“History doesn’t repeat itself, but it often rhymes.” This aphorism, commonly attributed to Mark Twain, aptly captures the events currently unfolding in the Persian Gulf. At a time when the geopolitical and geostrategic center of gravity has decidedly shifted to the Indo-Pacific region and strategic competition with China is heating up, Washington has allowed itself to once again be pulled into a potentially protracted conflict in the Middle East, without a clear-eyed assessment of the short- to medium-term geostrategic blowback.
On the eve of Operation Desert Storm (January 17-February 28, 1991), Paul H. Nitze had penned an opinion piece in the Washington Post, warning that “One of the most dangerous forms of human error is forgetting what one is trying to achieve. In the gulf crisis, it is crucial that we look beyond our anger at Saddam and remind ourselves of precisely what U.S. interests are in the crisis and what we seek to accomplish” [1]. Fast-forward to the present day, and it is painfully obvious that this sound advice has gone unheeded. Despite the White House’s insistence that its objectives in Iran remain “unchanged, unambiguous, and consistent” [2], the evolving narrative behind Operation Epic Fury—ranging from promises of liberation and regime change to denials of such intent, to claims of preemption against Iranian retaliation or Israeli escalation, to assertions of eliminating an imminent nuclear and ballistic missile threat, and even personal retribution—is a masterclass in rhetorical inconsistency. It points to a deeper strategic incoherence within the Trump administration, where objectives appear fluid, reactive, and politically driven rather than anchored in a clearly defined end state.
Describing the ongoing conflict as a “short-term excursion” and expressing surprise at Iran’s retaliation against Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members points to an especially naïve assessment of the broader strategic landscape [3]. It suggests that the Trump administration—perhaps encouraged by the swift and successful execution of Operation Absolute Resolve on January 3, which led to the capture of Venezuela’s Nicolas Maduro—may have grown overconfident in its ability to bring about similar change in Iran in similarly short order. Meanwhile, the former director of the National Counterterrorism Center, Joseph Kent alleged in his resignation letter on March 17 that the decision to go to war was driven less by imminent threat considerations than by external political pressure [4].
The Venezuela operation symbolizes an aggressive assertion of an ‘America First’ regional policy, with Trump stating in its aftermath that “Under our new national security strategy, American dominance in the Western Hemisphere will NEVER be questioned again” [5]. To its critics, meanwhile, the Trump corollary to the Monroe Doctrine—the Donroe Doctrine—features a “heap of contradictions” over the stated strategic justification for the operation, represents “foreign policy by spectacle” masquerading as grand strategy, and embodies an Orwellian thinking about spheres of influence [6]. Moreover, it augurs a harbinger of a new era of naked U.S. imperialism in the Americas, where history offers a cautionary tale about the long-term challenges for peace, stability, and democracy [7].
If the national security rationalization for Operation Absolute Resolve was questionable, the urgency and strategic calculus driving the decision-making behind Operation Epic Fury looks less like a clear-eyed, objective strategy and more like an epic miscalculation—with longer-term costs and geopolitical consequences that could prove far more consequential than initially anticipated.
“History is the unfolding of miscalculation.”
The Trump administration utterly failed to internalize the lessons of the 2003 Iraq War as it geared up for precipitate military action, launched (once again) on flimsy, unconfirmed, or disputed intelligence estimates, and with ill-placed confidence, bordering on hubris [8]. Indeed, with each passing week, Operation Epic Fury is increasingly reminiscent of the flawed decision-making process behind Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003). As the premature ‘Mission Accomplished’ narrative of that operation quickly faded away, the U.S. had to contend with deadly sectarian violence and insurgency that imposed significant military, political, and financial costs. For the better part of the ensuing decade, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan not only shrank America’s strategic bandwidth but also presented China with a “strategic window of opportunity” (战略机遇期)—one that Beijing quietly yet methodically capitalized on to accumulate and expand military power and economic leverage throughout much of the Indo-Pacific region. It appears that war, just like history, as Barbara Tuchman had famously noted in 1971, is “the unfolding of miscalculation” [9].
Under three successive U.S. administrations—from the “Asia Pivot” during the Obama administration (2009-2017) to the Indo-Pacific security strategies pursued by the Trump administration (2017-2021) and the Biden administration (2021-2025)—China’s rise and power ambitions dominated American foreign policy and national security priorities. Yet, Washington is facing the danger of repeating the same mistake of the early 2000s that led to forever wars [10], as the gravitational pull of the Iran war is once again prompting a redirection of American strategic attention and resources to the Middle East amid concerns about the intelligence and strategic clarity behind the decision to escalate the crisis with Iran.
Four weeks into the conflict, the limits of America’s strategic approach had already become all too visible. The emphasis on how many targets had been struck serves as a sobering reminder of the ‘McNamara fallacy’—the tendency to equate measurable outputs with meaningful strategic progress—during the Vietnam War. Washington is at risk of squandering valuable geopolitical capital at a time of heightened great-power competition with China and a rapidly evolving Indo-Pacific security landscape. The near- to medium-term strategic costs of the misguided Iran conflict are likely to be most acutely felt in Asia.
As the last remaining holdout of George W. Bush’s ‘Axis of Evil’, North Korea is confronted with the challenge of figuring out how to deal with an increasingly “predatory hegemon” [11]. The Iran war has effectively undermined any near-term prospect of renewed diplomatic engagement between Pyongyang and Washington. On the eve of hostilities, Oman’s Foreign Affairs Minister, Badr bin Hamad Al Busaidi, appeared hopeful about the possibility of a negotiated process, noting that “[A] peace deal is within our reach … if we just allow diplomacy the space it needs to get there” [12].
Viewed alongside the first Trump administration’s unilateral withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—despite verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that Tehran had complied with uranium enrichment limits between 2016 and early 2018—Washington’s simultaneous signaling of openness to diplomatic de-escalation and readiness for military escalation has clear and unambiguous implications for the security situation on the Korean peninsula. In light of the precedents set by Iraq (2003) and Iran (2026), Kim Jong-un is likely to feel further vindicated in his longstanding reluctance to yield to external pressure. Successive U.S. administrations have called for complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement (CVID), a framework initially embraced by President George W. Bush and later reframed as permanent, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement (PVID) by U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo during the first Trump administration. From Pyongyang’s perspective, the Iran war suggests that the United States cannot be trusted to negotiate in good faith, and that agreements reached through diplomacy may be temporary or subject to reversal entirely. The strategic lesson is thus obvious: nuclear weapons remain the most reliable guarantee of regime survival. That realization effectively raises the bar for any future deal over North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, and will likely include greater demands for sanctions relief, security assurances, and an insistence on carefully phased concessions.
At the same time, the war in Iran significantly limits Washington’s strategic bandwidth, diverting focus and diplomatic effort away from the Korean peninsula. North Korea may perceive an opportunity to assess U.S. commitment to extended deterrence and engage in opportunistic testing of thresholds—to secure concessions from Washington and/or to weaken U.S. regional security alliances, including most notably the U.S.-Japan-South Korea trilateral partnership, announced in August 2023.
Another strategic cost is the likely acceleration of an Indo-Pacific arms race, amplified by heightened threat perceptions (North Korea, China) and growing doubts about U.S. reliability. In the case of South Korea, the rapidly evolving security reality has already intensified domestic debates over the need to pair pragmatic, interest-driven diplomacy with self-reliant defense to achieve greater strategic autonomy. In recent years, public support for a nuclear deterrent has consistently been hovering between 60 and 70 percent, with a 2025 poll conducted by the Asan Institute for Policy Studies reporting that 3 out of 4 respondents expressed support for developing an indigenous nuclear weapons capability, and two-thirds supporting the introduction of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons on South Korean soil [13].
“The momentum for cooperation and shared prosperity is weakening across the world, and we are entering an era of increased conflict, where it’s every man for himself.”
Meanwhile, the redeployment of critical U.S. missile defense assets such as the THAAD (Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense) and Patriot missile defense systems from the Korean Peninsula to the Middle East has weakened existing deterrence postures, prompting hard-nosed strategic reassessments fueled by growing doubts about alliance ambiguity. South Korea’s president Lee Jae-myung pointedly noted in October 2025 that “[T]he momentum for cooperation and shared prosperity is weakening across the world, and we are entering an era of increased conflict, where it’s every man for himself” [14].
More troubling in the near-term is the “missile math” problem that has quickly come to light through efforts to counter the missile and drone barrage that Iran unleashed in the opening days of the conflict with Israel and the United States. The rapid drawdown of high-cost missile interceptor inventories to defend against low-cost offensive systems—such as the Iranian Shahed-136 attack drones, estimated at $20,000-$50,000 per unit [15]—has potentially destabilizing strategic implications. This new reality places an added strain on near-term procurement capacity, thus elevating the risk factor in other critical theaters, including the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait [16]. The resulting imbalance may well erode confidence in current defense architectures while simultaneously incentivizing both regional U.S. allies and adversaries to strengthen their defense capabilities through quantitative and qualitative military buildups, thereby increasing the prospects of a new arms race.
Finally, the Iran war may encourage Beijing to engage in ‘opportunistic aggression’ in the Indo-Pacific region at a time when Washington is strategically overstretched and its alliance commitment increasingly questionable. Through calibrated grey-zone tactics in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, China could test U.S. resolve without the risk of all-out conflict, while simultaneously expanding and consolidating its regional sphere of influence. From a strategic point of view, the consequences would be far-reaching: even calibrated probing of escalation thresholds could gradually shift regional balance-of-power perceptions, fuel fears of alliance ambiguity, and undermine confidence in U.S. commitment to regional security.
The Trump administration’s strategically questionable ‘short-term excursion’ into Iran—aptly labeled ‘Operation Blind Fury’ by The Economist—is distracting the U.S. from what should be the undeniable strategic priority in the 21st century: sustaining extended deterrence in the Indo-Pacific amid an inevitable China-U.S. great-power rivalry. The cumulative short- to medium-term effect is a more volatile Indo-Pacific security environment, one that is marked by heightened uncertainty, an accelerating arms race, an increased risk of miscalculation, and the potential unraveling of Asia’s long peace [17].
References:
[1]. Nitze, Paul H, and Stafford, Michael F. “War whether we need it or not?” Washington Post, January 6, 1991. (https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1991/01/06/war-whether-we-need-it-or-not/fd722f9b-c0eb-4863-b738-8847a94bd247/); also quoted in Nitze, Paul H. (1991). Paul H. Nitze on the Future (W Alton Jones Foundation Series on Arms Control). Bloomsbury Academic, p. 177.
[2]. “Operation Epic Fury: Decisive American power to crush Iran’s terror regime.” The White House, March 12, 2016 (https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/2026/03/operation-epic-fury-decisive-american-power-to-crush-irans-terror-regime/).
[3]. “We took a little excursion because we felt we had to, to get rid of some evil, and I think you’ll see it’s going to be a short-term excursion”, see: Chambers, Francesca, and Zac Anderson. “Trump calls Iran war a ‘little excursion’.” USA Today, March 9, 2026 (https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2026/03/09/trump-house-gop-retreat-iran-war/89006813007/); “They [Iran] weren’t supposed to go after all these other countries in the Middle East. Nobody expected that. We were shocked”, see: Landay, Jonathan, et al. “Trump was warned of likely Iranian retaliation on Gulf allies, sources say.” Reuters, March 17, 2026 (https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/trump-was-warned-likely-iranian-retaliation-gulf-allies-sources-say-2026-03-17/).
[4]. Kent, Joseph. “May God bless America.” March 17, 2026 (https://x.com/joekent16jan19/status/2033897242986209689). See also: Walt, Stephen M. “The Israel Lobby’s responsibility for the Iran war.” Foreign Policy, March 17, 2026 (https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/03/17/israel-lobby-iran-war-trump-responsibility/); Mearsheimer, John J., and Walt, Stephen M. The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy. Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007.
[5]. Bowen, Jeremy. “Bowen: Trump risks pushing world back to age of empires.” BBC, January 9, 2026. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cx2wg7437dvo.
[6]. See Applebaum, Anne. “Trump’s ‘American Dominance’ may leave us with nothing.” The Atlantic, January 5, 2026. https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/2026/01/trumps-american-dominance-may-leave-us-with-nothing/685503/; Bell, Jared O. “The Donroe Doctrine and the cost of foreign policy by spectacle.” Foreign Policy in Focus, January 20, 2026. https://fpif.org/the-donroe-doctrine-and-the-cost-of-foreign-policy-by-spectacle/; Walt, Stephen M. “The ‘Donroe Doctrine’ makes no sense.” Foreign Policy, January 8, 2026. https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/01/08/donroe-doctrine-trump-venezuela-empire/.
[7]. McPherson, Alan. A Short History of U.S Interventions in Latin America and the Caribbean. Wiley-Blackwell, 2016.
[8]. Wawro, Geoffrey. Quicksand: America’s Pursuit of Power in the Middle East. Penguin Press, 2010.
[9]. Tuchman, Barbara. Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-45. The Macmillan Company, 1971, p. 132.
[10]. Filkins, Dexter. The Forever War. Knopf, 2008.
[11]. Walt, Stephen M. “The predatory hegemon.” Foreign Affairs 105, no. 2 (2026), 8-23.
[12]. CBS News. “Full Transcript: Omani Foreign Minister Badr Albusaidi tells “Face the Nation” a U.S.-Iran deal is “within our reach”.” February 26, 2026. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/full-transcript-omani-foreign-minister-badr-albusaidi/.
[13]. Lee, Peter K., and Kang Chungku. “Worth the squeeze: A conditions-based analysis of South Korean public support for nuclear deterrence.” Asan Institute for Policy Studies. May 28, 2025. https://asaninst.org/bbs/board.php?bo_table=s1_1_eng&wr_id=236.
[14]. The Straits Times. “South Korea to increase defence budget by 8.2%, President Lee says.” October 1, 2025. https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/south-korea-to-increase-defence-budget-by-8-2-president-lee-says
[15]. Emmett Joe, et al. “Shahed-131 & -136 UAVs: a visual guide.” Open Source Munitions Portal. https://osmp.ngo/collection/shahed-131-136-uavs-a-visual-guide/
[16]. On the procurement capacity challenge, see: Brenes, Michael. “How America broke its war machine.” Foreign Affairs. July 3, 2023. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/how-america-broke-its-war-machine; Brown, Michael. “The empty arsenal of democracy.” Foreign Affairs 104, no. 3 (2025), 136-148; and Freymann, Eyck, and Halem, Harry. The Arsenal of Democracy: Technology, Industry, and Deterrence in an Age of Hard Choices. Hoover Institution Press, 2025.
[17]. See: Schortgen, Francis. “Storm on the horizon? Security challenges and the future of Asia’s ‘long peace’.” Strategy International. December 5, 2024. https://strategyinternational.org/2024/12/05/publication153/.
