As Clausewitz notes, tactics concern the employment of armed forces in battle, while strategy concerns the use of battles to achieve the political object of war. In asymmetric and hybrid conflicts, this distinction sharpens; an actor may achieve superiority by destroying infrastructure or killing leaders, yet incur strategic failure through prolonged insurgency, alliance fragmentation, or economic exhaustion. Tactical shocks can generate strategic defeat when they trigger a countermobilization that undermines the attackers’ long-term political objectives. The classic Clausewitzian distinction between tactics and strategy is particularly relevant to the conflicts that have unfolded since October, and most notably to the Israeli and U.S. strikes on Iran in 2025 and 2026.

In June 2025, despite the initial shock, the Iranian regime did not collapse. Ali Khamenei swiftly appointed replacements and no mass uprising materialized. Iran retaliated with ballistic missiles and drones at lower cost, while inflicting civilian casualties and damaging infrastructure. Notably, Iran’s network, such as Hezbollah, Iraqi militias, and the Houthis, largely abstained from engagement, revealing a structural shift, especially after the war in Gaza and Lebanon, but also the regime change in Syria. The Axis, once Iran’s strategic depth, is now a fragmented periphery, degraded by prior Israeli campaigns and unwilling to sacrifice themselves for Tehran’s existential fight. Iran found itself strategically stranded. Yet this isolation proved neither absolute nor static, but rather it has since begun to erode.

“As in all wars, the political object determines success. Should the conflict continue without a credible off-ramp, the narrative outcome may come to define the strategic result; a scenario in which Israel and the United States win battles, but lose the war for perception, legitimacy, and global influence.”

The February 28, 2026, joint U.S.-Israeli strike on Iran, marked by the assassination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the expansion of a sustained air campaign, is not a bilateral war but a spherical conflict involving states (GCC states, Turkey, Russia, and China) along with non-state actors (Iraqi militias, Houthis, Syrian regime forces, Kurds), and the culmination of a broader regional war encompassing Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and the Persian Gulf. In such a setting, Clausewitz’s distinction becomes the central analytical lens for understanding probable outcomes that will be determined not only by missile exchanges, but by who controls the narrative, who bears the costs, and who adapts faster.

The administration of Donald Trump entered the war with shifting, incoherent objectives: prevent Iranian nuclear breakout; dismantle Iran’s ballistic missile infrastructure; achieve regime change via decapitation; encourage Kurdish separatism and internal fragmentation; curb Iran’s support for proxy groups and regional destabilization. Public statements, including those by Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, suggest a reactive dimension to Israel’s strikes, intervening to preempt escalation against U.S.^[1] Alternative interpretations point to personal ambitions, domestic political incentives or ideological constituencies, especially in the light of domestic scandals and certain evangelical bases. Moreover, it raises suspicions of resource-driven motives and broader economic control of Middle Eastern oil flows in order to maintain petrodollar recycling and preserve U.S. leverage. Iran’s pivot to yuan-denominated oil sales and threats to require yuan paymasters for Strait of Hormuz passage directly challenges USD oil pricing, along with U.S. financial hegemony. However, this tactic may stabilize energy markets short-term, but risks prolonged disruption, higher global prices, and accusations of resource-driven imperialism. Therefore, it could weaken USD reserve status, raise U.S. borrowing costs and inflation, as well as boost China’s global financial influence.^[2]

On the other hand, Israel’s motivations are blending strategic, existential, political, security, and domestic imperatives with calculated opportunism. At the core, it might have been the drive to eliminate Iran’s nuclear and ballistic-missile threat, but also the operation was framed as preemptive self-defense of unrelenting hostility and Iran’s sponsorship of proxies, whose attacks have exposed Israel’s vulnerabilities. Under Netanyahu’s strategic goal of achieving full regime change and reshaping the Middle East in Israel’s favor, the conflict also served his personal ambitions by distracting from his domestic legal prosecutions, boosting his sagging approval ratings, fulfilling his career-long Iran objective, and solidifying his coalition ahead of the October 2026 elections.^[3] Economically and geopolitically, the war aimed to restore Israeli deterrence, secure regional energy flows, and counter Iran’s growing alignment with China and BRICS.

“Israeli and U.S. messaging secured early cohesion by framing the war as necessary; however, the strategic implications extend far beyond the Persian Gulf, exposing vulnerabilities in a multi-domain attrition contest, and the backlash is emerging, precisely because tactical narrative victories are failing to deliver strategic success.”

Tactically the Israel-U.S. side controls the skies and has inflicted measurable damage, but strategically the conflict has devolved into a protracted quagmire with no clear exit. Trump’s objectives keep shifting, promised regime change has not materialized, and Iran’s resilience via proxies, economic warfare and asymmetric tactics have prolonged the damage. This gap is fueling narrative erosion on multiple fronts and risks causing a long-term erosion of soft power, economic leverage, and public trust.

Initial patriotic framing is cracking in the U.S., with overall disapproval over the war rising, support from American Jews dipping, and from Iranian-Americans collapsing.^[4] The pro-Israel lobby faces growing pushback while the narrative that Israel dragged us into the war is gaining traction. Within the MAGA movement, isolationist sentiment reinforces the perception that the conflict betrays “America First” doctrine. The rally-around-the-flag effect that initially unified society and shielded Netanyahu is fading as what was framed as a swift and decisive campaign turns into a prolonged, censored conflict with rising dissent, information control, and economic strain. Global audiences see it as unchecked aggression amid multiple fronts causing Israel a strategic loss.^[5] Propaganda that bends reality to pump up support is not landing with a skeptical public already weary of forever wars. Even military victory damages U.S. credibility, invites prolonged conflict, spikes inflation and empowers adversaries. The result could cause accelerated alliance strain, domestic political repercussions, and a narrative vacuum that can be exploited by Iran, Russia, and China.^[6] Simultaneously, the framing of the war as one of “defensive necessity” is also losing ground to counter-frames of imperialism and destabilization. Allies refuse access to bases, Europe questions legality, and the Global South along with BRICS, amplify Iran’s portrayal as victim. Most critically, the objective of defending the petrodollar system appears increasingly counter-productive, as Tehran’s experimentation with alternative currency mechanisms, including yuan-denominated transactions with China, is accelerating parallel financial architectures rather than containing them.^[7]

“Russia benefits from elevated energy revenues and strategic distraction; China positions itself advantageously for post-conflict reconstruction and expanded economic influence.”

What Trumps is trying to accomplish on global politics and international organizations is meant to restore bargaining asymmetry in the context of realist institutional skepticism. It is a deliverable rejection of the post-1945 liberal international order, its institutions, norms, and moral language, in favor of a transactional model grounded in power and economic leverage. By leveraging competition over coordination, this method risks producing the very outcome it seeks to resist; a fractured, competitive, low-trust order where commerce does not prevent conflict but becomes the weapon. In parallel, Benjamin Netanyahu’s strategic objective, from Gaza and Lebanon to Iran, can be understood as an effort to reestablish Israeli deterrence supremacy through the dismantling of proxy-based equilibrium. This constitutes a rejection of the post-1967 Middle Eastern order, its balance-of-terror norms, containment doctrines, and moralized peace processes, in favor of a more unilateral, preemptive doctrine. The regional architecture he envisions is not Oslo-era, but post-Axis, a unipolar Levantine sphere under Israeli dominance. This is strategy, rooted in Mahanian power projection and commercial security realism, yet it remains fundamentally incomplete. Netanyahu’s approach hazards generating the very instability it seeks to prevent, a proliferating, vengeful periphery where degraded proxies evolve into nuclear-armed states, commerce through the Strait of Hormuz is transformed into contested blockade dynamics, and where Israel’s tactical superiority gradually erodes into a condition of perpetual strategic siege.

By neglecting three central dimensions, the U.S. risks repeating the strategic miscalculation of the Iraq war (2003), while Israel risks falling into a pattern reminiscent of the Lebanon war (2006). Many Iranians oppose the Islamic Republic, but they defend Iranian territorial integrity. In such a context, domestic fragmentation gives way to national consolidation. This reaction is not only political but social; Iran’s identity is deeply rooted in the long historic continuity. Moreover, the already fractured U.S. hegemony places Gulf states in a dilemma. Actors such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are compelled to balance security ties with the U.S. and normalization trends with Israel, while simultaneously managing exposure to Iranian attacks and ensuring maritime trade. This hedging behavior reduces the likelihood of cohesive regional alignment behind U.S.-Israel objectives.^[8] When it comes to the Iranian nuclear program, while it remains a central point of contention between Tehran and the Western alliance, the current war risks accelerating rather than preventing nuclear dynamics. Israel continues to maintain a policy of nuclear ambiguity, while framing its actions as preventive self-defense.^[9] This asymmetry reinforces the perception of a double standard within the non-proliferation regime, particularly as Israel remains outside the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Recent developments suggest that military confrontation may be shifting Iran’s strategic calculus. Historical patterns suggest that states facing existential threats are more likely to consider strengthening their arsenal, and even exploring nuclear options, as an ultimate security guarantee. Thus, the degradation of its conventional deterrence and proxy networks, combined with direct strikes on its territory, increases the perceived utility of a nuclear deterrent.^[10]

Power is a long-term concept based on political and social stability, and military action is merely a tool that, if not properly managed, can fail to produce a lasting, desirable political outcome. As Thucydides notes, “the state that decides to go to war must first decide how to end it”. Israeli and the United States have not yet answered clearly that question. They might have been winning the battles but risk losing the war through strategic exhaustion, alliance fragmentation, and economic blowback, while Iran may survive through resilience, attrition, and external beneficiaries.

1. [1]Singh, Kanishka. “How Trump’s Stated Reasons, Goals and Timeline for Iran War Have Shifted.” Reuters. March 21, 2026 https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/how-trumps-stated-reasons-goals-timeline-iran-war-have-shifted-2026-03-20/. ↑

2. [2]Mehdi, Syed S. “War in Iran Tests the Petrodollar as China’S Yuan Gains Ground.” Modern Diplomacy. April 4, 2026. https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2026/04/04/war-in-iran-tests-the-petrodollar-as-chinas-yuan-gains-ground/. ↑

3. [3]Halbfinger, David M. “Netanyahu Has the War He Always Wanted, but on Trump’S Terms.” The New York Times. March 14, 2026. https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/14/world/middleeast/netanyahu-iran-war-trump.html. Lubell , Maayan, and Rami Ayyub. “Netanyahu’s War Alliance with Trump Faces Test as Iran Crisis Widens.” Reuters. March 4, 2026. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/netanyahus-war-alliance-with-trump-faces-test-iran-crisis-widens-2026-03-04/. ↑

4. [4]Sledge, Matt. “Iranian Americans Have Turned Against the War, New Poll Finds.” The Intercept. April 1, 2026. https://theintercept.com/2026/04/01/iranian-americans-against-war-poll-israel/. The Economist. “America’S Pro-Israel Lobby Is Facing a Backlash.” March 26, 2026. https://www.economist.com/united-states/2026/03/26/americas-pro-israel-lobby-is-facing-a-backlash. ↑

5. [5]”Israel’S Unchecked War Machine.” Al Jazeera. April 4, 2026. Video, https://www.aljazeera.com/amp/video/the-listening-post/2026/4/4/israels-unchecked-war-machine. ↑

6. [6]Wolf, Zachary B. “‘Boom Boom’ US Propaganda Vs. the Emerging Iran War Reality.” CNN. March 12, 2026. https://edition.cnn.com/2026/03/12/politics/propaganda-videos-iran-trump-hegseth-noem-analysis. ↑

7. [7]Blustein, Paul. “Dollar Doomsayers Can Relax: Iran’S ‘Petroyuan’ Gambit Won’T Topple the Greenback.” Fortune. March 30, 2026. https://fortune.com/2026/03/30/petroyuan-us-dollar-dominance-not-under-threat-iran-war-paul-blustein/. ↑

8. [8]Theros, Patrick. “The Gulf Shock: Strategic Consequences of the U.S.–Israel War with Iran.” Gulf International Forum. March 10, 2026. https://gulfif.org/the-gulf-shock-strategic-consequences-of-the-u-s-israel-war-with-iran/. Rahman, Omar H. “The Gulf’S Wartime Unity Is Unraveling.” Foreign Policy. April 7, 2026. https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/04/07/iran-united-states-gulf-uae-qatar-bahrain-saudi-oman-war/. ↑

9. [9]Mednick, Sam. “As It Attacks Iran’s Nuclear Program, Israel Maintains Ambiguity about Its Own.” The Independent. June 23, 2025. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/israel-iran-middle-east-tel-aviv-experts-b2774992.html. ↑

10. [10]Zimmt, Raz, and Tamir Hayman. “Between A Nuclear Agreement and Active Containment: Israel and Iran’S Nuclear Program after the War.” The Institute for National Security Studies. July 22, 2025. https://www.inss.org.il/publication/iran-nuclear-program/. ↑