Introduction

For 16 years, Hungary under Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz Party demonstrated a foreign policy diverging from its western partners. Friction was generated with the European Union and NATO through the use of unilateral veto threats, transactional arrangements, opposition to collective European defense initiatives, and an arguable pro-Russian stance. This status quo has since been disrupted by the new TISZA government formed after the 2026 Hungarian Parliamentary elections, realigning Hungary’s international posture. Prime Minister Péter Magyar’s political campaign was rooted in fundamentally altering the nearly two decades of Orbán’s previous directions, with foreign policy being one of the major areas for reform.¹ This pivot is expected to be critical for the future of European integration, the strategic cohesion of NATO, and Central European diplomacy. This makes understanding Hungarian foreign policy of great importance.

With the first 100 days of Hungary’s new leadership flying by under Péter Magyar, the hazy change in foreign policy is starting to take shape. Previously the only indicators of the new direction were seen by pre-election promises and some actions making headlines.

“On August 25, 2026, the guiding directives for the Hungarian delegation at the 81st Session of the UN General Assembly were made public. Driven by these recently declared foreign ministry guidelines and diplomatic actions, Hungary is seen shifting from transactional bilateralism to multilateral engagement, adopting a firm stance on Russian aggression while pivoting from diplomatic isolation to mainstream EU and NATO security stances.”

This paper provides an analysis of the structural mechanics behind Hungary’s strategic shift, by utilizing the previously mentioned new directives published in the official government gazette (Magyar Közlöny No. 117/2026), specifically Executive Resolution 1266/2026.² Combined with recent operational decisions made by the foreign ministry, the analysis outlines an evidence-based roadmap of the renewed Hungarian foreign policy.

From Transactional to Multilateral Diplomacy

The previous government under Orbán has relied heavily on transactional bilateral diplomacy, practically making it the basis of its foreign policy. This was seen at a fundamental level even through symbolic actions such as the addition of the word ‘trade’ to the title of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Külgazdasági és Külügyminisztérium or KKM). This structural change reinforced the concept of a ministry which prioritized bilateral economic gain, commercial deals, foreign direct investments over norm-based, western political alliances. The old ministry’s approach was seen in a variety of its actions, such as the case of Paks II in 2014 (an expansion to the Paks nuclear plant facing hurdles to this day), for which a €12.5 billion contract was directly awarded to Rosatom, backed by a €10 billion loan from Moscow.³ By directly awarding the contract without an open, competitive tender Orbán circumvented standard EU public procurement frameworks to directly deepen relations with Russia. Following a similar logic, Orbán invested political capital into alignment with Donald Trump and conservative groups (CPAC Budapest). The close personal relations led to Hungary being shielded from NATO pressure aimed at Russia and having a high-profile partner in Washington granting it diplomatic legitimacy without adhering to Western norms.

One of the first actions of the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Anita Orbán, was to demonstrate the end of this previous era, removing trade from the ministry’s title, and reverting it back to its pre-2014 self. Following this, Hungary has demonstrated its intent for institutional cooperation through various diplomatic steps such as joining the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) to ensure transparency in managing EU aid.⁴ Since then, Hungary has publicly backed the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and is cooperating with the International Energy Agency (IEA). The new directions declared in the Executive Resolution further reinforce this intent. In it, Hungary establishes support for UN Reform via the UN80 Initiative, explicitly stating “strengthening the multilateral system is essential”. Expanding upon the previously rather EU focused institutional and multilateral approach of the new administration, the turn towards the UN is reflective of a broadened effort at increasing Hungary’s importance in the core of these institutions.⁵

The transition can be explained and understood by two distinct theoretical frameworks. Neoliberal Institutionalism, when applied to the explicit commitment of Magyar’s administration to international institutions and forums of dispute resolution, reflects a rational, calculated shift to move Hungary into the midst of institutionalized cooperation. This shift repairs Hungary’s standings within Western decision-making bodies and embeds it with time. The rather purely transactional diplomacy pursued by the previous government required continuous bargaining and has created high friction situations. The felt effects on the economy led to the Tisza government’s plan of embedding into well-established institutions, which in turn stand to provide predictable baselines of cooperation, trade, and funding without continuous term renegotiations and institutional sanctions the previous administration faced, ie.: the frozen EU funds.

A Realist perspective further explains the changes, as being driven by the severe changes of the balance of power and regional security. Balancing major powers daily, with the aim of having good standings with all of them is practically impossible, as regardless of Hungary’s best effort, its security could not be guaranteed. Being a small, landlocked country in the heart of Central Europe, counterbalancing state level threats and insulating energy infrastructure from global disruptions was not possible. Seeing this, the new government campaigned on and has since made it clear, Hungary has chosen a side. A side of western norms and collective security. Utilizing multilateral frameworks including NATO alignment and EU energy protocols, Magyar’s government solidified the new position. As per the Realist logic, this stands to maximize the nation’s survival and enforce regional stability in times of uncertainty facing just east of its borders.

Confronting the Russian Security Challenge

A statement which was expected but carries the utmost significance was declared within the Executive Resolution that was previously mentioned. It clearly states: “Russia’s behavior poses a threat to Hungary, Europe, and the global order”.⁶ The statement sees a complete turn from the previous government’s view of Russia, considering it an ally over ‘threat’. The previous Minister of Foreign Affairs, Péter Szijjártó having numerous personal calls with Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov, signified the previous stance concerning Russia. In a leaked call, Lavrov asked Szijjártó for help regarding the removal of EU sanctions from Gulbahor Ismailova, the sister of Russian-Uzbekistani oligarch Alisher Usmanov, to which Szijjártó replied “we will do our best to get her off”.⁷ The close personal relations coupled with a long list of diplomatic actions such as the case of Paks II, have led this Russo-Hungarian bond to grow stronger.

During the election times in Hungary, public sentiment grew against the Fidesz government’s relations with Russia, seeing masses of Hungarians chanting “Ruszkik Haza” (Russians go home), an homage to the 1956 anti-Soviet Revolution. As such, the new government is delivering on its promise to end this Russo-Hungarian ‘friendship’. First the Minister of Foreign Affairs summoned the Russian Ambassador following a Russian drone attack in Transcarpathia (a region in Ukraine where there is a significant Hungarian minority).⁸ Then the declaration of Russia being a ‘threat to Hungary” was made, marking a formal stance taken facing Russian aggression. Since then, Hungary has expelled 10 Russian diplomats citing activities against the Vienna Convention. Expert opinions argue these activities included intelligence operations endangering Hungarian sovereignty and security.⁹ The Russian foreign ministry claimed its response will be “harsh and painful”.¹⁰ While formal diplomatic channels remain open, bilateral relations have sharply deteriorated. It is expected that during the opening of the next session of the United Nations General Assembly, the relations between the two capitals will stay soured.

Hungarian Energy Sovereignty and Diversification

A major talking point of Russo-Hungarian relations within the past years has been energy. With 92 percent of Hungary’s crude oil import, 100 percent of its nuclear fuel, and 95 percent of its natural gas supplies having come from Russia in 2025, Hungarian dependency on Russian energy must not go unnoted.¹¹ Geographically speaking, Hungary is a landlocked country with supply constraints, basing most of its gas from the TurkStream pipeline through the black sea, and oil imports through Ukraine by the means of the Druzhba (“Friendship”) pipeline. A vulnerability which becomes more apparent during frayed relations between the two nations, needing to be addressed with an unshakable plan. This has led to Péter Magyar acknowledging the reality of the situation on multiple occasions, setting a long-term plan of phasing out Russian energy reliance by 2035.¹²

The Hungarian phase out plan starts to outline as well, with the Executive Resolution directly showing support for global market stabilizations through cooperating with the International Energy Agency (IEA) and EU energy purchasing frameworks. This demonstrates a direction for the future, which would allow Hungary to turn to different energy sources for portfolio diversification. The plan, still in its infancy, has a long way for a complete phase out, yet shows a promising foundation for the next steps to come.

The following quote from the Executive Resolution reflects this shift towards diversification, “The closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the disruption of maritime trade represent a risk to global energy security, which is why Hungary supports every effort directed at restoring regional stability.” ¹³ This is particularly relevant today to the major hotbed of tensions in the Middle East. Ahead of the UNGA, the official position regarding the situations in the Middle East further reflects an energy security lens. The stance makes it apparent that Hungary has vested interests in the stability of the global energy markets, trying to establish directions for new imports one step at a time.

Strategic Recommendations

Positioning Hungary as a pillar of Interfaith Dialogue

As of the times leading up to the UNGA, Hungary has not made specific efforts to get involved within the realm of interfaith dialogue, after having championed the cause of protecting oppressed Christian minorities in the Middle East. So far it has briefly made remarks about supporting those facing religious discrimination and prosecution, which it aims to convey during the UNGA. Hungary however could play a larger role in facilitating dialogue, conflict resolution, and host religious discussions.

“Religious instability within key oil export regions threatens global supply chains. As stability in global trading relations is an utmost interest to Hungary on its way for reorienting its excessive dependence on Russian energy supplies, Hungary may want to step up efforts to support religious reconciliation and understanding.”

Progress on applying AI for enhancing religious dialogue could provide an opportunity for Hungary to become more effective in working for interfaith dialogue. The crucial importance of this issue is highlighted perfectly in an article “We Must Guard Against the Dangers of AI and Religious Extremism” by Dr. Al-Issa, one of the most senior and respected Islamic religious figures.¹⁴ Meanwhile, any actions at embedding Hungary in such a process would give it the chance to align itself deeper with international institutions and collaboration.

The feasibility of Hungarian participation is made more realistic through already existing international institutional frameworks based in Hungary such as the Foundation for the International Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities. The foundation was formed in Hungary following recommendations drawn up jointly by representatives of the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the UN Advisory Committee on Genocide Prevention, and the EU. Since its inception in 2011, the foundation has worked continuously on building up international capacities in preventing the perpetration of the most extreme crimes and addressing the challenges of increasing diversity and multipolarity through incorporating dialogue in governance at both multilateral and national levels. The wide international network of the Foundation serves as a solid basis for effectively collaborating with governments and multilateral institutions in these domains. The integration of universities would further benefit the internationalization of Hungarian higher education.¹⁵

Maintain Stance on Russia and Western Realignment

The strategic imperative must remain to have a principled posture against Russian coercion. Within the short term, Russia possesses physical leverage such as the potential to disrupt the energy flow citing technical failures, safety audits etc… The long-term plan of a Russian energy phase out plan can be carried out with comparatively minimal risk for Hungary, while gaining new and stronger partnerships with Western allies.

By further realigning towards the Euro-Atlantic, concerns of Russian espionage, election interference, and hybrid sabotage can be systematically mitigated. The risk calculus will be greatly altered when Hungary further integrates itself within EU and NATO frameworks. Access to NATO threat-intelligence networks coupled with the EU Hybrid Fusion Cell grant the capabilities for early-warnings that are necessary to anticipate covert cyber and physical disruptions. Increased trust within Hungary’s government itself will lead to tighter collaboration with partner intelligence services, while complying with critical infrastructure resilience protocols of the EU such as the CER directive, enforce physical and digital redundancy across national energy grids. Last but not least, the anchorage of national infrastructure into a collective defense framework acts as a deterrent by making the escalatory costs of deliberate sabotage much higher for hostile actors. The realignment will shift Hungary from being an exposed security target to a resilient part of the broader Euro-Atlantic defense system.

Embedding Hungary at the Heart of Multilateral Diplomacy

Currently, the government is pursuing a proactive approach to multilateral diplomacy as previously described. While it is the ideal goal for Hungary to pursue, the means of doing so should be more multifaceted, utilizing other paths previously less addressed. Doing so will demonstrate Hungary’s eagerness at a realignment, while advancing both its international and domestic standings. There are 2 key areas by which Hungary can accomplish this:

1. Aligning foreign ministry voting directives with EU consensus positions in UN committees that are of key importance considering geopolitical developments around the world. The First Committee on disarmament and international security and the Third Committee on social, humanitarian and cultural matters, including human rights are of paramount value in this regard. The First Committee is a platform to solidify the now Western facing foreign and security policy in front of the other nations. Meanwhile, the Third Committee has an immense range of issues on the table, with which Hungary can both convey its position on more sensitive topics such as migration, while also getting closer relations with partner nations. Within the Third Committee, Hungary has the chance to pioneer in fields such as the concept of digital human rights. In an age where the digital space makes it a necessity to have basic protections, the lack of discussion needs to be addressed, and Hungary has the chance to take upon this role.
   
2. Seeking a non-permanent seat to the UN Security Council aligns directly with the new administration’s foreign policy strategy. The seat would be long overdue since the last time Hungary had served it was during the 1992-1993 term. It would grant the nation a direct voice in shaping the responses to Danubian and Black Sea security issues. This would have the strongest implication regarding regional route protections, the implications of the war in Ukraine, and the border security of Eastern and Central Europe. Commitments to international law and governance can be demonstrated by moving to a rule-based participation within the UN framework. Finally, voting on high-stakes security measures would naturally lead to open, strengthened diplomatic channels with P5 and Global South nations. This, in turn, could be translated directly into trade and diplomatic partnerships, beyond the borders of Europe.
   

Conclusion

The publication of Executive Resolution 1266/2026 and the operational decisions undertaken by the new administration, while settling into its comfort zone reflect an end to transactional bilateralism, the establishment of a structural realignment to integrate into the Euro-Atlantic, and a proactive approach to multilateralism. Hungary’s national interests can be seen conveyed rationally by these actions when contrasting them with the theoretical views of Neoliberal Institutionalism and Realism. Favoring a new approach of rule based cooperation, the previous administration’s bargaining strategy has come to an end. Short term trades with tactical volatility have now been replaced by favorable long term institutional stability and predictability. A pragmatic realist mandate is reflected by acknowledging Russia as a security threat, undertaking short-term energy friction to move away from the single-supplier vulnerabilities, and mitigating threats of hybrid nature.

“To make this shift in foreign policy fully operational, Hungary must pursue a multifaceted strategy. Pioneering digital human rights and hosting interfaith dialogues while leveraging existing institutional assets such as the Foundation for the International Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities gives Budapest a unique method of fostering regional stability all while advancing its standing internationally.”

By seeking a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council, Hungary would stand to gain crucial institutional leverage and positioning. Given its 33 year absence, the candidacy would likely receive support within the 23-member Eastern European Group. As Hungary is preparing its delegation for the 81st session of the UN General Assembly, its renewed posture will ensure Hungary no longer sits on the edge of Western decision-making. Its role will actively shape multilateral frameworks that are essential for its strategic resilience and long-term sovereignty.

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