Completing South America: How Brazil Could Seal Trump’s Regional Dominance
Ideological affinity, political need, opportunism, and interventionism have transformed South America into fertile ground for the ‘Donroe Doctrine.’ Brazil’s presidential elections in October offer an opportunity to consolidate and expand U.S. influence across the region. The outcome could either widen that fertile ground for American influence or preserve one of the region’s main zones of resistance.
In recent years, the right has returned to power in several South American countries. This does not necessarily mean that South American societies have moved decisively to the right. In many cases, what has prevailed is not ideological conversion, but the electoral success of opposition movements capitalizing on public frustration with incumbents. This moment creates fertile ground for U.S. influence with governments aligned to Washington, at a particular juncture when the U.S. seeks to recover its influence in South America and is taking decisive action.
The latest electoral results in South America have completed the painting of a map dominated by governments aligned with the U.S. — whether right-wing or center-right — or at the very least, representing defeats for the left, leaving a landscape that in the short term can only expand further in favor of U.S. alignment. The Trump administration appears ready to capitalize on this realignment.
Beginning in northern South America, in Colombia, Abelardo de la Espriella has just assumed office. He combines a style that is a mix of Nayib Bukele (El Salvador’s President) and Trump and goes by the nickname “El Tigre” (The Tiger), also bearing resemblance to “El León” (the Lion), as Javier Milei, President of Argentina, calls himself. In Ecuador, Daniel Noboa holds office until 2029, and in Peru, Keiko Fujimori was inaugurated in July with a five-year mandate. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio recently concluded a tour of these three countries to reaffirm alliances. The final stop was Lima, where Peru formally joined the Shield of the Americas. Behind the cooperation to combat criminal organizations — the stated purpose of Rubio’s visit — lies the execution of the Donroe Doctrine with the clear objective of limiting Chinese influence in the region.
Another important shift in 2026 was Venezuela. Although the country remains under Chavista rule after Nicolás Maduro’s detention, it is now subject to partial U.S. intervention. Venezuela has moved from resisting imperialism to accepting oil agreements that allow U.S. companies to develop its petroleum resources. In this case, whether the government is right- or left-wing matters less, because it is already under heavy U.S. pressure and influence.
Moving down the map, there is Bolivia, where last year the victory of Rodrigo Paz ended 20 years of MAS government, the party of Evo Morales. Paz reopened relations with the U.S. after decades and signed a cooperation agreement with the US. He has a mandate until 2030 and counts on U.S. backing as he faces a situation of political fragility and protests in the streets.
“The US has decided to limit Chinese influence, and South America’s political shift toward right-wing, Washington-aligned governments has created fertile ground for direct action.”
U.S. alignment extends to Paraguay under Santiago Peña, whose term runs until 2028, and to Chile under José Antonio Kast, who took office in March for a four-year term. The regional map closes with Argentina, where Javier Milei’s term ends next year but he remains positioned to seek reelection.
Milei’s Argentina illustrates the constraints that still limit efforts to curb China’s influence. Unlike his attacks on international left-wing figures, Milei avoids direct criticism of China or its leaders because Argentina remains economically dependent on Beijing. China is not only a major market for Argentine commodities; a portion of Argentina’s central bank reserves also rests on a currency swap with China’s central bank. A Chinese deep-space station sits in southern Argentina, operated by an agency linked to the Chinese military. This need to preserve good relations with Beijing pushes Milei to align even more closely with Trump to offset those constraints, while receiving political favors in return, including Trump’s recent suggestion that the United States could reconsider its position and support Argentina’s sovereignty claim over the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands. [1] Even so, the gesture appears aimed more at antagonizing the United Kingdom than at genuinely helping Argentina.
Among the left-wing governments in South America is Uruguay, which represents a non-radicalized left in a country were power shifts frequently between left and right without turmoil, turbulence, or rupture. And there is also Brazil, where a decisive electoral battle will be fought in October.
Brazil’s 2026 presidential election will hold its first round on October 4, with a runoff on October 25 if no candidate secures an outright majority. The race pits President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva against Senator Flávio Bolsonaro, the son of former president Jair Bolsonaro. Lula, who returned to office in 2023, remains one of the defining figures of the Latin American left. Flávio Bolsonaro, by contrast, seeks to carry forward the right-wing movement built by his father, who is barred from running while imprisoned for attempting a coup. Lula was climbing toward victory according to polls, but the latest data suggests a tight race. The electoral result will be consequential to the relationship between Brazil and the United States.
“Either Brazil joins the chorus of U.S.-aligned governments, completing Trump’s regional map, or it remains a powerful counterforce.”
Brazil matters to Washington not only because of its political weight, but because it is the largest economy in Latin America. It is also not governed by just any left-wing leader, but by one who has often shown greater autonomy and international ambition than many of his regional counterparts. Brazil is a key member of BRICS, and its relationship with China remains deep and strategic. Lula has made that relationship highly visible, underscoring that for Brasília, ties with Beijing are not tactical but structural. During Bolsonaro’s presidency (2019-2023), with his pro-US, anti-China orientation, trade between both countries increased significantly, with commercial ties becoming increasingly difficult to break. In 2025, trade between Brazil and China reached $170 billion, more than double Brazil’s trade with the United States, which totaled $80 billion. Paradoxically, Brazil is one of the few countries that has a trade surplus with China, and a trade deficit with the United States. The weight of Chinese trade in the Brazilian economy is expected to increase, taking into account that trade tensions between Washington and Brazil are leading to an increase in tariffs.
Under Trump and Lula, tensions have moved beyond rhetoric into diplomatic and institutional confrontation. Washington has imposed punitive measures on Brazilian authorities, while Brazil has responded defensively, reinforcing the perception that bilateral ties are now shaped not only by pragmatic disagreement but also by open political distrust. Friction has even reached diplomatic protocol, including disputes over ambassadorial credentials, further suggesting that the relationship has entered a more confrontational phase. [2][3] Yet it is not a complete rupture. Trump and Lula come from opposing political traditions, but both recognize the value of direct contact and transactional diplomacy. That complexity matters.
Headed into October’s election, Trump is clearly playing in favor of Bolsonaro. However, if he overplays his hand, it could produce the opposite of what he wants. Overt pressure can strengthen the very actors it seeks to weaken. In a close election, foreign pressure can easily be recast as national humiliation, and national humiliation often produces political backlash, like what happened in Canada’s last election. A victory by Brazil’s right would transform the regional picture for the Trump administration. Beyond military and geopolitical objectives, the new map could open the door to strong U.S. investments in the region.
Brazil could be the crown jewel for Trump, a stellar member in the Shield of the Americas, or it could continue being the thorn in his side, the dissenting voice and the only one in the south with the power and will to stand up to him.
REFERENCES
[1] Robert Tait. “Trump Suggests He Is Reviewing US Support for UK over Falkland Islands.” The Guardian, August 31, 2026.
[2] Gram Slattery and Lisandra Paraguassu. “Brazil Withholds Approval of Trump’s Ambassador Pick, Deepening Rift with US.” Reuters, July 30, 2026.
[3] Ana Ionova and Adam B. Ellick. “U.S. Revokes Visa of Top Brazilian Diplomat, Dialing Up Tensions.” The New York Times, August 4, 2026.
