By the mid-2020s, the continuum encompassing the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, the Red Sea, and the Arabian Sea has effectively evolved into a single, interconnected theater of operations. The deepening interdependence among these partially distinct regional subsystems is structured around overlapping security dilemmas, contested maritime routes, and increasingly intense geoeconomic competition. The past three years mark a clear inflection point in this process. Instability in the Red Sea, the militarization of maritime choke points through Houthi threats and resurgent Somali piracy, developments in Syria and the war in Gaza with their wider regional spillovers, as well as the emergence of alternative trade routes from India, have intertwined security, infrastructure, and power projection in a more complex and urgent manner.
For Greece, these developments constitute a strategic imperative rather than a mere policy option. Athens must position itself as an active power shaping the agenda surrounding the two principal corridors likely to decisively influence both regional and global order: the Red Sea axis and the India–Middle East–Europe Corridor (IMEC). A passive posture—limited to that of a recipient hub or logistics node—would relegate Greece to the role of a secondary observer at a moment when geography, emerging alliances, and maritime capabilities offer a unique opportunity for influence.
The Red Sea Corridor
The Red Sea—stretching from the Bab el-Mandeb Strait through the Suez Canal to the Eastern Mediterranean—has become a theater of intense competition. Houthi attacks on commercial shipping, often linked to Israeli/Greek interests, the resurgence of piracy and asymmetric maritime threats, and the growing involvement of extra-regional naval forces have transformed freedom of navigation from a logistical matter into a daily operational challenge. The participation of the Hellenic Navy in multinational security missions during 2024–2025 reflects Athens’ recognition that maritime security in this region is inseparable from its national interests. Rising transportation costs, major delays, and supply shortages have direct repercussions for economic performance and social stability.
Within this context, a closer Greek–Israeli strategic alignment assumes particular importance. Israel’s security doctrine extends beyond its immediate neighborhood, encompassing a connectivity arc from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. Israel’s recognition of Somaliland on 26 December 2025—the first such recognition since Somaliland’s declaration of independence in May 1991—signals deeper engagement with the Horn of Africa and regional states such as Ethiopia, against the backdrop of extensive Turkish influence in Somalia and Sudan.
“This move reflects a broader strategic logic: control, access, and influence over critical transit and security nodes are prerequisites for a state’s strategic survival in the emerging environment.”
Despite its extremely limited international recognition, Somaliland occupies a critical geographic position near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Its ports—most notably Berbera—have already attracted substantial investment, particularly from the United Arab Emirates through DP World, alongside broader infrastructure development opportunities. For Israel and Greece, engagement with such nodes—via diplomacy, security cooperation, or other forms of partnership—represents an effort to shape the operational environment at the southern gateway of the Suez system.
IMEC: The Holy Grail of Geoeconomic Influence
Alongside the Red Sea corridor, IMEC is emerging as a first-order geoeconomic instrument for reshaping global supply chains and redistributing power. Backed by India, the United States, the European Union, Israel, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia, IMEC aims to connect Indian ports with Europe via the Arabian Peninsula and the Eastern Mediterranean, reducing reliance on longer and more vulnerable routes. Although still largely conceptual, IMEC has already begun to recalibrate the strategic calculations of participating and neighboring states.
For Greece, IMEC represents both opportunity and risk. As a potential European gateway—through ports such as Thessaloniki and Piraeus—Greece can entrench itself within the institutional, economic, and defense architecture of the corridor. This, however, requires active political engagement, leadership, and the provision of security guarantees. Absent these, Greece risks marginalization or even bypass. Past experience is instructive: synergies reward those who set rules and provide security, not merely those who possess geography. Affirmative participation outweighs the pretense of entitlement-based rhetoric.
“Greek–Israeli cooperation is central to this effort. Israel’s ports, energy assets, and technological and intelligence ecosystems complement Greece’s naval-air power and EU institutional access, particularly when combined with Cyprus.”
Together, they can shape standards, agreements, security guarantees, and capital flows within IMEC. Notably, this axis increasingly converges with the strategic interests of the UAE and India.
Greece, Israel, the UAE, and India
By 2025, cooperation among Greece, Israel, the UAE, and India has evolved from ad hoc coordination into a loose yet increasingly structured alignment. This “Eastern Mediterranean–Indian Ocean nexus” rests on shared concerns over maritime security, supply-chain resilience, and the destabilizing role of revisionist actors. Joint military exercises, intelligence sharing, port investments, and energy cooperation have all expanded over the past five years.
The UAE plays a pivotal role, both financially and logistically, linking the Eastern Mediterranean with the Gulf and the western Indian Ocean. Emirati investments—from energy and IT infrastructure in Greece to port development in Berbera—combined with deepening Greek–Israeli defense cooperation, have created dense networks of interdependence. India, for its part, views Greece and Israel as reliable partners in its westward strategic outreach, offering access to European markets and a counterweight to Chinese influence along the Belt and Road.
This alignment does not constitute a formal alliance, but it functions as a force multiplier. It strengthens deterrence through presence and defense, reduces strategic vulnerability by diversifying partners and corridors, and embeds Greece and Israel within a broader Indo-Mediterranean framework supported by the United States.
“For Athens, participation enhances its capacity to transition from a peripheral consumer of security to a net provider.”
Turkey, Egypt, and the Question of Regional Order
The consolidation of Greek–Israeli cooperation—especially within a broader alignment with the UAE and India—inevitably intersects with the policies of Turkey and Egypt. Turkey’s revisionist posture, manifested in maritime claims, military deployments, and the instrumentalization of migration, constitutes a structural threat to both Greece and Israel. Ankara’s attempt to project power from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Horn of Africa underscores the competitive dynamics now unfolding across the region.
Egypt, by contrast, adopts a more ambivalent stance. While its interests partially converge with those of Greece and Israel in maritime, energy, and national security, Cairo seeks to balance between emerging poles. At the same time, its efforts to diversify infrastructure and reduce reliance on the Suez Canal—through which roughly 12% of global trade and 30% of global container traffic pass—open new opportunities amid Red Sea instability.
Proposed road and rail links connecting the Arabian Peninsula with Egypt, effectively linking Asia and Africa (the so-called Moses Bridge or Bin Salman Causeway, including projects such as a rail link between Ras Al-Khair and Sharm el-Sheikh), align with Egypt’s ambition to develop parallel overland trade routes reaching Mediterranean ports and onward to European markets. It has been argued that the Red Sea corridor and IMEC can—and should—operate as complementary pathways. A stable, credible, and resolute Greek–Israeli axis, connected to India via the Gulf, would provide Egypt with strong incentives to clarify the direction of its strategic alignment.
Coordinated control over the Eastern Mediterranean, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait—supplemented by overland alternatives—and secure transport links from the Indian Ocean could ensure freedom of navigation, deter state and non-state threats, and enhance crisis-response capabilities. In this sense, the emerging security ring elevates maritime security into a foundation for broader regional stability and, in conjunction with the Abraham Accords, could underpin a new U.S.-backed security architecture built on multilateral participation.
Migration, Warfare, and Resolve
Beyond conventional threats, Greece faces persistent challenges from hybrid tactics, particularly the instrumentalization of migration flows by state and non-state actors, including Islamist networks linked to the Muslim Brotherhood. These practices blur the line between human and national security within an ideological-religious warfare and constitute a critical tool for Ankara. For Greece, they pose an existential threat to sovereignty and social cohesion, constraining its ability to play the role required by the abovementioned strategic design. This threat must be recognized and addressed accordingly within a comprehensive security framework.
Clear strategic signaling—through policy, presence, and partnerships—is therefore indispensable. Greek–Israeli cooperation offers not only military and technological advantages but also a model of strategic clarity in a region marked by ambiguity and hedging. Synergies with the UAE, India, and Egypt enable Greece and Cyprus to act as agenda-setters rather than mere participants within a U.S.-led security framework, reinforcing the objectives and interests of all states within this security ring.
From Management to Strategy
The convergence of geoeconomics and security across the Eastern Mediterranean, the Red Sea, and the Indian Ocean leaves little room for incrementalism. The 2024–2025 period has demonstrated that managing fragile equilibria—such as the Athens Declaration with Turkey—is no longer sufficient.
“Strategic corridors are contested spaces, and influence accrues to those willing to invest political capital, articulate clear priorities, and develop operational capabilities on the ground.”
For Greece, the choice is stark. Through active engagement in both the Red Sea and IMEC, and by deepening practical cooperation with Israel, the UAE, India, as well as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, Athens can strategically leverage its exceptional geography. Failure to do so would marginalize Greece within a rapidly reconfiguring regional and international system and cede initiative to Ankara. The years ahead will be shaped not by cautious balancing but by confidence and decisive moves on the geopolitical chessboard. In such an environment, clarity of purpose is itself a strategic asset.
