African leaders, even in periods of weakness, have been adept at navigating the international system. From the Cold War era, when states successfully exploited East-West rivalry to secure economic and political benefits, to the contemporary era, African governments have demonstrated that they can negotiate and influence international outcomes despite limited military and economic capabilities.[1] Soft balancing involves non-military tools, such as the formation of limited diplomatic coalitions, the use of international institutions, and economic diplomacy. Although structural constraints such as debt, conflict, and political fragmentation remain significant, Africa is increasingly shaping rather than merely receiving developments.[2]
“Through collective diplomacy, economic leverage, and the strategic navigation of a multipolar world, African states are actively shaping global norms and reforming international politics. Africa’s shift from an object of international relation to a strategic global player is driven by three major dynamics: geopolitical leveraging, continental market consolidation, and reshaping politics.”
The continent’s states are actively navigating multialigned foreign policies, extracting concessions and securing infrastructure investments by balancing ties between traditional Western powers, China, Russia, and Gulf states.[3] Africa’s position in global trade is shifting the continent’s bargaining status from a fractured market of individual states, to a unified bloc.[4] Agency is not solely dictated by governmental elites, but independent civil society movements, private sector actors, and regional organizations significantly influence foreign policy outcomes.[5] The implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area is centralizing the region’s economic power, shifting the focus from fragmented, aid-dependent states to a unified, globally competitive market. African nations are wielding significant structural power by leveraging multilateral forums to demand fairer, more inclusive global governance.[6] They have led high-level debates on critical global challenges, most notably by successfully advocating for substantial climate financing and developmental equity. Along with that, regional bodies are dictating the terms of engagement, moving away from traditional dependency, toward demand-driven assistance, and asserting sovereignty over local crisis management. The continent is taking the lead in demanding inclusive reform of global governance and the international financial architecture.
China remains Africa’s largest bilateral trade partner, but the dynamic is changing as the era of unchecked “mega-loans” for raw infrastructure wraps up. By leveraging continental frameworks and redefining the terms of multilateral engagements, states are ensuring that infrastructure, energy, and resource extraction agreements yield sustainable, equitable benefits for local economies. Future relations will see a rise in joint ventures, with China establishing local manufacturing plants, Special Economic Zones, and assembly lines (such as initiatives in Ethiopia and Namibia) to meet African demands for domestic industrialization, while growing civil society awareness may push Chinese companies toward higher labor and environmental standards, as seen in Ghana.[7] The US has faced a relative decline in its traditional security grip on parts of Africa. Traditional frameworks are being re-negotiated. African leaders frame the partnership around reciprocal commercial interests rather than security paternalism. While the US heavily invest in massive logistics and infrastructure networks, such as the Lobito Corridor, Africa will use this western anxiety to secure premium infrastructure funding. The EU is shifting away from traditional development aid toward an investment-led model (focusing on space, digital networks, and green transition). The Samoa Agreement and the future of the JAES remain uncertain, with proposals for an “EU-Africa Compact” that could further reshape the relationship away from traditional, asymmetric aid-dependency models toward modern, horizontal partnerships.[8] Russia’s footprint in Africa is narrow but highly impactful, however insurgencies and recent tactical setbacks in the Sahel underscore that Moscow offers short-term regime survival rather than the long-term, comprehensive institutional or economic stability that Africa actually needs.
The primary vehicle for this diplomatic elevation has been institutional consolidation via the African Union (AU).[9] The integration of the AU as a permanent member of the G20 marks a structural shift in global governance. This seat provides the continent with a direct mechanism to influence macroeconomic policy, climate finance, and global health architecture.
Economically, African agency has materialized through internal trade integration and the strategic leverage of the green energy transition. Its reliance on commodity exports, limited industrialization, and vulnerability to global market fluctuations means that the benefits of great-power competition may accrue primarily to political elites rather than to ordinary citizens. African states, thus, are pursuing economic leverage to force technology transfers and industrial development from foreign corporations. A unified market aims to boost intra-African trade, accelerate industrialization, and build regional value chains, and limits external powers from employing “divide-and-rule” tactics. Moreover, the global transition toward renewable energy has placed Africa at the center of global supply chains, as governments are increasingly banning the raw export of these minerals and demanding local processing, refining, and manufacturing as a condition for extraction. [10]
“African agency is rewriting the rules of engagement regarding foreign aid and humanitarian intervention. Although humanitarian aid remains an important source of external financing, African governments and civil society organizations increasingly challenge donor-driven approaches. The emphasis has shifted toward local ownership, capacity building, and demand-driven partnerships rather than externally imposed development priorities.[11] Nevertheless, dependence on external funding continues to limit the extent of genuine autonomy.”
African agency, however, is not uniform, nor is it entirely unconstrained. Rather, there are internal and external systemic barriers; challenges regarding debt and internal cohesion remain prevalent. The African Union’s Agenda 2063 represents the clearest institutional expression of African agency.
How can a continent exercise “global agency” when individual states within it are actively fracturing, suffering civil wars, or do not agree on politics? Agency does not mean that every state agrees, rather that, Africa as a whole operates at different speeds across different layers. Even if countries are internally unstable, they tend to agree on the macro goals, such as building a unified free trade market, stopping foreign military unilateralism, and demanding a seat as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. The AU’s Peace and Security Council, Agenda 2063, and common negotiating positions at the UN reflect a gradual institutionalization of African coordination.[12] Regional Economic Communities act as localized political shock absorbers, and when state-level politics fail or collapse into civil war, regional bodies step in to exercise localized politics and mediate without external powers intervening.
While Africa has leverage, many states remain vulnerable to external debt distress (notably to a mix of Chinese state banks and Western private creditors), which can compromise sovereign decision-making. National interests occasionally undermine continental solidarity. For example, differing positions regarding foreign military bases (such as the high density of militaries in Djibouti) can fragment a unified African stance. While open-channel diplomacy prevents absolute hegemony, it introduces a different, highly complex threat of fragmentation and proxy friction.[13] Conflict weakens agency by diverting resources and increasing dependency on external actors. In such case, African doesn’t achieve agency, rather it becomes a fractured proxy battleground. We witness this tension in the Sahel region. The sudden expulsion of French and American forces in favor of Russian security integration and proxies of the Axis of Resistance, has deeply polarized regional bodies and introduced volatile geopolitical fault lines.
“Looking ahead, Africa will likely simultaneously experience deep internal fragmentation and unprecedented global leverage. Replacing the donor-recipient hierarchy is a complex unpredictable environment.“
On one hand states will use their assets as geopolitical bargain for economic independence, on the other nations that cannot guarantee internal security will reduce their politics into survival tactics. By mid-century, one in four people on Earth will be African.[14] For individual states, this bulge is either an explosive economic engine or a source of major civic unrest. Between 2000 and 2010, Africa’s real annual GDP growth averaged 5.4%, and while this slowed to 3.3% between 2010 and 2015, it still compared favorably to other world regions.[15] A unified African vote will alter how international institutions operate. The future of the continent, thus, depends on whether it can successfully manage its internal fragmentation, while it is essential to reform its financial architecture. In the broader international system, Africa’s place will transition from a peripheral region to an indispensable center of gravity. African agency will reshape global supply chains as the continent will influence the pace of global technological development. The current multipolar world offers opportunities and perils. If past hegemonic transitions brought colonization and decolonization respectively, the current one could bring development through strategic purpose and agency that serves the continent’s interests.
Chipaike, Ronald & Knowledge, Matarutse. “The question of African agency in international relations”. Cogent Social Sciences. 4. 2018. 10.1080/23311886.2018.1487257. ↑
Africa Center for Strategic Studies. “What to Expect from Africa-China Relations in 2026.” January 16, 2026. https://doi.org/https://africacenter.org/spotlight/africa-china-relations-2026/. ↑
Lopes, Carlos, and Lisa Musumba. “Africa Aware: Can the African Union Withstand Fractures to Multilateralism?” Chatham House, February 13, 2026. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/02/africa-aware-can-african-union-withstand-fractures-multilateralism. ↑
Coffie, A., & Tiky, L. (2021). “Exploring Africa’s Agency in International Politics”. Africa Spectrum, 56(3), 243-253. https://doi.org/10.1177/00020397211050080 ↑
Kasera, Odhiambo A. “Disentangling the Question of African Agency: Maturing, Retarded or Degenerating?” RSIS International. June 9, 2025. https://doi.org/https://rsisinternational.org/journals/ijriss/articles/disentangling-the-question-of-african-agency-maturing-retarded-or-degenerating/. ↑
Mabera, Faith. “In a Changing Global Order, Africa Is Embracing Its Agency.” The Global Observatory. October 21, 2025. https://doi.org/https://theglobalobservatory.org/2025/10/in-a-changing-global-order-africa-is-embracing-its-agency/. ↑
Chipaike, Ronald, and Matarutse H Knowledge. “The Question of African Agency in International Relations”. Cogent Social Sciences 4, no. 1. 2018. https://doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2018.1487257. ↑
Zeleza, Paul Tiyambe. “Africa’s Persistent Struggles for Development and Democracy in a Multipolar World”. Canadian Journal of African Studies. 53, no. 1. 2019. https://doi.org/10.1080/00083968.2019.1575757. ↑
- Moyo, Munyaradzi. “African Union And The Road To Agenda 2063 The Failure And Success”. Bindura University of Science Education. https://doi.org/https://www.academia.edu/109647106/AFRICAN_UNION_AND_THE_ROAD_TO_AGENDA_2063_THE_FAILURE_AND_SUCCESS. ↑
- Yeboua, Kouassi. “Large Infrastructure.” ISS African Futures. May 25, 2026. https://doi.org/https://futures.issafrica.org/thematic/11-large-infrastructure/. ↑
Kasera, Odhiambo A. “Disentangling the Question of African Agency: Maturing, Retarded or Degenerating?” ↑
Moyo, Munyaradzi. “African Union And The Road To Agenda 2063 The Failure And Success”. ↑
Haruna, S.M. “Geopolitical awakening in Africa: leveraging South–South cooperation in a multipolar world”. Asian Rev. Political Econ. 5, 9. 2026. https://doi.org/10.1007/s44216-026-00079-7 ↑
Sinha, Saurabh, & Melat Getachew. “As Africa’S Population Crosses 1.5 Billion, The Demographic Window Is Opening; Getting The Dividend Requires More Time And Stronger Effort”. UNECA. July 12, 2024. https://doi.org/https://www.uneca.org/stories/%28blog%29-as-africa%E2%80%99s-population-crosses-1.5-billion%2C-the-demographic-window-is-opening-getting. ↑
- Zeleza, Paul Tiyambe. “Africa’s Persistent Struggles for Development and Democracy in a Multipolar World”. ↑
