Turkey’s regional strategy hinges on military and security engagement, economic connectivity, infrastructure projects, and political-ideological positioning in the Muslim world. These elements enable Ankara to shape policies without always dominating arenas. Expanded military operations in places like Syria, Iraq, and Libya along with economic projects linking the Gulf, Iraq, and Europe, reflect a broader Turkish shift toward “geoeconomic geopolitics” blending trade, corridors, and infrastructure with military prowess.^[1] Despite criticism, Ankara maintains economic links with Tel Aviv and continues to interact with it within broader regional frameworks, oscillating between cooperation, competition, and confrontation, depending on regional developments.^[2]

As of today, the US-Israel military campaign against Iran, launched on February 28, has escalated into a full-scale conflict, with Iranian retaliatory missile strikes targeting Israel, Gulf states, and even reaching Caucasus and Turkey. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has positioned himself as a vocal critic of the US-Israeli actions, condemning them as violation of the international law, emphasizing de-escalation, diplomacy, and stability.^[3] This reflects Turkey’s balancing act between maintaining relationships with NATO member-states, economic links with Iran, and leadership ambitions amid potential power vacuums.^[4]

“Ankara is trying to walk a tightrope between mediation, strategic autonomy, and regional influence, while the escalation risks drawing it deeper into the confrontation.”

Former Israeli PM Naftali Bennett labeled Turkey the “new Iran” in February 2026, framed it as a strategic threat amid Israel’s “hexagon of alliances” with India, Greece, Cyprus, and Arab states.^[5] Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan is engaged in shuttle diplomacy with the US, Iran, Gulf states, and the EU, alongside Oman for ceasefires, underscores Iran’s stability for the region.^[6] The risk of escalation is rising, especially after missiles reaching Turkish territory, which marks Iran’s first direct fire at a NATO member; Ankara is prioritizing containment to avoid spillover. The state faces economic, security, migration, and energy insecurity, together with Kurdish separatism, Azeri insurgencies, and Baluchi unrest.

Opportunities emerge from viewing the conflict as a catalyst for regional integration. Turkey’s centrality emerges from four structural layers. Firstly, its geographic and logistical centrality. Turkey borders Iraq, Iran, and Syria, and controls access to the Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean corridors, making it critical for military transit, intelligence collection, energy and logistics routes, as well as refugee and migration flows. Despite being a NATO member, Ankara frequently pursues independent regional policies (cooperation with Russia in Syria, arms procurement, and diplomatic engagement with Iran). It serves as a transit hub between Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Europe, however its economic interdependence and significant imports of energy products from Iran constrain it from escalating against Tehran. Furthermore, Ankara has shaped its rhetoric and diplomacy, based on its positions and the ideological competition for regional political leadership. Frames itself as a defender for Palestinian rights and a critic of Israeli actions, while presenting its governance model as an alternative to both Iranian ideology and Gulf monarchies.

Globally, Turkey positions itself as a bridge through efforts to mediate conflicts, expanding defense exports, and forging strategic autonomy amid US-China tensions. In the current crisis, Iran’s fragmentation provides an opening for a more assertive Sunni power. Ankara sets as a key anchor between Saudi Arabia’s financial strength, Pakistan’s status as the only nuclear Muslim nation. This suggests a shift toward a multi-polar Middle East where regional powers reduce reliance on traditional Western actors. Defense cooperation, joint military exercises, drone and aerospace collaboration, along with political alignment on some international issues feed Israeli and Western concerns about potential technology sharing and strategic alignment.^[7]

“Strategic options abound, but they require nuance. By prioritizing pragmatic diplomacy over ideological posturing, Ankara has the option to position itself as a diplomatic broker capable of facilitating ceasefires or broader negotiations and to capitalize on this moment.”

Shuttle diplomacy preserves flexibility between the US, Gulf states, Oman and Iran, exemplifies Turkey’s potential as a mediator, while enhancing leverage in post-Iran reconstruction phase, such as energy diversification. Military hedging includes both buffer zones that address refugee and Kurdish risks while signaling readiness without escalation. If Iran’s influence declines significantly, Turkey could expand its role as a central organizing power in a reconfigured Middle Eastern order. Deepening ties with Saudi-Pakistan pacts counters Israeli enrichment fears, positioning Ankara to lead Sunni integration. However, overextension could provoke confrontation with Israel, Western alienation, or instability. Strategic intelligence should work not only on opportunities arising from filling Iran’s weakening in Syria, Iraq’s Development Road, or Gaza via Hamas, as well as economic interests, but also on Israeli-US backed Kurds, that threaten Iran’s interior and Turkey’s borders.^[8]

For European policymakers, the Turkish dimension is particularly consequential. Instability spreads elevate geopolitical leverage over the Eastern Mediterranean and Caucasus energy routes. For Greece, the implications are even more immediate. An empowered Turkey could assert more in the Eastern Mediterranean, intensifying geopolitical competition over maritime zones, energy exploration, and regional alliances, especially if Ankara emerges from the crisis with strengthened strategic partnerships and enhanced military capabilities.  

Greece maintains a position of non-participation in the US-Israeli military campaign, emphasizing de-escalation, citizens’ safety, and respect for international law, while providing defensive support to Cyprus.^[9] This stance reflects Greece’s strategic balancing with Israel and the US against Turkish influence, avoiding entanglement in Middle Eastern conflicts that could exacerbate domestic economic vulnerabilities, such as shipping disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz.

“A proactive stance would not only safeguard Hellenic interests but also position Greece as an indispensable actor in reshaping regional security architectures, potentially leading trilateral pacts with Egypt and the UAE.”

Greece’s EU membership positions it as a conduit for European interests in the Middle East. With Iran threatening European states, Athens could lead calls for an EU defense union, invoking Article 42.7 for mutual assistance. This forward pivot would elevate Greece from a peripheral EU member to a frontline guardian, fostering deeper integration with France and Germany while mitigating divisions. Geopolitically, Greece’s role as an anchor in NATO, contrasted with Turkey’s gatekeeper behavior, could solidify its strategic value. As US forces rely on Souda for logistics, Athens might negotiate enhanced military aid, including advanced F-35 integration, to deter Turkish encroachments in the Aegean. In a scenario where Iran’s collapse empowers Kurdish or Azeri separatists, Greece could collaborate with Israel to contain spillover, preventing a refugee surge that could overwhelm its borders.

“This conflict unlocks opportunities for Greece to bolster its security, economy, and influence, yet it also demands agile policies to navigate a more assertive strategic future.”

The intensifying pressure on the Strait of Hormuz has spiked global oil prices. This status makes EastMed pipeline and LNG from Israel and Cyprus, an increasingly strategic hedge for Athens and Europe, reducing Tehran’s leverage over Gulf supplies, and dependency on volatile routes. Moreover, the dispatch of F-16 Vipers and frigates to Cyprus demonstrates Greece’s readiness, potentially attracting US investments in Alexandroupolis as a NATO hub.^[10] This could evolve into joint anti-drone cooperation with Israel, enhancing Greece’s capabilities against hybrid threats and exporting expertise to EU partners. Economically, disruption is creating congestion in hubs such as Athens.^[11] Global shipping reroutes around Africa, could impact Greece’s Piraeus port, boosting GDP if Athens invests in infrastructure resilience. Lastly, UN condemnations position Athens as mediator between EU restraint and US assertiveness. By countering Turkey’s shuttle diplomacy, Greece has the chance to forge bloc, isolating Ankara and resolving EEZ disputes favorably.

Yet, these opportunities are shadowed by risks, especially security challenges. Souda Bay’s strategic value makes it a prime Iranian target, risking direct strikes or proxy attacks via Hezbollah. Terrorist threats to potential targets, including embassies, synagogues, and Israeli investments in Crete, demand vigilant countermeasures, straining resources. Migration risks escalate, as an Iranian collapse could unleash millions of refugees through Turkey, overwhelming Frontex and reigniting 2015-style crises. Economically, Greece’s dominance in global shipping exposes it to prolonged disruptions in Hormuz, potentially costing in rerouting and insurance hikes. Seafarers’ strikes and stranded crews amplify human costs, while energy price surges could fuel domestic inflation, and tourism, a GDP pillar, faces cancellations amid flight suspensions. Politically, alliance strains pose dilemmas. By aligning too closely with Israel-US, European states risk alienating EU partners favoring restraint, as seen in divided responses.^[12]

Greece has cultivated an alternative network of partnerships with Israel and key Arab states, positioning itself as a stable European gateway to the Eastern Mediterranean and an anchor for energy and security cooperation. The more Turkey consolidates influence across the Middle East and Eurasia, the more Athens strengthens multilateral alignments designed to balance it. Conversely, Greece’s expanding diplomatic and energy partnerships constrain Ankara’s regional maneuverability and complicate Turkish ambitions for uncontested leadership in the Eastern Mediterranean. The resulting interaction is not merely rivalry; it is a structural contest over connectivity, alliances, and geopolitical narratives in a rapidly transforming regional order.

1. Siboni , G., Prof. Colonel (res.), & Winner, E., Brig. Gen. (res.). “Turkey–Israel Relations: Strategic Context and Policy Considerations”. The Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security. January 1, 2026. https://jiss.org.il/en/siboni-winner-turkey-israel-relations/. ↑

2. Mankoff, Jeffrey, & Bergmann, Max. “Strategic Ambiguity: Erdoğan’S Turkey in a Multipolar World.” Center for Strategic and International Studies. December 2, 2025. https://www.csis.org/analysis/strategic-ambiguity-erdogans-turkey-multipolar-world. ↑

3. Reuters. “Turkey’s Erdogan Says Attacks on Iran Are Clear Violation of International Law.” March 2, 2026. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkeys-erdogan-says-attacks-iran-are-clear-violation-international-law-2026-03-02/. ↑

4. Yıldız, Güney. “Iran’s Leadership Decapitated — Turkey Will Define What Comes Next.” Forbes. March 1, 2026. https://www.forbes.com/sites/guneyyildiz/2026/03/01/irans-leadership-decapitated—turkey-will-define-what-comes-next/. ↑

5. Speakman Cordall, Simon. “Turkish ‘Threat’ Talked up in Israel as Netanyahu Focuses on New Alliances.” AlJazeera. February 23, 2026. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/2/23/turkish-threat-talked-up-israel-netanyahu-focuses-new-alliances. ↑

6. Reuters. “Turkey’s Erdogan Says Attacks on Iran Are Clear Violation of International Law.” Reuters. “Turkey Says It’s Engaging with All Sides to End Iran War, Resume Diplomacy.” March 3, 2026. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-says-its-engaging-with-all-sides-end-iran-war-resume-diplomacy-2026-03-03/. ↑

7. Mankoff, Jeffrey, & Bergmann, Max. “Strategic Ambiguity: Erdoğan’S Turkey in a Multipolar World.” ↑

8. Jacinto, Leela. “US Reaches Out to Iran’S Kurds, but Will They Also Be ‘Hung Out to Dry’?” France24. March 5, 2026. https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20260305-us-reaches-out-to-iran-kurds-but-will-they-be-hung-out-to-dry-this-time-middle-east-war. ↑

9. Ekathimerini. “Drone Strike Drives Calls to End British Military Presence on Cyprus.” March 3, 2026. https://www.ekathimerini.com/politics/foreign-policy/1296851/greece-is-not-participating-in-attacks-against-iran-foreign-ministry-says/. Kambas, Michele. “Drone Strike Drives Calls to End British Military Presence on Cyprus.” Reuters. March 6, 2026. https://www.reuters.com/world/uk/drone-strike-drives-calls-end-british-military-presence-cyprus-2026-03-06/. ↑

10. Psaropoulos, John T. “After Iran’S Warning, Europe Fails to Unite on War Launched by US, Israel.” AlJazeera. March 4, 2026. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/4/amid-middle-east-crisis-europe-fumbles-towards-mutual-defence. ↑

11. GEODIS, “Middle East Situation – Network Disruptions & Operational Guidance.” March 3, 2026. https://geodis.com/blog-resources/customer-advisory#:~:text=We%20would%20like%20to%20inform%20you%20about,distance%20increases%20both%20mileage%20and%20transit%20time. ↑

12. Gkritsi, Eliza. “How Every EU Country Responded to the Strikes on Iran.” Politico. March 1, 2026. https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-react-iran-us-israel-crisis/. ↑