The author of this article is Dr. Cyril Widdershoven
The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) are looking at major shifts, if media and political statements are to be believed. The continuing confrontation between Israel and Hamas, combined with continuing instability in Lebanon (Hezbollah), Syria (extremism, fundamentalism, and ethnic cleansing), and Iran, is causing shockwaves throughout the region. At the same time, Israel’s known military-security strategy to hunt possible terrorists and the leadership of extremist anti-Israeli groups, culminating in the unsuccessful attack on Hamas leaders in Doha, Qatar, is pushing the region to a full-scale reconsideration of alliances, security arrangements, and possible tectonic geopolitical shifts. At the Doha Summit, organized by the leaders of the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, officially to show support for Qatar in the wake of Israel’s strike on a meeting of Hamas leaders in the city, several high profile statements were made about the solidarity of the Arab Nations, the need for two-state solution for Israel-Palestine, and a regurgitation of old security ideas, such as an Arab NATO approach.
The concept of a regional military-security alliance among Arab or Islamic states has resurfaced after nearly 80 years of discussion, with Egypt’s last attempt in 2015 being put on hold by Saudi Arabia and others. At present, the Arab NATO idea is being pushed by more than one, as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and even Egypt have shown an interest.
Still, political statements have been countered by facts on the ground, as evidenced by the unexpected Saudi-Pakistani mutual defense agreement, which includes a nuclear umbrella. These developments require immediate assessment, and certainly in the future, as recent military cooperation between unexpected partners suggests a potential tectonic shift in alliances, affecting not only Israel but also US-European interests and stability in the Southern Mediterranean region of the European Union/NATO.
Over the last few decades, the idea of a formal, NATO-style collective defence arrangement among Arab and Muslim states has been discussed at moments of regional crisis. Until last week, the ideas never materialized. However, since the discussions held in Doha (September 2025) a new combination of interest and strategic allignments has popped up, as there has been (a) renewed public discussion in Doha in September 2025 about such an arrangement, while (b) Saudi Arabia’s decision to sign a Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement with Pakistan on 17 September 2025 now has moved into another more intricate way, as it combines symbolism and concrete security networking. The latter, also looking at the growing military cooperation between Egypt, the Arab world’s most significant military power, and Turkey, a NATO member, necessitates more analysis.
Until now, the Doha talks have been again more for the media, or the Arabs in the streets, than a real strategic move to quell not only Israel’s military prominence in the region, or to set up a regional military alliance, but also indicating the willingness of Arab states, mainly Western military linked, to assess other options that the perceived US military security umbrella. The unexpected Israeli strike on Hamas leaders in Qatar has shaken not only the Qatari elite, which has been linked to Hamas, Iran, Hezbollah, and Taliban, but also the rest of the Arab world. The latter is extraordinary, looking at the hundreds of drone attacks over the last decades by US, Western forces, and others, on terrorist and extremist groups and leaders in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, and Africa.
The most striking development is the unexpected nature of the perceived pro-American ally Saudi Arabia’s decision to set up an independent security and military alliance with a non-NATO, non-American-linked, Islamic country, Pakistan. This move, led by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, a perceived friend of US President Donald Trump, has surprised many in the geopolitical community. At the same time, Riyadh has also opted to sign an agreement with the only Islamic nuclear-armed state in the world. Keep in mind that others, including Gulf Arab groups, have partly funded Pakistan’s nuclear armament program. This unexpected turn of events underscores the need for further analysis and understanding of the current geopolitical landscape.
The re-emergence of the Arab NATO discussion and the subsequent Saudi-Pakistani agreement could mark the beginning of a significant regional reconfiguration. This reconfiguration would not be limited to economics, energy, and finance, but would also encompass alliance politics and regional deterrence.
The potential fall-out of this reconfiguration could introduce new risks to the current East Mediterranean constellation.
Let’s take a step back first, assessing the outcome of the Doha Summit. Egyptian officials proposed a NATO-style collective defense arrangement for Arab/Islamic states. As indicated, the proposal should be seen as exploratory, as it has always been based on a mixture of political rhetoric, calls for enhanced coordination (joint exercises, intelligence, and naval patrols), and a desire to institutionalize deterrence against external aggression rather than a drafted Article-5 binding treaty. The old idea, as Cairo proposed such a framework also in 2015, has already been rejected (not officially) by Qatar and the UAE, both unwilling to put other alliances at risk, or, in reality, worried about the power position of Egypt in such an alliance. You could argue, looking at NATO, Egypt’s position would and will be as strong as at least the UK or France in NATO, or some even indicated that it would be the Arab version of the USA, if Turkey were not to participate. At the same time, the current rhetoric is changing perceptions in the region. Still, the gulf between rhetoric and real changes on the ground is vast, mainly due to diverging national interests, regime power struggles, strong military alliances, especially with NATO, US, UK, and other Western powers, economic interests (India vs Pakistan), and the reality of an immense operational challenge of integrating military forces with different capabilities and especially doctrines.
The implications of the Saudi-Pakistan security pact, signed on September 17, 2025, are still unclear. According to Riyadh, it is called a “Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement”, indicating that an attack on one is an attack on both. The main change, as both countries already hold long defense and military training cooperation ties, is that it brings (or allows) Pakistan into a clearer institutionalized Gulf security role. Even though it has not been declared, a possible Pakistani nuclear umbrella for the Gulf seems to be on the table. The main regional implications are, at present, a signal of strategic hedging (against a weaker or more diffuse US reliability and involvement). At the same time, it also shows that Riyadh is willing to set up a network of security partners beyond Western alliances. The latter could open the door for Russian or Chinese military participation, which would be a full-scale, dangerous scenario for Western interests. At the same time, more assessments are needed to include the reaction of India to the deal with Pakistan. For most Arab Gulf states, India is a much more critical economic partner than Pakistan. For Saudi Arabia and others, India’s emerging economy holds vast promises for hydrocarbon and renewables. Below the surface, there are many more Indian expatriates in the region than Pakistani expatriates, so all should consider this.
In reality, the primary outcome of the above is a political signalling to Israel and Iran, possibly with a recalibration of regional deterrence politics. Some could argue it is meant to deal with Israeli military moves or Iran. Still, overall, the region, especially its leading power brokers, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, is reassessing its options and power structures.
The Arab NATO, or Arab collective defense arrangements, strategy is still far from being a reality. As has been shown before, since 1948 or even during the Cold War-Iraq invasion of Kuwait, 9-11, the removal of Saddam Hussein or the Arab Spring (Winter), a collective security arrangement at present is not on the mind of regional powers, national governments, or even Middle East – North Africa players. An Article-5 style pact is not in place, and will be very hard to reach, looking at the divergent threat perceptions, different security dependencies, and inter- and intra-regional power competition. At the same time, including other Islamic states in the conundrum, such as Pakistan, Indonesia, or even Turkey, will only undermine any option in the future. Without a full-scale existential threat (which Israel is not!), power politics and internal power dynamics (Sisi, MBS, MBZ, Erdogan) will not be a basis to find a common NATO-style approach.
Even a “coalition of the willing” will be hard to find, as this should include Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and maybe even Iraq and Turkey. They all have different agendas, are pursuing other goals and targets, and are simultaneously fighting internal and external troubles. Inclusion of Turkey, as some see a real fit for the ambitions stated by some, is out of question at present. As a NATO member, it is politically, militarily, and technically barred from joining another alliance. While operational cooperation will be an option, outright membership, which would leave the NATO alliance open to new risks and threats, will not be taken lightly. The most possible outcome of the so-called Doha declarations and political posturing of some will be the setup of military standing working groups (naval, air force, or crisis response). Looking at the current state of most, it will be naval cooperation-focused, while pushing mainly for combined exercises, such as those now being held between Egypt and Turkey in the Mediterranean.
This leads to another risky development, as the realignment of powers and a potential restructuring of military positions, based on the Doha Summit’s outcome and Saudi-Pakistani agreement, the impact on East Mediterranean developments could be exaggerated. A new web of Arab security partnerships, based on Saudi-Pakistani cooperation or Egyptian-led initiatives, could increase tension and possible instability in the East Med. Analysts are worried that the current developments on the ground will enable Egypt (or force Cairo) to increase its leverage over East Med energy and maritime security issues, putting Cyprus, Israel, and Greece at risk. At present, Egypt’s dependency on energy imports, especially via Israel, gives the latter some additional leverage, but this could be minimized if Turkey gets closer to Cairo, leaving space for a new Cairo power play.
At the same time, increased cooperation between Egyptian and Gulf Arab navies in the East Med could increase risks of confrontation, especially if Turkish-Egyptian navies are also cooperating. Without even looking at the maritime borders and interests of Israel, Cyprus, or Greece, NATO’s southern shores and global naval trade will be under pressure. As stated before in reports, the Red Sea and East Mediterranean are central arteries for international trade, LNG flows, and crude shipments. Egypt’s geographical, economic, and military role is pivotal to all. Any militarised posture that increases naval activity, interdictions, or blockades risks raising insurance costs, rerouting shipments (longer sailing times around Africa), and spiking energy price volatility. Increased naval posture, perceived by parties, such as Israel or Greece, to be hostile to their national interests, could easily materialize in a confrontation. With already signs available that MENA societies are undergoing a militarization of the state and society, risks are increasing, as a potential arms race is imminent, with power projections outside national arenas being discussed.
For Western countries, the primary focus at present should be to look at the potential fallout for existing alliances and interests. As stated before, the Saudi move towards Pakistan is primarily a security hedge, with at the same time a message to Washington and others to wake up and deal with Arab concerns.
Not yet, American military interests or power are at risk, but a first shot has been fired, trying to wake up Western policy makers. Some could even argue that the current developments are a call for more cooperation, speeding up arms deals, and showing more interest in Gulf Arab-Egyptian interests and concerns. The media is mainly looking at it all in a frame of ‘countering Israeli aggression or fear for Israeli military hegemony”, the latter is not valid. Israel’s military adventures against Hamas, Hezbollah, Houthis, Lebanon, Syria, and Iran have not been assessed by most as a first step towards large-scale war with the leading Arab powers. At the same time, the killing of Hamas in Doha, even though Arab media and politicians reacted furiously, was not unexpected, and was sometimes even supported by most. It appears that the voice of the Arab Street is being heard, and it needs to be channeled by Arab rulers, kings, and sheikhs. No interest is being voiced in going for a confrontation with the Israelis, even though most would like to see Israel’s PM Netanyahu removed from office.
The two other global power players, Russia and China, are taking the most advantage of all at present. A fractured Western position in MENA only is to the advantage of Moscow and Beijing. By leveraging their capabilities to provide arms, investments, or diplomatic cover, Xi and Putin are smiling. Beijing also wants to increase its own power over MENA, looking not only at energy but also control over renewables, ports, and infrastructure. Moscow is mainly using all to counter Western sanctions or to weaken European support for Ukraine.
Overall, the Doha Summit and the Saudi-Pakistan pact are not PR stunts, but the first signs of a possible regional drive to reshape security (and other) arrangements. The position of the West, especially the USA, is under pressure, but not yet heading towards a tectonic shift in all. Grand power ambitions seem to be colliding with regional developments and the ambitions of emerging Middle Powers. More coordination between the Middle Powers is clearly on the table. In the coming weeks and months, two other main developments should be assessed:
- India’s reaction to the changing political-military situation in the Arabian Gulf, while addressing Delhi’s growing economic and military cloud.
- The changing position of Erdogan’s Turkey, as a growing power in the Middle East (Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Syria), and the GCC, could destabilize not only the region (neo-Ottoman) but also weaken NATO.
