The Head of States and Governments of the European Union Members, held an extraordinary – even ‘emergency’ – Summit in Brussels (6 Mar 2025), with the presence of the Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, to discuss the military future of the EU, in light of the Trump administration’s decision, to freeze the military and financial aid to Ukraine, including the provision of sensitive intelligence, such as targeting.

The motto to encapsulate the Council’s Decisions was ‘ReArm Europe’, a very ambitious initiative, to avail 800 billion euros to upgrade EU’s military capabilities, in order not only to support Ukraine to sustain the – now more than ever – unbalanced war against Russia, but also to upgrade and enhance EU’s member states’ ability to ‘commonly’ defend their soil.

In addition, it will offer ‘fiscal flexibility’, as the tight national budget constraints will be more relaxed on defense expenditures, and it will redirect EU funds to the defence industry through the existing mechanisms such as the European Defence Fund (EDF) [^[1]], the EU Permanent Structure Cooperation (PeSCo) [^[2]] and the European Defence Industrial Program (EDIP) [^[3]].

The follow-on ‘White paper for European defence – Readiness 2030’ [^[4]], sets out a vision for Europe to obtain the necessary military capabilities, by ensuring the European defence industry can produce at the requested speed and volume and – to that end – the European troops and assets could be rapidly deployed where needed, be it in European soil or elsewhere. In addition, the white paper underlines the need for addressing the military capability gaps and for supporting the European defence industry, including simplifying regulations and streamlining industrial programs. In the core of that concept is the preparedness for the worst-case scenarios, such as a full-scale war against Russia, by improving military mobility, stockpiling, and fostering operational cooperation across the EU.

The ReArm Europe Plan/ Readiness 2030 will boost defence funding by launching a 150 billion euros loan instrument called Security Action for Europe (SAFE), with funds raised on capital markets and disbursed to interested Member States upon demand, based on national plans. SAFE will also include a redirection of unused EU funds towards defence-related investments and therefore encourage Member States to spend ‘better, together and European’. The next 650 billion euros (until 2030) will be found by the activation of the national escape clause of the Stability and Growth Pact, allowing Member States to increase defence spending by almost 1.5% of their GDP. Finally, the European Investment Bank Group will widen the scope of its lending to defence and security projects to mobilize private capital, so that the European defence industry is not reliant on public investment alone.

It was not the first time that the strategic and operational autonomy of the Union has been on the table. However, that was the first time common defence was discussed in parallel, or even outside, of the security provisions of NATO’s Article V [^[5]], which offered the auspices of the collective defence guaranteed (more or less), by the United States. EU’s strategic autonomy has always been seen under the prism of complementarity with NATO, which always had the primary role.

From his first term in office (2017-2021) and even before that, President Trump showed his intentions regarding NATO: He criticized the Alliance referring to it as ‘obsolete’ on several occasions [^[6]]. He explained, though, that he mainly targeted NATO’s focus areas (Cold War threats vs. modern terrorism) and burden sharing (low European defense budgets) and not necessarily the whole organization per se. Moreover, there were reports that he threatened to withdraw from NATO (2018) [^[7]], as US might ‘go its own way’ if members didn’t meet their financial obligations. His stance led to the increase of European Allies’ defence budgets; however, it weakened cohesion, solidarity and mutual trust among NATO members. His statements and overall stance were – again – underestimated by the Europeans.

Earlier than that though, and always in close coordination with NATO, EU took a significant step towards its Common Security and Defence Policy in Lisbon (2007). The adoption of two articles, that of Article 42.7[^[8]] of the Treaty of the EU (TEU), the ‘mutual assistance clause’ and that of Article 222[^[9]] of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the ‘solidarity clause’ , offered the appropriate framework, although more political in the wording, to allow for a strong and coordinated EU military response to any aggressor.

The collective defence of the Euro Atlantic area, remained in NATO hands and – to that end – as long as the primus inter pares among the Allies stayed fully committed, the EU member states focused more on the political integration of the Union, which – of course – was also rather underachieving, mainly due to the mass enlargement of EU eastwards, twenty years ago. In addition, the BREXIT (2016-2022) came to further marginalize the efforts towards a more militarily autonomous Europe.

The next chapter on the EU Defence was written on the 3rd of February 2022. A catalytic EU-Ukraine Summit took place in Kyiv, only a few weeks before a new – the second in 8 years [^[10]] – Russian invasion of Ukraine (24 Feb 2022). The EU Leaders tried to deter Russia, by reaffirmed their unwavering support for Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity and by announcing a 1.2 billion euros emergency financial aid. Nevertheless, once again, EU member states took a diverging position regarding the Union’s overall posture, despite the agreed opposing to Russia’s invasion: From the hardliners, such as Poland and the Baltics, to the more moderate ones, like Slovakia and Cyprus. However, the strong pro-Russian position of Hungary, which maintains close economic and political ties with the Russian regime, is one of the reasons that EU did not manage to convey a credible message to Russia and to the World.

The ambitious plan of rearming Europe could – and in fact should – work towards the same end task: Protecting the sovereignty of the European countries against Russian aggression.

Although political will is in place and the resources have been allocated, the national agendas of the EU member states’, an inherent flaw in every supranational organization, will certainly hamper the effort. The unknown remains to what extend… For example, to which Member States will the funds go? What will the criteria be? Which programs will be given priority in the remedying of the existing capability gaps? The answers to those questions, along with the decision-making lengthy processes of EU, will probably – if not certainly – undermine the overall effort.

Another big obstacle to the EU’s strategic autonomy, is the potential role of the European NATO Member States that are not EU members, mainly the UK and Turkey. Both have a rather advanced defence industry and both claim a ‘fair share’ of the ‘European defence’. While UK maintained close military ties with the EU, after the unfortunate BREXIT, Turkey still occupies territory of one of the EU Member States and threatens with war another. A potential inclusion of Turkey in the ReArm Europe concept is a thorn in the side of the EU, as it will create frictions that will jeopardize the solidarity of the EU member states.

The undisputed fact of the shifting of US strategic center of gravity eastwards does not necessarily mean the dissolution of NATO, or the withdrawal of the US from it. However, there is constant pressure for the European NATO member states, or the EU as such, to come forward and fill the military gap in European soil. The Brussels Summit of the 6th of March 2025 could become a milestone for the EU and could go down in history along with those of Maastricht (1991) [^[11]], Nice (2000) [^[12]] and Lisbon (2007) [^[13]], provided that the implementation of ‘ReArm Europe’ will proceed quickly and will bear fruit in the coming few years.

REFERENCES

1. EDF: The main EU tool for defense cooperation, focused on research and development (R&D) and the joint acquisition of defense capabilities. https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/european-defence-fund-edf-official-webpage-european-commission_en ↑

2. PeSCo: Launched in December 2017 to enhance the EU’s defense capabilities and integration. Today, over 60 collaborative defense projects are underway (ie. Military Mobility, European Patrol Corvette, Cyber Rapid Response Teams etc). https://www.pesco.europa.eu/about/ ↑

3. EDIP: It provides financial support with €1.5 billion from the EU budget over the period 2025-2027. https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edip-dedicated-programme-defence_en ↑

4. https://commission.europa.eu/topics/defence/future-european-defence_en ↑

5. Washington Treaty (1949), Article V: ‘The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.’ https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm ↑

6. a. Trump’s 2016 Campaign Speech “NATO was set up to fight the Soviet Union. It’s obsolete because it’s designed for another time.”, The Washington Post, March 21, 2016.

   b. In a joint interview to “The Times” (UK) and “Bild” (Germany) on January 15, 2017, President Trump said: “I said a long time ago that NATO had problems. Number one, it was obsolete, because it was designed many, many years ago. Number two, the countries aren’t paying what they’re supposed to pay.”, The Times, January 15, 2017. ↑

7. NATO Summit, Brussels (July 2018): ‘We’re protecting Germany, we’re protecting France, we’re protecting everybody… and we’re paying a lot of money to protect….’ https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/trump-believes-us-paying-a-lot-of-money-to-protect-nato-allies/ ↑

8. Article 42(7) TEU – The EU’s mutual assistance clause: ‘If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.’ https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/article-427-teu-eus-mutual-assistance-clause_en ↑

9. Article 222 TFEU: ‘The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster.’ https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/tfeu_2016/art_222/oj/eng#:~:text=The%20Union%20and%20its%20Member%20States%20shall%20act,the%20victim%20of%20a%20natural%20or%20man-made%20disaster. ↑

10. The first one being the Annexation of Crimea in 2014, after the overthrow of Ukrainian pro-Russian president, Viktor Yanukovych and a controversial referendum on the 16th of March. Warsaw Institute, 24 April 2018 https://warsawinstitute.org/yanukovych-facilitated-annexation-crimea/ ↑

11. Maastricht Treaty, February 7, 1992: It laid the foundation for the modern EU and introduced the euro as a common currency. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/about-parliament/en/in-the-past/the-parliament-and-the-treaties/maastricht-treaty ↑

12. Nice Summit, December 10, 2000: Focus on European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), as it set the ground for the EU military operations. In addition, the reforms adopted in Nice, led to the enlargement of 2004, with 10 new members. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/nice1_en.htm ↑

13. Lisbon Treaty, December 13, 2007: Reformed EU governance (ie. President of the EU Council, European External Action Service, High Representative, expansion of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/lis/sign/eng ↑