in Tehran. Although Israel has neither acknowledged nor denied its involvement, Iran alleges that Israel carried out the hit.[1]

The Iranian regime’s rationale for retaliation spans a multidimensional approach, incorporating elements of realism, rationalism, and revolutionism.[2] Its Shiite leadership, based on its self-perception, adds an element of unpredictability to its foreign policy, often perceived as irrational by the West. Even if some form of retaliation occurs in the future, the current delay in implementing the loudly announced punishment against the Hebrew state may suggest that Israel, supported by its allies, is succeeding in deterring Iran from military action.[3]

Is Israel’s power of deterrence truly regaining its strength after the tragic events of October 7, 2023, which had caught it off guard? Or has a series of significant hits against its enemies’ strategic interests and symbolic figures contributed to an escalation, pushing Iran to delay its attack to better prepare and gain tactical advantages or achieve a strategic nuclear breakthrough? Is Israel, by implementing a policy of “deterrence through force” generating a spiral of serenity, or are we heading toward an escalation—a spiral of violence?[4]

Although Israel is confronted with a multifaceted conflict involving multiple players on several fronts, the primary source can largely be attributed to the regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In Tehran lies the head of Scylla. During its recent military operations, Israel achieved major success in eliminating enemy infrastructure and high-ranking hostile personnel. Each time, Israel has also sent direct or indirect warning signals to Iran about the IDF’s military capability for prevention or retaliation, its credibility in asserting updated red lines, and its warning communications.[5] These “3 Cs”—Capability, Credibility, and Communication—are the three pillars of deterrence being redesigned by Israel.

Looking first at the Gaza front since October 2023, Israel has strategically shifted the balance of power in its favor by significantly reducing Hamas’s control over the local population, hitting its infrastructure and firepower, and eliminating its leadership, with the most senior figure being Muhammed Deif, Hamas’s military chief, in July 2024. By targeting Hamas in Gaza, Israel not only fulfills Prime Minister Netanyahu’s three goals for IDF operations in the Gaza Strip but also reinforces its 3 Cs of deterrence against Iran, the main architect of Hamas’s October 7 operations:[6] Capability to remove one arm of the octopus from Gaza, credibility in achieving the IDF’s objectives, and communication regarding both current and future targets. When Israel achieves its goal of destroying Hamas’s military capability, bringing back the hostages, and establishing a governance that does not threaten Israel after the war, Iran loses—at least one tentacle.

On its northern front, subject to Hizballah’s attacks, Israel has eliminated a significant portion of the leadership of this terror organization, which is directly affiliated with Iran. In April 2024, the IAF destroyed an Iranian diplomatic building in Damascus that harbored Iran’s secret warfare operations in Syria and Lebanon, eliminating top IRGC staff, including Iranian General Mohammed Reza Zahedi, along with Islamic Jihad executives from Gaza. With this operation, Israel demonstrated its focus on deterrence by attacking major threats, even if those were Iranian generals hiding in diplomatic compounds used for belligerent purposes.

On July 30, Israel continued its course of deterrence against Iran and its proxies during a retaliatory operation following a missile launch that killed 12 Israeli children in Northern Israel the previous day. This time, in Beirut—previously deemed ‘off-limits’—Israel targeted Fuad Shukr, a senior Hizballah military leader responsible for the missile attack and a key player in the acquisition and operation of Iranian long-range missiles from Lebanese territory. Although this may not be as effective against Hizballah itself, which still possesses around 150,000 missiles and rockets targeting Israel, forcing some 80,000 Northern Israel residents to flee their homes, this other tentacle of Iran-Scylla appears more fragile under Israel’s pressure.

Another success in Israel’s increasing deterrence against Iran was the IDF’s operation on Yemen’s Al-Hudaydah port infrastructure in July 2024. The day before, the Houthis, an Iranian proxy, had launched a drone attack on Tel Aviv, resulting in the death of an Israeli civilian.[7] The Israeli retaliation targeted weapons storage and military facilities, damaging a power generation plant, fuel storage facilities, and the port’s infrastructure. This was a significant financial and military blow to this third tentacle of Scylla, which has been engaged in numerous attacks against Israel and has disrupted navigation in the Red Sea.[8] It significantly harmed Yemen’s energy production and economy and marked the first major operation against an actor that had been disrupting Freedom of Navigation for months.

However, it’s on Iranian soil that the Israeli attacks are the most spectacular—and the most humiliating—for the Iranian regime. They are also the most efficient in delivering the 3 Cs message directly to the head of the octopus.

One such attack was openly claimed by Israel on April 19, 2024. Following the assassination of General Reza Zahedi, Iran had launched a retaliatory operation on April 13, 2024. A total of 350 drones, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles had been launched from Iran and its proxies’ territories onto Israel, causing one death and minor material damage thanks to a defensive operation supported by Israel’s allies and neighbors. However, the consequences could have been much worse for Israel, which needed to send a strong signal to Iran to deter it from repeating such an assault. Therefore, on April 19, Israel successfully penetrated Iran’s airspace undetected and destroyed the radar system of a Russian S-300 anti-aircraft battery at the 8th Shekari Air Base near Isfahan, a key component in the defensive system for Iran’s nuclear complexes.

This Israeli strike demonstrated to Iran—and to the world—the limits of Iran’s anti-aircraft warfare. It also reinforced Israel’s credibility by showing it was not deterred from acting directly against Iran. This is likely a major reason for Iran’s current delay in attacking Israel. Any additional Israeli attack on Iranian soil, if it occurred, would only reinforce this analysis.

In addition, two further steps in Israel’s deterrence doctrine have recently been openly discussed.

The first is the legitimacy of disproportionate retaliation, especially concerning potential attacks by Israel on Lebanon, from where Hizballah’s attacks originate. The Dahiya doctrine, which advocates an asymmetric warfare strategy involving the disproportionate use of force to destroy civilian infrastructure utilized by belligerent elements, is named after a Beirut neighborhood used by Hizballah in 2006 to plan and execute attacks on Israel. The warning is clear, as Hizballah and Iran are closely connected. Despite some differences of opinion and claims of autonomy by the terrorist organization, Hizballah remains a tentacle of the Iranian octopus. Taking the scenario a step further, the Dahiya doctrine could be expanded beyond Lebanon, bringing the conflict to Tehran’s upscale neighborhood of Elahiyeh, for instance. Due to its nature, the Dahiya doctrine reinforces Israel’s deterrence by wrapping it in an unbalanced and unpredictable strategy.

A second step, which has been widely speculated about, is the possibility of an Israeli preemptive attack on Iran. Past and well-known examples of such Israeli initiatives include the bombing of the Egyptian Air Force in 1967 and the Iraqi Osirak nuclear reactor bombing in 1981. The moral parameters to justify such an action would be the imminence of an Iranian attack and, more broadly, a credible threat of such an attack, the temporal necessity of a preemptive strike, and a proportionate strategy.[9]

Although these parameters already seem to be in place, one main obstacle prevents Israel from choosing such a strategy. Despite intelligence on Iran’s progress toward nuclearization and its open statements about attacking Israel, the current international mood, the U.S.’s commitment to peace talks and de-escalation with Iran and its proxies, as well as the double standards of international institutions scrutinizing Israel’s military actions, complicate Israeli decision-making. Besides, if the Israeli defense establishment was seriously considering a pre-emptive strike on Iran, it wouldn’t mention it in broad daylight[10]. Yet it remains an option being widely debated, which serves to strengthen Israel’s deterrence capabilities.

As the course of offensive defense and deterrence risks creating a spiral of violence, the alternative—trusting and appeasing Iran while restraining Israel—has proven to destabilize the balance of power in favor of a totalitarian and revolutionary adversary and its proxies, thus threatening a Western, democratic regional power and the Western world.

For now, the IDF and the security establishment remain on the defensive, with their fingers on the trigger. Beyond the dust clouds at its southern and northern borders, Israel’s long-term objectives remain what they were before October 7: preventing a nuclear Iran and promoting the expansion of the Abraham Accords, especially with Saudi Arabia, toward peace and prosperity.

Any risk taken by Israel is less threatening than the gamble of doing nothing, as for Israel, above all, it’s a war for survival. In light of the current conditions, without absolute support from the Western world, Israel’s efforts to deter Iran from planning and implementing aggressions, its citizens’ resilience, the IDF’s determination, and the government’s handling of the crisis, are remarkable. Its offensive-defensive strategy has already succeeded in reversing the effects of the pattern prioritizing appeasement and de-escalation by shifting apprehensiveness onto Iran’s regime.[11]

Tehran’s latest hesitation in implementing its threat could indeed show Israel’s success in deterring the Iranian regime from renewed direct and indirect attacks. It could signal the creation by Israel of a path to peace, generating a spiral of serenity—a peaceful area for its citizens, the region, and the world.

Could it really? On the flip side, Iran could also be playing its adversaries for fools and using this waiting period to develop an alternative tactic, re-establishing its honor following the elimination of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran. Iran has demonstrated its skill in confusing its enemies and using deceptive tactics, whether in nuclear diplomacy or military battles. And while all eyes are on the skies to the east and north, a surprise naval attack by Nahang or Ghadir-class mini-submarines, recently enhanced with electronic warfare, could launch a few torpedoes, mines, or missiles at Israeli and allied assets in the Eastern Mediterranean, on Israel’s western coast, or near Eilat. Considering the time needed to bring mini-subs to the Eastern Mediterranean, the early September 2024 minimum lunar luminosity, and a couple of symbolic Shiite religious holidays between the end of August and the start of September 2024, nothing—certainly not Iran’s statements—guarantees that the Iranian delay in attacking Israel is due to Israeli deterrence and not a tactic from Sun Tzu’s playbook.

In any case, the spiral of serenity, like any spiral, does not reveal what lies around the next curve. Should Iran launch its next attack, it would signal Israel to unleash massive retaliatory power.[12] The game has changed: it is no longer Israel alone that finds itself in a war for survival. Should Iran and its proxies decide to resist the spiral of serenity tide by launching a new attack on Israel, it may amount to throw a boomerang that could crush Scylla’s head and end the Mullahs’ regime in Tehran.

Endnotes

  1. Missy Ryan, Susannah George, Mohamad El Chamaa, and Suzan Haidamous, “Iran and Its Allies Mourn Militant Leaders, Vow Revenge Against Israel,” The Washington Post, August 1, 2024. ↑

  2. Laleh Gomari-Luksch, “Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism in Iran’s Foreign Policy: The West, the State and Islam” (PhD diss., University of Tübingen and University of St. Andrews, 2017). ↑

  3. Ephraïm Herrera, “Riposte Iranienne: Pourquoi Téhéran Hésite?” Mosaïque, August 12, 2024 (video). ↑

  4. Yonah Jeremy Bob, “The Three Assassinations That Changed the Middle East,” The Jerusalem Post, August 5, 2024. ↑

  5. Robert P. Haffa, “The Future of Conventional Deterrence: Strategies for Great Power Competition,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 12, no. 4 (2018): 94–115. ↑

  6. MEMRI, “Iranian Officials Acknowledge Iran’s Role in Planning and Executing October 7 Hamas Invasion and Massacres in Southern Israel,” Special dispatch no. 11439, July 10, 2024. ↑

  7. “U.S. Intelligence Warns Russia Is Arming Houthis; CENTCOM Commander Says US ‘Failing’ to Deter Attacks on Shipping in Red Sea,” Ynetnews, July 19, 2024. ↑

  8. Oded Gour-Lavie, “Reclaiming Maritime Dominance: The Urgent Need for a Bold US Naval Strategy,” The Jerusalem Post, August 4, 2024. ↑

  9. John D. Huntsman, “Just Strike: A Commander’s Guide to Pre-Emptive Self-Defense” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2018). ↑

  10. Yonah Jeremy Bob, “A Preemptive Strike on Iran and Hezbollah – the Strategic vs the Tactical,” The Jerusalem Post, August 6, 2024. ↑

  11. Arash Azizi, “Iranian Insiders Warn That Attacking Israel Is a Trap”, the Atlantic, August 5, 2024. ↑

  12. Herb Keinon, “Is Israel Too Passive in Waiting for the Iranian Response?” The Jerusalem Post, August 4, 2024. ↑

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