The roller-coaster of Iran-US tribulations appears to have come to a rocky albeit temporary halt through a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed between the two countries. To the surprise of even his own supporters the US President, Donald Trump, has started negotiations with the leaders of the Islamic Republic in Switzerland. What transpires from the media seems to indicate Washington has done an almost U-turn on some of the most important conditions she had previously laid down for the cessation of hostilities.
The most compelling issue throughout has been Iran’s capacity to develop nuclear weapons. The bombings by some of the powerful and sophisticated US weaponry of Iran’s nuclear sites is widely believed to have all but removed that threat. Another US condition related to the destruction of Iranian uranium enrichment facilities in the country.
“However, key questions remain about what the MOU really means in terms of long-term Iran’s nuclear programme, including its uranium enrichment which is a key component of a nuclear weapon.”
Thirdly there was the question of over 400 kilograms of 60 percent-enriched uranium inside Iran that the White House insisted must be transferred overseas. Then there was Iran’s technology in manufacturing and storing long range ballistic missiles that had caused damage to Israel and the Persian Gulf states during the war. Last but not least the Islamic Republic’s financial and logistical support for proxy terrorist groups had to come to an end, the US government demanded. Later in the wake of Iran’s blocking free passage of shipping in the Strait of Hormoz, free flow of traffic in the Strait was added to the list of condition by the US.
In the event of an agreement Washington had promised to remove the blockade of Iranian ports and ease the sanctions on Iran allowing the country to sell its oil and gas internationally. Thirdly, and subject to further negotiations, the US had agreed to permit unblocking Iranian funds in foreign accounts.
On her part, Tehran was demanding an immediate cessation of hostilities on all fronts including Israel’s assault on Hezbollah in Lebanon. Reparations for the war were also demanded as was the lifting of the blockade of the Iranian ports by the US military. Release of Iranian funds in foreign accounts was another condition laid down by the clerical regime’. Iran maintained that she would not compromise on her right of uranium enrichment, nor would she agree to scale down the range or the quality of her missiles.
In spite of the rhetoric the US President appears to have conceded to at least some of Tehran’s demands without really getting much in return. Some of the biting sanctions on Iran have been lifted, and the blockade of the ports has been discontinued. Some of Iranian funds are now to be released albeit conditionally. Israel has agreed to halt all offensive operations against Hezbollah for the time being.
Iran will not transfer the enriched uranium overseas but instead will dilute it to lower grades inside the country. No agreement seems to have been reached on the missiles and Iran has agreed in the Memorandum of Understanding that she will not pursue manufacturing or procuring nuclear weapons.
On the face of it at least, the Iranian theocracy would be justified in claiming victory in the war, at least politically. Her written commitment not to pursue nuclear weapons is no more than a simple repetition of what Iran, a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, is already legally bound to. On the question of missiles and proxy groups too Tehran seems to have got her way. What did really happen?
The factional politics of the Islamic Republic is hard at work these days but with a notable difference. Having lost the former hardline spiritual leader in the first hour of the war, those in favour of mending fences with Washington after forty-seven years of hostility, seem to have gained the upper hand at least for the time being. Should they continue to hold power it may well prove to be a turning point not only in regional politics but also in international relations. Ramifications will be multifarious and far-reaching.
However, should the hardline faction manage to push back the ones who are now hard at work trying to reach a deal with the US, it will probably cause a political backlash in Washington. Resuming the war will not be an option then for the Republican government as it could adversely affect congressional election results in November and lead to a Democrat majority in the House if not the Senate. In effect the outcome of the war would then seem to be little more than the status quo ante. Lives lost and billions of dollars spent for the war together with a politically stronger clerical regime in Tehran could hardly transpire to a victory for Washington.
The President’s gambit may in fact be a gamble that could reshape the internal politics in Iran leading to better relations with the US and greater regional stability. The flip side of that is that Iran could end up remaining in the hands of even more radical elements with more negative regional and global impact. What has not been factored in here are the social and political dynamics inside Iran that render fundamental change almost inevitable. The US could help shape that change but to do so she will need greater clarity of purpose, an unswerving strategy and a more nuanced diplomacy.
“Donald Trump’s war against Iran began with a plan but, at-least for now, has ended with a gamble.“