Amid the ongoing Ukraine conflict, on July 14th, after months of talks on ending the conflict between various intermediaries, President Trump announced that he was fed up with President Putin and that he was going to end the war by tightening the economic screws on Russia through the imposition of secondary tariffs on Russia’s trade partners if Moscow didn’t agree to a cease-fire in 50 days. This rather arbitrary deadline was adjusted on July 29th to 10-12 days, or July 8th or 10th, 2025.[1] The response was swift from Moscow and its trading partners, who dismissed the threat.[2] As the deadline approached and passed, President Trump announced that instead of imposing tariffs, he was going to meet President Putin in Alaska on August 15th, leaving the future of the secondary tariffs unclear.
This policy approach, however, represents a fundamental misunderstanding of both the nature of current global trade relationships and the limitations of unilateral economic coercion.
Building upon legislation proposed by Senators Lindsey Graham and Richard Blumenthal,[3] these tariffs reflect a profound misreading of how sanctions have actually performed since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Western policymakers have consistently overestimated the isolating effects of their sanctions regime while underestimating Russia’s adaptive capacity and its ability to circumvent the restrictions.
Additionally, the current sanctions, totaling over 16,500, have had no measurable impact on Russian behavior.[4] The idea that secondary tariffs can succeed where comprehensive primary sanctions have failed is unrealistic.
With limited US-Russian trade,[5] secondary tariffs represent a desperate attempt to create indirect pressure through third parties. This is problematic because it places enormous weight on their willingness to sacrifice their economic interests for American foreign policy objectives.
Critically, Washington behaves as if countries can easily redirect their energy procurement, ignoring both the physical infrastructure requirements and the price premiums involved in alternative supplies.
Russia exports its energy with significant discounts to its trading partners. This creates economic incentives that transcend political considerations, making their continuation of trade relationships a matter of national interest rather than mere commercial preference.
Sino-Russian trade has grown to $245 billion in 2024.[6] This represents not just commercial opportunism but a growing interdependent relationship, benefiting both countries’ increasingly complementary economies. While Russia relies on China for critical investment, China benefits from Russian oil and natural gas.[7] The bilateral trade partnership, with $129.32 billion in Russian exports to China and $115.49 billion in Chinese sales to Russia [8], serves both countries’ long-term interests. It is doubtful that China would sacrifice this relationship in response to American tariff threats.
Efforts to squeeze India are proving just as problematic. India imported about 1.8 million barrels per day of Russian crude in the first half of 2025, equaling about 37% of its oil imports [9], representing a significant increase over pre-invasion levels.[10] This dramatic expansion reflects India’s growing energy needs, with Russian oil offering both price advantages and supply security that alternative sources cannot match.
The assumption that India would abandon these compelling economic benefits to appease American trade threats ignores fundamental realities of Indian strategic culture, which explicitly rejects binary alignment choices.
New Delhi has already angrily dismissed secondary tariff threats, doubling down on their relations with Russia and pursuing a rapprochement with China rather than increasing compliance with U.S. preferences.[11]
Furthermore, the apparent targeting of India demonstrates a troubling inability to prioritize competing objectives. India’s collaboration in military partnerships including the QUAD, intelligence sharing, and technology cooperation is crucial if the US has any hope of containing China in the Indo-Pacific region. If Washington sees China as the major challenge moving forward,[12] its relationship with India provides far greater strategic value than any marginal gains in economic pressure on Russia, which will likely not impact Moscow’s behavior in any case.
The threat of secondary tariffs has implications beyond the immediate backlash from Russia’s trading partners, potentially accelerating the fragmentation of the global trading system and undermining American centrality in international commerce and its long-term national interest.
Secondary tariffs risk pushing major economies toward alternative arrangements that explicitly exclude American influence. The increased use of sanctions by the US as a tool of coercion has accelerated the creation of alternative payment systems, currency arrangements, and trading relationships that reduce the global economy’s dependence on dollar-denominated transactions. This is most clearly exemplified by the rise of BRICS+ alternative financial structures. Secondary tariffs are more likely to accelerate these trends than reverse them, hastening the decline of US hegemony.
Ultimately, the proposed secondary tariffs on Russia’s trading partners are both unrealistic and counterproductive. This approach ignores the structure of contemporary economic relationships and overestimates US leverage over other states when their national interests are at stake. Rather than changing Russian behavior, these tariffs will damage American strategic relationships, drive states interested in challenging US hegemony closer together, and accelerate the development of alternative economic institutions that undermine US global dominance.
REFERENCES
- “Instead of Sanctions, Donald Trump Announces a Summit with Russia,” The Economist, August 9, 2025, https://www.economist.com/europe/2025/08/09/instead-of-sanctions-donald-trump-announces-a-summit-wit-russia.
- Kevin Liptak, Rhea Mogul, and Nectar Gan, “Trump Vows More Secondary Sanctions for Russia Oil Buyers Are Coming, Including Potentially on China,” CNN, August 8, 2025, https://www.cnn.com/2025/08/07/world/trump-secondary-sanctions-china-intl-hnk.
- Elizabeth Crisp, “Graham, Blumenthal Hail Trump’s New Russia Sanctions Plan,” The Hill, July 14, 2025, https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/5400430-graham-blumenthal-trump-russia-sanctions/.
- R. David Edelman, Shelley Rigger, and Jordan Muchnick William A. Galston, “Sanctions on Russia: What’s Working? What’s Not?,” Brookings, July 11, 2024, https://www.brookings.edu/events/sanctions-on-russia-whats-working-whats-not/#:~:text=In%20response%20to%20Russia%27s%20invasion,Brookings%20Senior%20Fellow%20Fiona%20Hill.
- “Russia,” United States Trade Representative, accessed August 13, 2025, https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/europe-middle-east/russia-and-eurasia/russia#:~:text= U.S.%20goods%20and%20services%20trade,($263%20million)%20over%202023.
- Claus Soong et al., “China-Russia Dashboard: Facts and Figures on a Special Relationship,” Merics, July 31, 2025, https://merics.org/en/china-russia-dashboard-facts-and-figures-special-relationship#:~:text=China%2DRussia%20bilateral%20trade %20has,electronics%2C%20and%20other%20consumer%20products.
- Clara Fong and Will Merrow, “Where the China-Russia Partnership Is Headed in Seven Charts and Maps,” Council on Foreign Relations, December 12, 2024, https://www.cfr.org/article/where-china-russia-partnership-headed-seven-charts-and-maps#:~:text=Complementary%20Economies,call%20their%20relationship%20complementary%20economies.&text=Source:%20Observatory%20of%20Economic%20Complexity,by%203.6%20percent%20in%202023.
- China-russia 2024 trade value hits record high – Chinese customs | Reuters, January 13, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/markets/china-russia-2024-trade-value-hits-record-high-chinese-customs-2025-01-13/.
- Clyde Russell, The crude oil market bets Trump’s India threats are hollow | reuters, August 11, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/crude-oil-market-bets-trumps-india-threats-are-hollow-russell-2025-08-11/.
- Snapshot of India’s Oil & Gas Data monthly ready …, December 24, 2024, https://ppac.gov.in/download.php?file=whatsnew/1737011904_Snapshot-of-Indias-Oil-and-Gas-Data_WebUpload_December-2024_compressed.pdf.
- Sriram Iyer, “India Isn’t Flinching: Why Trump Might Be Misreading India’s Tariff Playbook,” CNBC, August 8, 2025, https://www.cnbc.com/2025/08/07/india-isnt-flinching-why-trump-might-be-misreading-indias-tariff-playbook.html.
- Annual threat assessment of the U.S. intelligence …, March 2025, https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2025-Unclassified-Report.pdf.