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Ukraine Doesn’t Need a Perfect Peace. It Needs This One.

While the impulse to reject the current peace proposal is understandable on moral grounds, as it can be viewed as rewarding Russian aggression, taking this deal now is the only rational choice. Every day of delay makes the eventual outcome worse.

In November 2025, the Trump administration with its envoy Steve Witkoff proposed a 28-point peace plan to end the Russo-Ukrainian War, freezing the war along current lines. The peace plan presents Ukraine with a difficult choice: accept a peace deal that cedes nearly 20% of its territory and neutrality in exchange for security guarantees and a path to the European Union or continue fighting a war it’s slowly losing. While the impulse to reject the current peace proposal is understandable on moral grounds, as it can be viewed as rewarding Russian aggression, taking this deal now is the only rational choice. Every day of delay makes the eventual outcome worse.

The question that confronts Ukraine and its supporters is fairly simple and brutal: is this deal better than what Ukraine will get if it keeps fighting?

The answer, at this point, based on available data, is yes.

Since Ukraine’s failed 2023 counter offensive, Kiev has seen few victories. Even its much-heralded efforts at seizing Russian territory in Kursk in 2024, proved short-lived. As of November 2025, Russia controls approximately 45,322 square miles of Ukrainian territory. That’s roughly equivalent to half the size of Iowa! Further, it has been gaining an average of 169 square miles of Ukrainian territory every month.[1] At this rate, Ukraine will lose an additional 2,000 square miles over the next year. Meanwhile, civilian casualties in July 2025 reached their highest monthly total in three years, with numbers 48% higher than the same period in 2024.[2] The trend isn’t improving. Ukraine’s energy infrastructure now operates at only one-third of pre-invasion capacity, and the only reason Ukraine still has any infrastructure left, is because Russia has chosen not to destroy it all.[3]

While most are focused on the land concessions Ukraine is being asked to make, the proposed peace plan does offer substantial incentives to the Ukrainians.

Ukraine will receive reliable security guarantees. While Ukraine agrees to make changes to its constitution ensuring that it will not join NATO, and NATO agrees to guarantee that Ukraine will not be admitted in the future, Kiev will be provided with the equivalent of NATO Article 5 protections. These would be legally binding guarantees voted on by the US Congress. Further, while the size of the Ukrainian Armed Forces will be limited to 600,000 personnel, this is larger than the British, French, and German armies combined and significantly larger than the size of its military prior to the invasion. Additionally, Ukraine is eligible for EU membership as early as 2027, and in the meantime, it will receive short-term preferential access to the European market. Further, Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction is ensured by the US and will be financed in part by $100 billion in frozen Russian assets.[4]

Any future threat is also addressed. If Russia were to invade Ukraine again, in addition to a decisive coordinated military response, all global sanctions will be reinstated, recognition of the new territory and all other benefits of this deal will be revoked. While this is certainly not the desired outcome for either Ukraine or its supporters, who continue to hope for complete Russian defeat, it is the best option to securing Ukraine’s future as an independent, sovereign state.

Those who continue to oppose this plan must answer one simple question: what’s the alternative?

US officials explicitly warned that security guarantee offers “will not be on the table forever.”[5] This reflects the current US political environment. American political support for continued aid is neither as stable nor as widespread as it used to be. This is especially true among Republican and independent voters.[6] Europe is also bitterly divided, with far-right parties gaining support, often advocating for ending aid to Ukraine. European unity is also fracturing under economic and political pressure, as the recent divisions over how to fund the war illustrated.[7] The coalition supporting Ukraine won’t hold indefinitely.

Despite what some commentators claim, the situation on the ground is looking very bleak for Ukraine.[8] Russia’s territorial gains follow a consistent, measurable pattern, representing not spectacular breakthroughs but methodical, grinding advances that compound over time, reflecting a war of attrition that Russia is better positioned to win. Since February 2022, Russia has captured 29,000 square miles. That’s 12% of Ukraine. In total, including Crimea, Russia controls 20% of Ukrainian territory. Between November 25 and December 22, 2025, Russian forces gained 138 square miles of Ukrainian territory, averaging 176 square miles per month since January 2025.[9] At the current rate of advance, Ukraine faces the loss of an additional 1,014 square miles over the next six months and 2,028 square miles within one year. By December 2027, if current trends continue, Ukraine will have ceded approximately 50% more territory than Russia controls today. The cities and regions at risk include critical logistics hubs that, once lost, would compromise Ukraine’s ability to defend remaining positions.

More importantly, the hoped for Russian collapse is not coming. While getting accurate casualty numbers on both sides is difficult, Russia continues to recruit 50-60,000 new troops monthly[10], while Ukraine is forced to rely on grabbing young men off the streets.[11] Russia’s population of 144 million versus Ukraine’s 37 million reflects a brutal fact: in a war of attrition, size matters. Furthermore, despite the continued sanctions, Russia’s economy is not collapsing anytime soon and is even projected to grow in the coming years.[12] Nor has its ability to produce weapons. It is estimated that Moscow has tripled its tank production since the start of the war.[13] Ukraine has fought magnificently. But courage doesn’t change demographic realities or industrial capacity. Russia has substantial advantages with its larger industrial base and ability to mobilize far more soldiers.

Those who argue that Ukraine should wait for a better deal, ignore the fact that as it loses territory, and its infrastructure collapses, its negotiating position does not improve.

It gets worse! Nor is there much hope that its Western partners will be able to rescue it. NATO weapons production continues to lag behind Russia’s despite having larger military budgets.[14] And the continuous supply of new “game-changing” weapons, whether it was HIMARS, ATACMS, Storm Shadow missiles, or F-16s, have made little difference in the progress of the war. Thus, the choice is clear: the pursuit of a perfect peace that doesn’t exist or accepting an imperfect peace that preserves Ukrainian statehood, secures NATO-equivalent protection, and opens the path to European integration.

Ukraine has already achieved something remarkable. It has forced Russia into a negotiation that grants Ukraine Western integration, massive reconstruction funding, and security guarantees that should prevent future Russian aggression. That’s not failure. That’s extracting the maximum possible from a terrible situation. The alternative to this imperfect peace is not a perfect peace. It’s more death, more destruction, more territorial losses, and eventually a worse peace forced from a position of weakness.

REFERENCES

[1] Russia Matters, “The Russia-Ukraine War Report Card, Nov. 12, 2025,” November 12, 2025, https://www.russiamatters.org/news/russia-ukraine-war-report-card/russia-ukraine-war-report-card-nov-12-2025

[2] UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, “Number of civilians killed and injured in Ukraine reaches three-year monthly high in July 2025,” August 13, 2025, https://ukraine.ohchr.org/en/Number-of-civilians-killed-and-injured-in-Ukraine-reaches-three-year-monthly-high-in-July-2025-UN-human-rights-monitors-say

[3] Ben Aris, “Bne IntelliNews – Putin Is Pulling His Ukraine Blackout Power Punches,” BNEIntelliNews, December 18, 2025, https://www.intellinews.com/putin-is-pulling-his-ukraine-blackout-power-punches-417008.

[4] Barak Ravid and Dave Lawler, “Trump’s Ukraine-Russia Peace Plan, in the Full 28 Points,” Axios, November 20, 2025, https://www.axios.com/2025/11/20/trump-ukraine-peace-plan-28-points-russia.https://www.cnn.com/2025/12/16/europe/trump-ukraine-russia-peace-deal-berlin-intl

[5] NBC News, “Ukraine peace talks: Putin, Donbas still in question despite security guarantees progress,” December 16, 2025, https://www.nbcnews.com/world/ukraine/ukraine-peace-talks-russia-putin-donbas-security-guarantees-rcna249448

[6] Moira Fagan, “Republicans and Democrats Continue to Differ over U.S. Support for Ukraine,” Pew Research Center, February 13, 2025, https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2025/02/14/americans-views-of-the-war-in-ukraine-continue-to-differ-by-party/sr_25-02-14_ukraine-views_2/.

[7] Ben Aris, “Reparation Loan Fails, Last Chance All-or-Nothing Meeting in Miami This Weekend,” bneeditor.substack.com, December 19, 2025, https://bneeditor.substack.com/p/reparation-loan-fails-last-chance.

[8] “Ukraine Scrabbles for Handholds against Russia’s Massive Assault,” Economist, December 17, 2025, https://www.economist.com/europe/2025/12/17/ukraine-scrabbles-for-handholds-against-russias-massive-assault.

[9] “The Russia-Ukraine War Report Card, Dec. 23, 2025,” Russia Matters, Dec. 23, 2025, December 22, 2025, https://www.russiamatters.org/news/russia-ukraine-war-report-card/russia-ukraine-war-report-card-dec-23-2025.

[10] “Russian Force Generation and Technological Adaptations Update June 6, 2025,” Institute for the Study of War, September 2, 2025, https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-june-6-2025/.

[11] Mansur Mirovalev, “Ukraine’s Conscription Crisis: Alleged Abuse Leads to Protests, Emigration,” Al Jazeera, August 8, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/8/8/ukraines-conscription-crisis-alleged-abuse-leads-to-protests-emigration#:~:text=For%20more%20than%20two%20years,seat%20of%20his%20old%20Skoda.

[12] Nicholas Fenton and Alexander Kolyandr, “Down but Not out: The Russian Economy under Western Sanctions,” CSIS, April 11, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/down-not-out-russian-economy-under-western-sanctions.

[13] “Russia Has Tripled Production of T-90M Tanks: Can It Keep up with Wartime Attrition?,” Military Watch Magazine, June 20, 2025, https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russia-tripled-production-t90m-keep-up-wartime-attrition.

[14] Marianna Satta, “The Strategic Ammunition Gap: NATO’s Industrial Lag Risks Deterrence,” Atlas Institute for International Affairs, October 19, 2025, https://atlasinstitute.org/the-strategic-ammunition-gap-natos-industrial-lag-risks-deterrence/.

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