The attacks of 7 October 2023 constitute one of the most lethal episodes of non-state violence in recent history. More than 1,200 people were killed inside Israel and approximately 250 individuals were abducted to the Gaza Strip. It was the deadliest single day for Jews since the Holocaust and, by fatalities, the most severe terrorist attack in Israel’s history. In comparative perspective, it ranks second only to the 9/11 (2,977 fatalities) and is broadly comparable to the Camp Speicher massacre [^[1]] perpetrated by ISIS in 2014 in Iraq (estimated 1,095–1,700 fatalities). These benchmarks underscore the scale of the event and frame the debate about Hamas, its origins, transformations, and potential trajectories following the fragile ceasefire concluded at Sharm el-Sheikh on 13 October 2025 [^[2]], widely attributed to U.S. mediation.

In the aftermath of the 1947–1949 Arab Israeli war and Israel’s consolidation as a state, the Gaza Strip came under Egyptian military administration. Large numbers of displaced Arabs, settled in camps throughout the enclave, providing the social base for an emergent “Palestinian resistance.” During the 1950s, cross-border raids by fedayeen (فِدائيّين, “those who sacrifice themselves”), increasingly organized or facilitated by Egypt in the latter half of the decade, prompted Israeli reprisal operations (e.g., “Black Arrow” [^[3]]) and helped set conditions for the 1956 Suez War. Israel’s brief occupation of Gaza during that conflict, largely dismantled the fedayeen infrastructure, though cross-border violence persisted.

The June 1967 war further transformed the conflict’s geography. Israel captured Gaza alongside East Jerusalem, the West Bank, the Golan Heights, and the Sinai Peninsula (returned to Egypt under the 1979 Camp David Accords, implemented in 1982). Israel established a military government in Gaza and, over time, civilian settlements. In 1987, amid the First Intifada (انتفاضة, “uprising”), the Muslim Brotherhood’s Gaza branch launched Hamas (حماس – “ardor”), formally the Islamic Resistance Movement (حركة المقاومة الإسلامية), as a distinct organization aimed at institutionalizing Islamic resistance to Israel.

Although Hamas has portrayed itself as the Palestinian extension of the Brotherhood, the two diverged in organizational design, repertoire, and political theory.

The Brotherhood emphasized religious reform and gradualist participation in state institutions; Hamas, while sharing a Sunni Islamist worldview that treats Islam as a comprehensive social and political order, developed a dual structure: a civil organization and a military wing, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades (كتائب عز الدين القسام), established in 1991. Hamas built its own leadership and command network and sustained financing, with external support from Iran, Qatar, and Turkey among others. Crucially, it consistently advocated armed struggle against Israel, even when tactically embracing ceasefires.

The Oslo process (1993–1995) brought mutual recognition between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), created the Palestinian Authority (PA), and inaugurated limited Palestinian self-rule. Hamas, not a party to Oslo, rejected the accords and sought to undermine them, including through attacks inside Israel. While the Second Intifada (2000–2005) had multiple causes, Hamas’s opposition to Oslo formed part of the broader breakdown of the peace process. The presidential election of January 2005 delivered Mahmoud Abbas (Fatah) a mandate to re-engage diplomatically. However, the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) elections in January 2006 produced an unexpected Hamas majority, catalyzing a violent split with Fatah. By mid-2007 [^[4]], Hamas exercised de facto control over Gaza, while the PA, dominated by Fatah, retained authority in the West Bank and continued to serve as the principal interlocutor for Israel and the international community.

From 2007 onward, Hamas consolidated authoritarian control in Gaza. International human rights organizations documented arbitrary detentions, abuses against rivals, and extrajudicial killings. The 2017 “Document of General Principles and Policies” [^[5]] signaled an ideological recalibration: Global recognition of a Palestinian state within 1967 borders, while neither recognizing Israel nor renouncing armed resistance. Economically, the Israeli (and, in practice, Egyptian) blockade constrained formal commerce and employment, leaving the isolated Gaza heavily dependent on international aid. Evidence from 2007–2023 indicates that Hamas invested significant resources in an extensive tunnel network, rocket and mortar capabilities, and military infrastructure, often embedded in dense urban areas, while Iran provided material support, training, and technical know-how. This period also saw recurrent large-scale hostilities (notably 2008–2009, 2012, 2014, and 2021) [^[6]], with high Palestinian civilian casualties, and significant damage to infrastructure, reinforcing a pattern of cyclical escalation and temporary ceasefires.

The war that erupted following 7 October 2023 did not produce a definitive political settlement. The ceasefire announced at Sharm el-Sheikh on 13 October 2025, fragile by design, left core issues unresolved. Among its contentious provisions were disarmament steps for Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), reportedly deferred to enable immediate public-order functions in Gaza. Key implementation questions remain: the timing and verification of disarmament; the identity and authority of the enforcing actors; and the composition of Gaza’s governing apparatus, whether technocrats of Palestinian origin, a restructured and re-legitimized PA, or an interim international administration. The strategic choices embedded in this governance design will heavily influence Hamas’s future.

Coming to the prospective trajectories, three scenarios capture the most discussed pathways: Denied governance, Hamas reverts to a clandestine network with terrorist attacks. The likelihood of this outcome increases absent a credible political horizon and amid rising civilian casualties. Prolonged exposure of Gaza’s population, particularly youth, to trauma and deprivation risks replenishing insurgent recruitment pools.

In the second scenario, Hamas transforms into a political organization without an armed wing, seeking formal participation in a reconfigured Palestinian political order. Israel and key external actors might tolerate such a transition if demobilization is verifiable. Preconditions would include meaningful disarmament steps, improved relations with Israel, and integration into a reformed PA framework capable of commanding domestic legitimacy.

In the third option, Hamas openly enters politics while retaining (or covertly rebuilding) military capabilities. In the near term, such a model could reduce large-scale warfare if external monitoring and aid conditionality are robust; over time, however, it risks institutionalizing armed veto power within Gaza’s polity and perpetuating cycles of deterrence and escalation.

Several external and internal variables will shape which scenario emerges. First, the policy and resource commitments of regional patrons, most notably Iran, will affect Hamas’s capacity to regenerate militarily. Second, Israeli choices on crossings, trade, and the broader blockade will influence whether Gaza can attain a minimally self-sustaining economy compatible with de-radicalization. Third, the PA’s reform, performance, and legitimacy will determine whether it can credibly govern Gaza and cohere national institutions. Fourth, the pace and equity of reconstruction will affect public support for armed or political strategies. Finally, progress toward wider international recognition of Palestinian statehood, even if border demarcation requires further negotiation, could alter incentive structures on all sides.

The events of 7 October 2023 have reshaped regional security and Palestinian politics, but they did not resolve the strategic dilemma at Gaza’s core: how to align governance, reconstruction, and security in ways that reduce incentives for violence while preserving political agency for Palestinians and security for Israelis.

Whether Hamas persists as an underground insurgency, reinvents itself as a political actor, or occupies a hybrid space, will depend less on declaratory texts than on the institutional design of Gaza’s “day-after,” the credibility of enforcement mechanisms, and the availability of a negotiated political horizon.

REFERENCES

1. Human Rights Watch, ‘Iraq: Set Aside Verdict in Massacre of Cadets’, July 16, 2015 https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/07/16/iraq-set-aside-verdict-massacre-cadets?utm_source=chatgpt.com ↑

2. CBS News, ‘Trump, world leaders sign Gaza peace deal after Hamas frees all living hostages’, Oct 13, 2025. https://www.cbsnews.com/live-updates/israel-hamas-peace-deal-live-updates-hostages-trump-knesset-egypt/?utm_source=chatgpt.com ↑

3. Michael B. Oren, ‘Escalation to Suez: The Egypt-Israel Border War, 1949-56’, Journal of Contemporary History Vol. 24, No. 2, Studies on War, Apr 1989, pp. 347-373, Sage Publications, Ltd. ↑

4. Glenn E. Robinson, ‘Gaza 2014: Hamas’ Strategic Calculus’, Parameters 44, no. 4, 2014, https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2973&context=parameters&utm_source=chatgpt.com ↑

5. The Islamic Resistance Movement, ‘A Document of General Principles and Policies’, May 2017, https://palwatch.org/storage/documents/hamas%20new%20policy%20document%20010517.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com ↑

6. OCHA, ‘Data on Casualties’, https://www.ochaopt.org/data/casualties?utm_source=chatgpt.com ↑