Prof. Kobi Michael and Jerome Vitenberg

On October 7, 2023, Hamas launched a shocking assault on Israel, unleashing barbaric violence that left approximately 1,200 people slaughtered, burned, raped, or beheaded, and 251 others abducted into the Gaza Strip. Fifty-nine hostages remain in Gaza at the time of writing, with 24 believed to be alive as of today. This brutality stunned the Israeli public, military, and political leadership, embedding itself in the Jewish collective consciousness as the greatest catastrophe since the Holocaust.^[1] The attack exposed critical vulnerabilities in Israel’s security apparatus, revealing intelligence failures and a disastrously slow operational response, both still under investigation.

Yet, beyond the immediate trauma, October 7 marked a turning point, galvanizing a unified national resolve to respond decisively by reformulating its grand strategy to reshape the regional order.

From the outset, Israel recognized that it faces a regional, multi-front war against the axis of resistance led by Iran, with Hamas as one component of this axis and the Gaza Strip as one front. Beyond combating Hamas, this was a fight for Israel’s right, as part of the free world, to defend itself against a radical, violent Islam that views Israel as the ultimate symbol of an infidel colonial world represented by the United States and Europe. The Israeli government swiftly outlined three objectives: eradicate Hamas as a governing and military force, secure the release of all hostages, and ensure Gaza no longer poses a perennial security threat to Israel. These goals shaped Israel’s military and political strategy, reflecting a commitment to immediate security and long-term stability.^[2]

The following day, October 8, 2023, Hezbollah escalated the conflict by joining the offensive, turning it into a multi-front war. Rockets soon rained from Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Iran itself, most notably during Tehran’s attacks on April 13, 2024^[3] and October 1, 2024.^[4] Guided by realist strategies and constrained by tactical limitations, Israel’s military adopted a pragmatic approach, concentrating forces on the southern front in Gaza rather than risking an intensive two-front war with Hezbollah in Lebanon. Israel deployed forces along the northern border to prevent a Hezbollah invasion but chose not to launch a preemptive attack, prioritizing resource allocation while pursuing the government’s objectives.

More broadly, the Gaza conflict reflects a struggle between the Western-led order and authoritarian regimes seeking to dismantle it, echoing Cold War dichotomies. This regional war reverberates globally as Russia and China, revisionist powers^[5] opposed to American hegemony, align with Iran’s axis of resistance.^[6] Viewing the conflict as an opportunity to undermine Western influence, they leveraged it to advance their strategic interests: Russia in Ukraine and China in the South China Sea. Their cooperation, from diplomatic backing to arms and technology supplies, transformed the war into a proxy battle within a contest for global dominance.

For Israel, the fight against Hamas transcended a local struggle; it became a stand for the free world’s right to defend itself against radical Islamic barbarism. As a Western-aligned democracy, Israel positioned itself as a bastion against extremist ideologies threatening not only its existence but also the values of liberty and human rights upheld by the West, and its right to self-defense.^[7]

Yet, despite this framing, the West’s response was fragmented. Israel faced swift criticism from the international community after an initial wave of empathy for its October 7 losses. Accusations of genocide emerged from UN organizations, Western foreign offices, international media, and student protests at prestigious universities. Recent evidence suggests some U.S. university demonstrations, particularly at Columbia University, were orchestrated by pro-Hamas students, some even suspected of having prior knowledge of the October 7 plan, and are now under US investigation.^[8] Even the Biden administration, a traditional ally, imposed obstacles like arms embargoes and opposed Israel’s military plans and pressured Israel to increase humanitarian aid into active war zones – despites Hamas’s well-documented control over aid distribution, which it uses it to rebuild its power and dominate the population^[9] – reflecting internal Western divisions that hindered Israel’s efforts.

Nevertheless, the shock of October 7 outweighed any resistance to Israel’s conduct of what it perceived as a war for survival. The attack shattered Israel’s trust in its neighbors, wrecking the previous mantra that it could manage relations through rational, peaceful and appeasing measures. For years, Israel had operated under a strategic doctrine based on the conception that assumed Hamas’s institutionalization would lead it to adopt responsible state behavior, prioritizing the well-being of its people and focusing on state building, thus allowing it to be contained and deterred through economic development and readiness to use decisive military force if needed.

Instead, funds from Qatar and humanitarian aid, intended to foster stability, were misused by Hamas to build warfare tunnels, extort locals for basic necessities, and control institutions like UNRWA’s educational system and Gaza’s hospitals, which became tools for indoctrination and anti-Israel operations. The catastrophic failure of this approach on October 7 led to its decisive rejection, prompting a shift to a proactive security posture.^[10]

The Hamas offensive forced Israel to reformulate its grand strategy. The severity of the attack and its escalation into a multi-front regional war, led and inspired by Iran, prompted Israeli leadership to conclude that it must shift from a strategy of containing and adapting to the existing system to one of changing it, known in strategic jargon as a change of second order.^[11] Beyond Hamas and Hezbollah, Iran orchestrates this coalition of proxies, forming the backbone of its “Ring of Fire,” a strategy developed over two decades with significant investment. Although Hamas likely withheld the exact timing of October 7 from Iran and Hezbollah to avoid leaks, Tehran’s deep involvement in planning and preparation is undeniable. Iran remains the head of the octopus, its tentacles extending through proxies with the ultimate goal of destroying Israel, a cornerstone of its regional ambitions.^[12]

Changing the existing system requires significantly weakening Iran as the leader of the axis of resistance. Focusing on Iran to alter the regional system would counter its aspirations for regional hegemony, its threats to destroy Israel, and its efforts to weaken the pragmatic Sunni Arab camp affiliated with the United States.

Thus, Israel’s campaign against Iran and its proxies not only safeguards its survival but also serves U.S. interests and those of Sunni Arab allies like Saudi Arabia and the UAE. By weakening Iran’s influence, Israel boosts the pragmatic Sunni camp, aligning with American efforts to counter Tehran’s ambitions and stabilize the Middle East.^[13]

Israel’s decisive military victories, nearly dismantling Hamas and crippling Hezbollah – notably through the Mossad’s “Grim Beeper” operation in September 2024 and massive attacks on their leadership and strategic weapon arsenal – triggered a domino effect.^[14] These successes first humiliated Iran by exposing its vulnerabilities, then led to the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, stripping Iran of its most significant asset and further weakening its military reach and prestige, potentially destabilizing the regime or curtailing its regional influence.

Hezbollah’s collapse indeed left Syria’s Assad regime without its key supporter, contributing to its downfall and a seismic shift in the regional balance. This, in turn, stripped Russia of its Middle Eastern foothold, exemplified by the withdrawal of vessels from the Tartus naval base, weakening Moscow’s influence amid its Ukraine war.^[15]

The fall of Assad reverberates further, potentially threatening Jordan’s^[16] border security and opposition stability, shifting Iraq’s sectarian dynamics, and risking a Muslim Brotherhood revival in Egypt, reshaping the region’s political landscape. Thus, the fall of the Assad regime is an event of tectonic importance, with far-reaching regional significance and considerable international implications. Seen from an Israeli perspective, the ultimate goal of this domino effect should be the fall of the regime in Iran or, at the very least, a deepening of the damage to Iran, particularly to its nuclear infrastructure but also by significantly disabling its regional influence.

Israel’s military effort is intended to destroy Hamas as a governmental and military entity; greatly weaken Hezbollah, enabling Lebanon to restore its sovereignty and functionality and align with the pragmatic Suni axis; weaken other Iranian proxies; and harm Iran by dismantling its air defense capabilities, severely damaging its ballistic missile production facilities, and exposing its vulnerabilities. Alongside the military effort, Israel is engaged in a political effort to expand and consolidate a new regional architecture by advancing the Abraham Accords, with an emphasis on normalization with Saudi Arabia,^[17] followed by potential normalization efforts with Lebanon and Syria. This new regional architecture will form a counter-axis to the Iranian axis, contributing to its weakening and restraint and, most importantly, to the stability and prosperity of the broader Middle East.

At this stage, changes and developments in the regional system remain fluid. For instance, it is unclear how Turkey will translate its hegemonic ambitions in the region or what its influence in Syria will be.^[18] It is also uncertain whether the new regime in Syria will succeed in stabilizing the country or if additional shockwaves will reach Jordan, Iraq, or even prompt a reorganization of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.

With Donald Trump’s election in November 2024 and his return to the White House, his administration has influenced the considerations and conduct of regional actors. His firm support for Israel and hardline stance against Iran, evident in Prime Minister Netanyahu’s recent high-profile White House visits, promise to accelerate the weakening of Tehran’s axis, bolster the Abraham Accords, and counter antagonistic powers like Russia and China. As President Trump envisions transforming the Gaza Strip from a land of conflict into a beacon of peace, replacing terrorist flags with stars and stripes, symbols of freedom, the Middle East stands on the cusp of a hopeful, prosperous future, embodying Western aspirations.

The October 7 attack, though a tragedy, catalyzed Israel’s strategic overhaul, transforming the Middle East’s power structure. By dismantling Iran’s proxies and fostering a new regional order, Israel not only secures its future but also exemplifies the free world’s resolve to confront radical threats. Despite the uncertainty, instability, and risks that persist, the October 7 Hamas attack and its aftermath prompted Israel to update and reboot its strategy, leading to a transformation of the regional system and laying the groundwork for reshaping it to ensure the stability, security, and prosperity the region craves. A most significant achievement is the reaffirmation of the free world’s right and ability to defend itself against radical Islamist threats that challenge its existence and seek to dismantle it.

1. Endnotes

   Mashiach, Amir, and Nitza Davidovitch. “Between Holocaust and National Tragedy–The Case of Israel.” Journal of Education Culture and Society 15, no. 2 (2024): 135-150. ↑

2. Netanyahu Benjamin, “Statement by PM Netanyahu”. Prime Minister Office Website, 29 November 2023. ↑

3. Williams, Dan and Hafezi, Parisa. “Iran launches retaliatory attack on Israel with hundreds of drones, missiles”. Reuters, 14 April 2024. ↑

4. Sorace, Stephen and Friden, Liz. “Iran fires multiple missile strikes across Israel”. Fox News, 1 October 2024. ↑

5. Latham, Andrew. “What is a ‘revisionist’ state, and what are they trying to revise?”. The Conversation, 31 March 2025 ↑

6. Dekel, Tomer. “Hamas and the new great game.” In INSS, vol. 27, no. 1, p. 3. 2024. ↑

7. Ben-David, Daniel. “Israel is on the front line of the battle for Western civilization, says diaspora minister”. The Jewish Chronicle, 17 November 2023. ↑

8. Sinclair, Annabel. “Columbia students accused of prior knowledge of 7 October in new Hamas lawsuit”. Jewish News, 26 March 2025. ↑

9. Margolin Devorah and Neumann Neomi. “Countering Hamas’s Shadow Governance in Gaza”. The Washington Institute for Near-East Policy, 25 October 2024. ↑

10. Laish, Gur. “The Long War Phenomenon: Is a New Security Concept Required After October 7?”. The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, 19 August 2024. ↑

11. SULLIVAN, MARK P. “Second Order Change.” The Mechanism for Strategic Coercion: Denial or Second Order Change? Air University Press, 1995, pp. 21-30. ↑

12. “Hamas’ strategy to destroy Israel: from theory into practice, as seen in captured documents”. The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 13 March 2025.
    See also: Special Dispatch 11439. “Iranian Officials Acknowledge Iran’s Role in Planning and Executing October 7 Hamas Invasion and Massacres in Southern Israel”. The Middle East Media Research Institute, 10 July 2024. ↑

13. Klein, Zvika. “Three-way subtext: How Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Egypt quietly back Israel on Iran – analysis”. The Jerusalem Post, 26 October 2024. ↑

14. McKernan, Bethan. “Hezbollah’s war with Israel left the Assad regime fatally exposed”. The Guardian, 8 December 2024. ↑

15. Riboua, Zineb. “Assad’s Collapse Is a Blow to Russia’s Middle East Strategy”. Hudson Institute, The National Interest, 11 December 2024. ↑

16. Winter, Ofir. “A Pivotal Player: Jordan and the New Syria”. The Institute for National Security Studies, Insight no 1931, 12 January 2025. ↑

17. Podeh, Elie. “Normalizing relations with Saudi Arabia provides new opportunities – opinion”. The Jerusalem Post, 25 January 2025. ↑

18. Lappin, Yaakov and Beeri, Tal. “Turkey’s Involvement and Entrenchment in Syria – Goals and Implications”. Alma Research and Education Center, 2 January 2025. ↑