Lebanon remains tripped in a quagmire of political dysfunction, economic collapse, and security challenges. While the election of President Joseph Aoun in 2024 briefly raised hopes for reform and stability, those aspirations have since faded in the face of entrenched political paralysis and the inability of the political elite to address critical national priorities. This domestic stalemate is compounded by the broader regional dynamics that continue to shape Lebanon’s trajectory, for better or worse.
Despite its weakened military capabilities, Hezbollah retains significant political and social influence in Lebanon. The group has masterfully exploited the fragility of state institutions, portraying itself as an indispensable actor in the country’s security landscape. By leveraging ceasefire agreements and Israel’s continued military occupation in Southern Lebanon, Hezbollah justifies its arsenal and portrays disarmament as both unfeasible and dangerous. Its narrative is bolstered by a sophisticated propaganda apparatus, which stokes fears of extremist threats from Syria and positions the group as the ultimate protector of Lebanon in general and the Shia community in particular. Such a narrative has been recently reinforced by comments made by Tom Barrack. the U.S. Ambassador to Türkiye and envoy to Lebanon and Syria, who resurrected historical grievances such as Syria annexing Lebanon or the latter’s security being outsourced to the new pro-U.S. Syrian regime. Even if the intention of these statements were to incentivise Lebanon, their form, substance and timing were largely inappropriate and actually led to an adverse effect, thus strengthening Hezbollah.
Added to a pervasive lack of pollical and public will for reforms, the political and security impasse has further paralyzed Lebanon’s overdue key reforms such as the frozen bank deposit crisis, economic remodeling and fiscal restructuring…etc. Without these reforms, Lebanon’s economic recovery remains a distant dream, leaving vulnerable communities increasingly reliant on political patronage networks for basic services and economic support—chief among them, Hezbollah.
Israel’s novel security paradigm, shaped by its trauma from October 7, 2023, has significant implications for Lebanon, as it emphasizes demilitarized buffer zones and unrestricted operational freedom across its borders. In Lebanon, this has translated into a continued occupation by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) of five locations, and a de facto buffer zone in Southern Lebanon through aerial surveillance and civilian intimidation.
While tacitly acknowledging the competence of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in southern Lebanon, Israel shows little interest in dismantling Hezbollah’s broader security infrastructure, focusing instead on neutralizing its missile and drone arsenals in order to curb its offensive capabilities. In this context, the LAF, widely respected for its professionalism, remains severely underfunded due to conditional international aid tied to broader political reforms beyond the LAF’s control. This undermines the LAF’s ability to fill the security vacuum in Hezbollah-dominated areas, weakening the only national institution that still enjoys broad public trust. A more robust and unconditional support framework for the LAF could gradually erode Hezbollah’s influence without inciting further instability.
The emergence of a post-Assad transitional government in Syria at the beginning of 2025 raised hopes for the stabilization of a country ravaged by a brutal war since 2011. That optimism has since faded as Syria has become a battleground for competing geopolitical interests—particularly involving Israel and Türkiye. The instability in – and fragmentation of- Syria now spills over into Lebanon, providing Hezbollah with a political and public leverage, making its disarmament and political reform even more challenging. Moreover, Syria’s disintegration exacerbates Lebanon’s Syrian refugee crisis, placing immense strain on its already fragile economy and social fabric.
Iran’s momentary vulnerability in mid-2025, compounded by the earlier fall of Bashar Assad and the weakening of Hezbollah, presented a unique opportunity to degrade its regional influence. However, the U.S. and its allies failed to act decisively, allowing Tehran to recover politically and diplomatically. Iran’s efforts to rebuild its network of influence now pose a renewed challenge for Lebanon, as it reinforces Hezbollah’s position in Lebanon. As Tehran regains its footing, it is likely to double down on its support for Hezbollah, both as a deterrent against Israel and as a means of shoring-up its influence in the Levant, thus further complicating efforts to disarm the group.
The competing agendas of the U.S. and Iran have become starkly visible in Lebanon in recent months, further eroding the state’s already feeble credibility. Washington’s push to disarm Hezbollah was channeled through a publicly debated, so‑called “American Paper,” a move that, whatever are its substantive merits, exposed the government to accusations of tutelage, undercut its reformist posture, and handed opponents an easy sovereignty critique; an outcome that a diplomatically tactful and more discreet process might have mitigated. Tehran, for its part, seized the optics: during a visit to Beirut, Iran’s head of the Supreme National Security Council, Ali Larijani condemned U.S. interference and alleged double standards in the government’s tolerance of diplomatic commentary, even as Iran’s own involvement remains salient. Two episodes captured this paradox: the prime minister’s censure of Iranian meddling days after his cabinet endorsed a U.S.-drafted disarmament proposal, and an Iranian envoy’s defense of Lebanese sovereignty alongside a visibly injured Iranian ambassador, hurt in the wave of pager explosions attributed to Israel. The ambassador’s association with a device linked to Hezbollah operatives would itself signal improper entanglement. These dynamics intensify polarization, weaken state authority, and complicate any credible pathway to political and security reform.
Despite the headwinds, Lebanon still has a workable path forward—one that synchronizes security, political, and economic tracks rather than advancing them in isolation. LAF have shown since late 2024 that disciplined deployments and coordination in the South can reduce the operational space for non‑state armed actors, and that this performance should be scaled into a phased, nationwide disarmament process under a clear mandate, measurable benchmarks, and sustained external backing. This requires intensified, predictable support to the LAF so the state, not armed factions, provides security.
Two critical issues further complicate Lebanon’s path forward: Israel’s continued occupation of five locations in Southern Lebanon, and the lack of funding to reconstruct both the South and Beirut’s southern suburbs—areas widely regarded as Hezbollah strongholds. If the U.S., Israel, and the GCC genuinely see their interests aligned with the emergence of a strong, legitimate, and credible central government in Lebanon, then any serious effort to disarm Hezbollah must be accompanied by a phased withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory. At present, prospects for reconstruction remain bleak, hindered by the reluctance of major donors to commit resources and by Israel’s stringent security measures, including a de facto ban on civilian access to a self-declared buffer zone along the border. Should Lebanon begin implementing concrete steps toward disarmament and reform, the international community must be prepared to launch a substantial assistance program—one that includes intensified support to the Lebanese Armed Forces and meaningful efforts to address the Syrian refugee crisis.
Going forward, external pressures must be aligned and calibrated. Israel should intensify its targeted pressure on Hezbollah’s military apparatus—strictly avoiding civilian infrastructure—to highlight the costs of harboring an armed party and to prevent rally‑around‑the‑flag effects. In parallel, sustained, coordinated diplomatic pressure should be brought to bear on Lebanon’s political elite. GCC assistance—particularly from Saudi Arabia—can be tied to concrete reform benchmarks, while the U.S., EU, and IFIs align incentives (and targeted sanctions for obstruction) around an IMF‑anchored program covering fiscal consolidation, banking restructuring, electricity sector reform, customs and port governance, and judicial independence. Crucially, domestic popular pressure must assert local ownership of these reforms.
No strategy for Lebanon’s recovery can succeed without addressing the Syrian refugee crisis, which continues to strain the country’s social cohesion. Facilitating refugee return to Syria while pressuring and supporting Lebanon to properly distinguish between Economic Syrian Migrants and those who really qualify as refugees under international law, must therefore be treated as an integral part of Lebanon’s reform and recovery process, rather than a marginal issue.
Impulsive, poorly informed diplomacy and piecemeal steps will not set Lebanon on a path toward recovery and stability. Only coordinated, sustained pressure and support—strategically aligned over time—can shift the political calculus and enable meaningful change.