As the EU navigates a shifting geopolitical landscape shaped by war in Ukraine and an increasingly unreliable transatlantic alliance, Turkey’s potential as a defense and security partner comes into the spotlight. Countries across the EU maintain vastly different positions vis-à-vis Turkey’s role in an emergent European defense and security framework, with reactions ranging from positive engagement and active collaboration to skepticism and mistrust. Racing to redesign its security architecture, the EU faces the challenge of bringing Turkey closer, without undermining its core values, unity and long-term security, especially in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Turkey’s defense and security potential is grounded upon multiple factors. Located at the crossroads of Europe, Asia and the Middle East, with access to the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, Turkey’s position is strategically key. Geographical considerations are particularly important in the context of war between Russia and Ukraine, since Turkey shares a border with both through the Black Sea. Crucially, Turkey also controls the straits of Marmara and the Bosphorus (1936 Montreux Convention). Moreover, Turkey has the second largest NATO army, with an active personnel of over 355,000 people [1], and a booming defense industry, with exports steadily growing from 2.3 billion USD in 2020 to 7.1 billion USD in 2024 [2].
Source for data used to create this graph [2].
Existing ties with many EU countries through NATO enhance Turkey’s potential as a defense partner, ensuring interoperability between military systems. Participation in the European Sky Shield Initiative, the Eurofighter deal and several bilateral agreements between Turkish and European military companies, all mark significant steps towards Turkey’s integration into a European defense system. Closer diplomatic engagement is actively pursued, with Turkey participating in meetings of the “coalition of the willing”, as well as in the framework of the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy.
“Turkey stands ready to capitalize on shifting geopolitical circumstances, casting itself as the missing piece of European security.”
Erdogan argues that “European security is unthinkable without Turkey” [3], and Turkish foreign minister, Hakan Fidan, similarly suggests that a framework “that leaves out a military force like Turkey” would be neither realistic nor operational [4]. At the same time, Turkey has repeatedly reaffirmed its commitment to EU accession as a “strategic priority”, actively forging a link between EU membership and broader European security enhancement. As Erdogan explained, hinting to a shifting defense and security context: “We expect our European friends to face this reality and advance our full membership process with visionary perspective” [5]. Military cooperation is seen as part of broader EU-Turkey political engagement.
Yet, beyond an apparent willingness for closer cooperation, underlying disjunctions render long-term alignment problematic. Turkey’s foreign policy over time has proved largely pragmatic, often opportunistic and typically non-committing. Josep Borrell, in his 2023 report on EU-Turkey relations, notes that Turkey is “a significant and assertive foreign policy actor” that places “security interests and strategic autonomy at the core of its actions” [6]. Crucially, he adds, Turkey is at odds with EU priorities set in its Common Foreign and Security Policy, “maintaining a very low alignment rate of on average 10%” [6]. Specific areas of misalignment include Turkey’s continued ties to Russia; Erdogan’s involvement in Syria; his response to the 7 October Hamas attacks, as he “not only refrained from condemning and qualifying them as terrorism but also spoke out in support of Hamas, in complete disagreement with the EU common position” [6]; and the Cyprus issue, which represents “a core element of Turkey’s strong disagreements with the EU in the Eastern Mediterranean” and “continues to hamper different paths of cooperation, including in the areas of security and defense” [6].
Turkey explicitly prioritizes “strategic autonomy” in foreign affairs, as it aims to become “a fully independent, effective, and influential actor” with “a genuine national foreign policy, independent of any external spheres of influence” [7]. Its perception is that of a middle power, flexibly engaging with competing blocks: a NATO member on the one hand, yet actively pursuing closer ties with the BRICS and the SCO on the other. Erdogan purposefully delayed Sweden’s and Finland’s NATO accession to extract concessions; and he did not hesitate to leverage control of migration flows to Europe for financial gains. Turkey’s foreign policy under Erdogan appears strategically ambiguous – recalling perhaps Frank G. Weber’s work on the country’s position during WWII, coined as “evasive neutrality” [8].
“As EU security concerns focus firmly on Russia, persisting ties between Ankara and Moscow represent a core obstacle in EU-Turkey defense cooperation.”
Erdogan’s positioning over the war in Ukraine confirms Turkey’s strategic ambiguity: although Turkey supported Ukraine’s war effort with drones, it refrained from imposing sanctions on Russia – and, in fact, continued to rely on and export Russian energy, helping Putin circumvent EU sanctions [9]. It is also noteworthy that Turkey, currently purchasing Eurofighter jets from its western allies, previously purchased Russian S-400 missile defense systems (2017).
An additional point of friction between the EU and Turkey relates to the latter’s increasingly illiberal turn in the domestic sphere, characterized by a move away from western standards of democracy, human rights, the rule of law, secularism, etc. Freedom House, in its 2025 report, rates Turkey as “Not Free”, noting declines in political rights and civil liberties [10]. EU spokespersons have repeatedly raised concerns over democratic backsliding, particularly following the arrest of Ekrem İmamoğlu (March 2025). According to a press release of the European Parliament, Turkey’s “geopolitical and strategic importance cannot make up for the government’s democratic backsliding” [11]. Still, in the face of competing imperatives between geostrategic priorities and a values-led foreign policy, the EU has largely turned a blind eye to Turkey’s authoritarian turn: normative criticisms have not prevented increasing defense and security collaboration.
“Given the multilayered nature of EU-Turkey relations, formulating a unified policy at the EU level becomes increasingly challenging – particularly as national perspectives within the EU diverge significantly [12].”
Certain states, like Spain and Italy, have welcomed cooperation: Spain signed an MoU for the use of Hürjets in its military training programs, and Italy’s Leonardo partnered with Turkish Baykar for the joint development of drones. Such developments reveal willingness to engage, whilst also potentially facilitating Turkey’s indirect participation in projects funded by the EU’s SAFE instrument. On the other hand, Greece and Cyprus strongly oppose closer collaboration with Turkey, viewing their larger neighbor more as a security threat, and less as a partner. Both have pending territorial disputes with Turkey: Cyprus over the occupation of the northern part of the island since 1974, and Greece over Turkish revisionism in the Aegean Sea, most notably expressed in the Turkey-Libya maritime agreement (2019). Greek Prime Minister, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, opposed Turkey’s admission into SAFE on the grounds that “countries that threaten EU member states with war cannot participate” [13] – referring to the Turkish parliament’s 1995 casus belli declaration. Greek defense minister, Nikos Dendias, argued that it would be impossible to “defend Europe if the enemy is within its walls” [14], painting Turkey as a Trojan horse that could threaten the EU from within, if integrated.
Effectively addressing Greek/Cypriot security concerns through concrete guarantees could facilitate EU-Turkey defense cooperation. Existing provisions, like the EU’s Mutual Assistance Clause (Article 42.7 TEU), arguably have mostly symbolic rather than military value. Guarantees could be integrated in military deals concluded between European countries and Turkey. For instance, German sources initially mentioned guarantees that Eurofighters would not be used against another NATO power; however, Turkey subsequently rejected any such conditionality [15]. In the context of Turkish revisionism in the Aegean Sea, Greece has explicitly linked defense cooperation to the lifting of Turkey’s casus belli declaration [16]. This would signal an attitude of goodwill, opening the path to further constructive dialogue. Still, under current circumstances, it is unlikely that EU expectations will be met without concessions. Continued diplomatic efforts to resolve pending disputes and mitigate tensions are, therefore, essential to foster trust and ease concerns over regional security.
Engaging with Turkey on defense projects selectively and conditionally could also further EU goals without overlooking the reality of clashing values and diverging agendas. For example, access to EU funds and innovation opportunities could become conditional on Turkey joining western sanctions against Russia. This would both bring Turkey closer to the European security sphere and serve EU strategic priorities. Or, more pressure could be applied regarding human rights and the rule of law, bridging the gap between the EU’s normative rhetoric and its policymaking. Of course, Turkey’s willingness to align with EU demands is not guaranteed, particularly as the country enjoys a favorable moment internationally, benefiting from regional developments like Assad’s fall in Syria or declining Russian and Iranian influence. But Turkey is also plagued by domestic upheavals and a continuing economic crisis, meaning that its ability to maintain international defense competitiveness is uncertain: significant financial resources are required to keep up with rapid technological advancements [17]. Turkish drones, whilst successful in the initial phases of the war in Ukraine, subsequently underperformed, as Russian counter-drone technologies adapted [17]. Additionally, the monopoly exercised by Baykar (run by Erdogan’s son-in-law) over the drone industry creates unfavorable conditions for competitive innovation. In this context, EU financial capital and advanced technological insights present important leverages in EU-Turkey discussions.
Finally, efforts to increase cohesion at the EU level could strengthen the block’s overall power in the pursuit of common foreign policy objectives. The EU has arguably already moved in this direction, establishing concrete frameworks and relevant structures. However, defense and security remain, to a large extent, a matter of national sovereignty, decided by member states according to their specific interests, concerns and priorities. At present, NATO remains the cornerstone of European security. But the EU can boost its defense capabilities long-term by overcoming the fragmentation of its disparate national defense systems. This would require compromises by member states, and a mindset shift to view defense as collective rather than national.
“Arguably, the mindset shift will need to be, not just political, but also psychological: coming to terms with the realization that Europe is not immune to war [18].”
Overall, Turkey offers an attractive prospect for strengthening Europe’s defense and security capabilities fast. Indeed, closer integration is already under way, with countries like Italy and Spain leading the way. But skepticism and opposition persist, especially in Greece and Cyprus, over long-term security in the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey may not be the most trusted, like-minded friend of the EU; but in an era of hard-power politics, Turkey’s autonomous, transactional policymaking – approached with reciprocal pragmatism – may just prove to fit into a new European security and defense architecture.
REFERENCES
[1] H. Foy and J. P. Rathbone, ‘Military briefing: How Turkey became vital to European security’, Financial Times, May 14, 2025. [Online]. Available: https://www.ft.com/content/1de61da8-2481-4371-a0cd-b24ffba8b210
[2] From roots to horizons: the story of Türkiye’s rising defence industry, 1st Edition. Ankara, Türkiye: Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye – Directorate of Communications, 2025.
[3] ‘Europe’s reluctant reset with Turkey’, The Economist, Apr. 24, 2025. [Online]. Available: https://www.economist.com/europe/2025/04/24/europes-reluctant-reset-with-turkey
[4] S. Aktan, ‘Turkish FM demands role in new European defence strategy’, Euronews, Feb. 27, 2025. [Online]. Available: https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/02/27/turkish-fm-says-any-new-european-defence-architecture-without-turkey-is-unrealistic
[5] E. Tekin, ‘Europe’s security unimaginable without Türkiye: President Erdogan’, Anadolu Agency (AA), Mar. 03, 2025. [Online]. Available: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/europes-security-unimaginable-without-turkiye-president-erdogan/3498827
[6] High representative of the union for foreign affairs and security policy, ‘JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL State of play of EU-Türkiye political, economic and trade relations 2023’, Nov. 2023. [Online]. Available: https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/joint-communication-european-council-state-play-eu-turkiye-political-economic-and-trade-relations-0_en
[7] ‘Speech by H.E. Hakan Fidan, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye at the Opening Session of the 14th Ambassadors’ Conference’, Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Aug. 07, 2023. [Online]. Available: https://www.mfa.gov.tr/disisleri-bakani-sayin-hakan-fidan-in-14-buyukelciler-konferansi-acilisinda-yaptigi-konusma–7-agustos-2023.en.mfa
[8] F. G. Weber, The evasive neutral: Germany, Britain, and the quest for a Turkish alliance in the Second World War. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1979.
[9] V. Jack, ‘Brussels wants to ditch Russian gas. Turkey could keep it flowing undetected.’, POLITICO, Aug. 07, 2025. [Online]. Available: https://www.politico.eu/article/turkey-snubs-eu-plan-track-russian-gas-imports-energy-sanctions/
[10] ‘Turkey: Freedom in the World 2025 Country Report’, Freedom House, 2025. [Online]. Available: https://freedomhouse.org/country/turkey/freedom-world/2025
[11] ‘Türkiye’s EU accession process must remain frozen’, European Parliament News | Press Releases, May 07, 2025. [Online]. Available: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20250502IPR28215/turkiye-s-eu-accession-process-must-remain-frozen
[12] S. Adar et al., ‘Alignment of Necessity’, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), Aug. 07, 2025. [Online]. Available: https://www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/alignment-of-necessity
[13] ‘Greek PM says Turkey should not join EU defense program’, eKathimerini, Sept. 15, 2025. [Online]. Available: https://www.ekathimerini.com/politics/foreign-policy/1280890/greek-pm-says-turkey-should-not-join-eu-defense-program/
[14] ‘Dendias: Europe’s ReArm plan cannot include countries that threaten EU states’, eKathimerini, May 20, 2025. [Online]. Available: https://www.ekathimerini.com/politics/foreign-policy/1270208/dendias-europes-rearm-plan-cannot-include-countries-that-threaten-eu-states/
[15] ‘Turkey seeks to deploy the Eurofighters in the Aegean as well’, Nov. 05, 2025. [Online]. Available: https://www.naftemporiki.gr/english/2029411/turkey-seeks-to-deploy-the-eurofighters-in-the-aegean-as-well/
[16] M. Kostidis and V. Nedos, ‘Turkey EU defense bid tied to casus belli’, eKathimerini, May 23, 2025. [Online]. Available: https://www.ekathimerini.com/politics/foreign-policy/1270533/turkey-eu-defense-bid-tied-to-casus-belli/
[17] DW News, ‘Can Turkey be a reliable partner for European Security?’, Oct. 17, 2025. [Online]. Available: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yo979slBH6Y
[18] ‘French army chief warns France should be “prepared to lose children” in face of Russian threat’, Le Monde, Nov. 21, 2025. [Online]. Available: https://www.lemonde.fr/en/france/article/2025/11/20/outcry-after-french-army-chief-s-prepared-to-lose-children-warning_6747661_7.html
