The author of this article is Dr. Cyril Widdershoven
Greece’s upstream reboot: deepwater bets, LNG gateways, and the race to turn a transit map into molecules
Southern European Greece has stepped up its efforts to gain a pivotal role in the EU’s energy supply and security. After a decade of discussion and time spent reimagining its role as a gas gateway to Southeast Europe, Athens now seems to be taking significant steps. In the last 14 days, it has adopted an even bolder approach: it has submitted a credible bid to return as a gas producer. Backed by two significant upstream deals — an ExxonMobil farm-in off the Ionian coast and a Chevron–HelleniQ pairing named preferred bidder south of Crete — could be pushing Greek acreage back onto the Mediterranean exploration map. At the same time, Athens has at last stepped up its efforts regarding its natural gas supply issues, announcing the start-up of the Alexandroupolis floating LNG terminal and a first long-term U.S. LNG supply contract. Combining these two efforts — upstream optionality and concrete midstream leverage — has attracted renewed international attention. The main question, however, still to be answered in the coming months or years, is whether geology, geopolitics, and Europe’s decarbonisation timetable will allow Greece to turn momentum into molecules.
Paper barrels or reality: Ionian Sea and south-of-Crete
As international media have reported widely, US major ExxonMobil agreed on November 6 to farm into Block 2 in the Ionian Sea alongside oil and gas independent Energean and HelleniQ Energy. The farm-in entails ExxonMobil taking a 60% stake and assuming operatorship of Block 2, a location with significant potential for gas exploration. Current information indicates that guidance points to spending $50–100 million on initial exploration, with the first drilling not before early 2027. The latter approach suggests that Greece will not see any commercial gas production before the early 2030s. Even though there is still a long time span to cover, Greek officials have already reported that the ExxonMobil farm-in will mark the first meaningful U.S.-major upstream entry in a decade. Athens reiterates that this is also a vote of confidence in the Ionian margin’s potential.
The ExxonMobil farm-in follows the previously reported preferred bidder status in October 2025 of a consortium made up of US major Chevron and HelleniQ for the exploration of four deep-water blocks south of the Peloponnese and Crete. The latter deal could be significant, as it entails ultra-deep acreage with long timelines (seismic from 2026, possible test wells 2030–2032), while financials could be an issue if crude oil prices are low. At the same time, the Greek Court of Auditors and Parliament still need to clear the contracts. Still, the road taken by Greece is clear, Athens majors’ balance sheets and subsurface toolkits in both the west and south play.
Even though optimism is very high in Greek politics and offices, it should still be tempered a bit, as the results will not be seen before the 2030s.
Neither package transforms supply overnight. Oil and gas analysts are still cautious, as all blocks involved are frontier-ish gas hunts, a term used to describe high-risk, high-reward exploration activities in unproven areas, where probability trees will still dominate long press releases. However, Athens has been able to swing public opinion, especially as the East Med region has become volatile and changes occur almost daily. The area has been witnessing a situation in which the investment spotlight has swung between Egypt’s LNG plants, Israel’s stop-start field politics, and Cyprus’s stranded discoveries. The Greek opportunities, which are locked to a two-front approach, could be very advantageous. Ionian as a nearer-term, shallower prospect set; south of Crete as a bigger, riskier swing.
Greek gas balance: from importer to hub (or future exporter)
With domestic gas production negligible, Greece is a net importer of natural gas. The country’s total energy system relies on LNG and pipeline flows that Athens increasingly re-routes north into Bulgaria, Romania, and beyond.
The government also needs to address its rapidly increasing gas consumption, as it increased by ~30% year-on-year in 2024. The latter is mainly caused by power-sector burning and industrial demand.
Athens’ main hub ambition is anchored on three assets at present:
- Revithoussa LNG terminal near Athens (workhorse of the 2022–23 supply shock).
- the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), which has now delivered 50 bcm since start-up, bringing Azeri volumes into the EU via northern Greece; and
- the IGB interconnector to Bulgaria, which unlocked northbound flows and the so-called “vertical corridor.”
In the last 12 months, another part has become available: the Alexandroupolis FSRU. Since October 1, 2024, the latter is operational, mainly supplying the Balkans, and in the near future, Ukraine via Romania. The FSRU, combined with DESFA’s grid upgrades, has now positioned Greece as a redistribution node rather than a mere sink for gas in global markets. In October 2025, DESFA reported that gas exports and transits were already surging, with total demand, including exports, reaching 56.36 TWh in the first three quarters. DEFSA also stated that northbound flows were rising sharply as regional buyers arbitraged LNG against pipeline imports.
American LNG and Greek metal
While the history of relations between the USA and Greece has been checkered and at times even volatile, Washington and Athens seem to be on the same page. Growing trans-Atlantic deals clearly reinforce Greece’s role as a hub. As reported, Athens signed its first long-term US LNG contract on November 7, 2025, for 0.7 bcm/y over 20 years from 2030. Both sides agree that the deal signed in Athens, mainly tied to DEPA and Venture Global, is meant to push out or substitute Russian molecules across the EU. For Washington, it is a significant opportunity, as the Trump Administration announced last week that the U.S. logged a record 10.1 million tons of LNG exports in October. For Europe, US LNG will be a central pillar for Europe’s natural gas supply stack throughout the 2030s. US diplomats have also reiterated that Greece is considered a gateway for American LNG into Eastern and Central Europe. The US government clearly indicated that it has an eye on the Alexandroupolis linkages and the northbound network extending “to Ukraine.” The underlying message, however, is clear: Greece should take it into account for sure; it is less about Greek demand than about Greek geography.
Greece’s role in the East Med chessboard
The renewed interest in Greece clearly is linked to the broader East Med energy puzzle, whose pieces have shifted since 2022:
- Egypt at present remains the region’s only optional LNG exporter (Idku and Damietta, 12.7 mtpa combined). Its exporter’s role, however, has been constrained by its domestic gas balance and power shortages. East Med coordination is key for Egypt, but the molecules are an issue.
- Israel is wrestling with field governance, security risk, and export pathway politics after repeated shocks.
- Cyprus has discovered gas, but the financials are a significant constraint. The cost-effective monetization of its resources is directly linked to regional (contested) pipelines, whereas a standalone LNG plant is not commercially viable at all.
- Turkey remains the region’s most muscular transit state, but its conflicts with Cyprus, Greece, and increasingly Israel block any possible opening.
Libya’s Tripoli-based authorities are also getting involved, especially given that Libya has protested Greek licensing south of Crete, arguing that there is maritime overlap. The latter is not only linked to Libya, but a significant power play by Turkey.
Taking all the above into account, Greece seems to have decided to set up and implement its own hedged strategy: secure majors for both the Ionian and the south of Crete; deepen LNG import capacity and re-export routes; and tie the whole lot to EU security-of-supply priorities. While the media is looking at the molecules (LNG, deepwater offshore), Athens tries to use its other capacity —molecules that move through Greek pipes and ports, regardless of where they were produced.
At the same time, Athens will need to assess and obtain the necessary environmental and social licenses. NGOs have been very active in protesting any exploration in the vicinity of the Hellenic Trench. Environmental groups have warned about the impact on cetaceans and the effects of seismic noise. There is also a significant presence of sperm whales and other species in areas with winter-only survey windows. Greece will also have to address societal and ESG-related questions, such as its overall position on natural gas. The latter should be addressed by arguing that gas is a transitional hedge while renewables and interconnectors scale, and by secondly asserting that EU security of supply after 2022 justifies prudent upstream exploration proximate to EU markets.
Still, the situation for Greece has changed dramatically, increasingly for the positive. There are three tangible shifts;
- Greece can push at present genuine upstream options. The participation of major US oil and gas majors shows that competence and capital will be available. Timelines are long, but the odds of a respectable appraisal program in the late 2020s have materially improved.
- Greece as an LNG Gateway now has been backed up by the Alexandroupolis FSRU, but also by Revithoussa seasoned, TAP proven, and IGB unblocked. The Greek market can now take spot and term cargoes (increasingly American) and route them to the Balkans.
- Athens’ regional energy and political leverage have increased. After years of political discussions and hot-air ballooning, Greece can now have a stronger voice in European gas policies, thanks to the infrastructure that now exists to make diplomacy bite.
Risks to be dealt with
Analysts and experts agree that Greece will need to address geology and timelines. The Ionian prospects will be long-term, taking years to materialize, while South of Crete is deep, complex, and legally fussy. If all is being dealt with before 2032, Greece would have set a new standard in the Mediterranean.
At the same time, Athens will face significant policy headwinds, mainly due to the tightening of the EU decarbonisation policy. Athens will need to address the fact that Brussels will challenge locking 20-year LNG deals beyond 2040. Investors and operators will also call for so-called no-regret midstream: reversible facilities, hydrogen/ammonia-ready designs, and de-risked offtake to neighboring markets.
As always, Greece will have to deal with clear and future maritime disputes. Additionally, there is always the issue of price and demand uncertainty.
As a Northern European, whenever discussing Mediterranean projects, but especially Greek projects, the old saying pops up, “Who Pays The Ferryman?” In the case of the Greek upstream future, the checks, however, are not immense—quite the opposite, in fact—especially by super-major standards. The tens of millions needed for early exploration will not be an issue. The development phase of the proposed projects, however, will be counted in billions, which would require clarity on market access (TAP expansion, long offtake in Italy, and others) and on carbon. The carbon issue should not be underestimated, as banks and export credit agencies will ask about the CO₂ intensity of production. The answer will shape whether upstream dollars crowd in—or stall at appraisal. Regarding the LNG and midstream projects, markets are interested and clearly have a strong lender appetite.
Overall, there are several options for how Greece can turn the current moment into a resilient strategy with positive outcomes. Athens will have to nail the “vertical corridor” and make it bankable, which entails ensuring that the northbound capacity is very predictable and that the cross-border balancing arrangements are clear. Athens should push for regional capacity auctions and harmonized balancing with Bulgaria and Romania.
Upstream, it will be necessary to keep the majors engaged through predictable permitting. Greece will need to provide fast, credible ESIAs; clear winter-survey calendars; streamlined state approvals; otherwise, ExxonMobil/Chevron will slip Greek assets down global portfolios, as other regions are also competing for capital. Without a doubt, Athens will need Brussels’ blessing, especially regarding pairing exploration with visible decarbonisation. Also, use momentum to crowd in industrial investment through LNG contracts. If US LNG is entering Greece from 2030 onwards, the country could be courting energy-intensive investors (fertilizer, petrochemicals, data centers). It could also already put in place infrastructure that could be reconfigured for low-carbon hydrogen/ammonia later in the 2030s.
Last but not least, which is somehow always critical in Mediterranean projects, DON’T OVER-PROMISE TIMELINES. The most feasible message that should come from Athens is:
“We will test the Ionian in 2027–29, prepare south-of-Crete for the early 2030s, and in the meantime monetize our hub role”.
Bottom Line
In recent years, even though it was somehow hidden under the surface, Greece has been very successful in setting three things. It has lured back US majors’ interest in offshore. At the same time, it has converted the LNG gateway discussion into operational infrastructure. Last but not least, Athens has crafted a high-level diplomatic narrative on EU energy security and East Med cooperation through the EMGF—none of the above guarantees molecules, a successful upstream project, or income generation.
The real outcome is that all has flipped Greece’s energy story from passive recipient to active shaper.
While history has not been positive for Greek projects or energy-related strategies, the momentum could now change. When keeping in mind that Athens will never become a petro-state, the real opportunity is that it could become a more valuable partner in the volatile European arena. It should mainly push the new position so that it can move energy to where it is needed, regardless of its origins.