The “Rally around the flag” effect is a psychological and political phenomenon which describes the unification of citizens and societies behind national leaders in support of their government institutions during times of crisis or external threats, as for example during wartime. Firstly, defined by John Mueller in a 1970 paper discussing the “Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnson”, the concept arises from the human tendency to seek unity when facing a threat or significant challenge, and setting aside political division in favor of cohesion when confronted by danger.^[1] 

The effect can lead to strengthened cooperation and increased support with government directives. On the other hand, as critics argue, such periods on national crisis can be utilized and exploited by leaders in order to gain support, or divert attention from domestic instability.^[2]

October 7^th 2023 marked a profound national trauma for Israel. Hamas militants launched an unprecedented assault killing some 1,200 people – many of them were attendants on a music festival – and kidnapping 251 hostages. Immediately the Israeli government waged a large-scale military operation in Gaza.^[3] The ensuing Gaza war produced a burst of unity and support towards leadership, along with a shift in political discourse. As Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu emphasized, the threat posed by Hamas echoed the group’s foundational charter of 1988, which infamously declares: “Israel will exist and will continue to exist until Islam will obliterate it, just as it obliterated others before it.”^[4] Such language reinforced the perception of an existential struggle, thus triggering the psychological mechanisms underpinning the rally effect.

Initially, this unity strengthened public support for the military campaign and temporarily bolstered trust in Netanyahu’s leadership. The internal unrest and political divisions are significantly influencing public opinion in Israel, and as societal cohesion waned, so did public sentiment behind the war.^[5] Polls indicate that a growing number of Israelis are dissatisfied with the government’s handling of the conflict. Many citizens are questioning the effectiveness of the military strategy and are increasingly supportive of a ceasefire and negotiations for the return of hostages.^[6] Netanyahu’s leadership, already under pressure due to judicial reform controversies and corruption trials, now faced renewed scrutiny both domestically and abroad.^[7] This erosion could impact his political standing as well as influence future policy decisions and national strategy.

However, Israeli society remains polarized. A recent poll, conducted in March 2025 by Israeli scholar Tamir Sorek, professor at Penn State University, and published by the Israeli newspaper Haaretz, found that 82% of Israeli Jews supported the forced expulsion of Gaza residents, with 47% of respondents agreeing that the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) should eliminate all inhabitants when conquering an enemy city.^[8] Such data indicates a significant segment of the population remains aligned with extreme national-security approaches, and the results could influence the moral of Israeli society and its relations with Palestinians.

At the same time, on May 18 the Mossad unveiled parts of the Eli Cohen Archives, after being held for almost 60 years in Syrian security archives.^[9] Prime Minister Netanyahu seized the opportunity, calling Cohen “an Israeli legend. He’s the greatest agent Israeli intelligence has had in the years the state existed. There was no one like him”.^[10] Highlighting symbolic victories can redirect attention in a period of fragmentation and disapproval. Thus, the recovery of Eli Cohen’s archive is not merely a historical event but a strategic asset that can reinforce national identity and collective memory, as well impact public opinion and political strategy.

In a time of domestic polarization, eroding trust and international criticism, the return of a historic figure can revive a shared sense of identity and serve as a point of pride restoring social cohesion and bolstering national morale.

By thoughtfully integrating this development into national narratives and diplomatic efforts, Israel can enhance its position both domestically and internationally.

The rally effect, in its essence, is an emotional and psychological response to trauma reflecting a natural human tendency. Citizens facing existential threats may consolidate support around national symbols as an emotional reaction – rooted on a perceived existential threat along with both societal and national identity – to fear, uncertainty and the need for collective security. They often prioritize survival and unity over critique and accountability. In Israel, a nation born out of trauma and conflict, national security is not merely policy, but has always been central pillar of its identity. In this context the phenomenon is not only especially prominent, but also intensified. However as Murray states – and we can see it in the example of the American elections of 1992, when George H. W. Bush’s failed to win re-election after the Persian Gulf War – “Ongoing war with casualties can soon become corrosive to a president’s popularity. […] The effects of short popular wars do not necessarily have staying power to carry the next election”.^[11]

In times of crisis societal cohesion is essential in order to prevent societal and morale collapse, along with strengthening international support and internal legitimacy. Whistle insecurity can serve as distraction and leverage, not only is it after incidents such as the October 7^th attack that unity follows as a natural consequence, but also Israeli Prime Minister is still facing criticism. Specifically, the leveraging of national trauma and of the war, as well as the manipulation of the public opinion could strengthen the support towards Mr. Netanyahu by recaliblating the political momentum, delaying inquiries, halting the judicial reform debate, limiting the opposition’s voice and preserving far-right coalition stability, continuing military operations despite faltering public support, and maintaining extreme rhetoric. Nonetheless, those derivatives can be interpreted as responses and not part of a strategy. Rallying and cohesion may had happened regardless of political leadership as when people suffer the same trauma, unity follows naturally. Additionally, there is external constraint, pressure, and increasing disapproval signifying limited political resilient and sustained legitimacy.

Additionally, let’s not forget the narrative of a generational and existential war which Mr. Netanyahu has presented. Jonathan G. Leslie on “Fear and Insecurity” discusses the role of the current Prime Minister in promoting and sustaining the Iran threat in Israeli society by picturing the Islamic Republic as not only an existential threat, but also as global menace. Nonetheless, Yoram Peri, adducing that the effect is deeply embedded in Israeli strategic culture, has noted the dual function of military action in Israel, which often serves national security and cultivates political legitimacy.^[12] Similarly, Eyal Zisser, with his work as Middle East historian, highlights Benjamin Netanyahu’s pattern of aligning critical political moments with military tensions.^[13] Both of them converge on the notion of the ability to invoke terror or crisis as a unifying force. The instrumentalization of conflict becomes more visible when internal legitimacy is low, leadership faces mounting criticism and go through coalition instability, judicial reforms and corruption trials.

Public opinion and perception are both influenced by state actions and influential in shaping national policies and strategic decisions. This interrelation is principal in understanding how the rally around the flag effect operates and evolves.

Trauma and fear caused by the October 7^th attack can reinforce national and societal identity pressuring the government to prioritize hostages over military objectives, and on the other hand strengthen support to military services, along with limiting coalition. At the same time media framing and symbolic acts, such as the discovery of the archive of Eli Cohen by reinforcing national pride could shift attention from accountability and the rhetoric of “humanitarian corridors” and “surgical operations”. Public opinion is highly, instinctively, psychologically conditioned to consolidate in the face of fear, like an immune system is activating against existential threats.^[14]

The aspects of the phenomenon are more identifiable and distinct in Irasel, due to the characteristics of the national identity of the Israeli society. The aftermath of the October 7^th attack saw a familiar to the rally-around-the-flag-effect pattern: initial unity, symbolic reinforcement, and eventual erosion as trauma gave way to critical reassessment. Symbolic acts, national narratives, and emotional appeals can operate as tools in shaping both public opinion and state strategy. But like all immune responses, the effect has limits. What began as a unifying security mission has become a politically divisive and strategically stagnant situation.

Lastly, the rally-around-the-flag effect, when weaponized, may serve short-term leadership survival, but it often comes at the expense of democratic cohesion, long-term stability, and moral clarity. Such actions can have humanitarian and ethical consequences as the dehumanization of the enemy, the public support towards disproportional or genocidal rhetoric, and reducing moral restraint. On the other hand, when it comes to domestic political costs, they could lead to the polarization of the society, to the re-emergement of unresolved division, and to the fracturing of social and political consensus and contracts.

1. [1] [1]John Mueller, “Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnson”, The American Political Science Review vol. 64, no. 1, 1970, pp. 18–34. https://doi.org/10.2307/1955610. ↑

2. [2] [2]William Baker & Oneal John, “Patriotism or Opinion Leadership?: The Nature and Origins of the ‘Rally ‘Round the Flag’ Effect”, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 45, no. 5, 2001, pp. 661–87. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3176318. ↑

3. [3] [3]Atlintic Council, “One year after Hamas’s October 7 terrorist attacks, here’s how the region has changed”. October 4, 2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/one-year-after-hamass-october-7-terrorist-attacks-heres-how-the-region-changed/. ↑

4. [4] [4]Bruce Hoffman, “Understanding Hamas’s Genocidal Ideology”, The Atlantic, October 10, 2023 https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2023/10/hamas-covenant-israel-attack-war-genocide/675602/ ↑

5. [6] [6]Tamar Hermann, Lior Yohanani & Yaron Kaplan, “One Year of War – Public Opinion in Israel at the One Year Anniversary of the War in Gaza”, The Israel Democracy Institute, 07 October, 2024, https://en.idi.org.il/articles/56081. ↑

6. [7] [7]Tai Staff, “Poll: 70% of Israelis don’t trust government, including a third of coalition voters”, The Times of Israel, 29 March 2025 https://www.timesofisrael.com/poll-70-of-israelis-dont-trust-government-including-almost-half-of-coalition-voters/ ↑

7. [8] [8]Jon Henley, “Public support for Israel in western Europe at lowest ever recorded by YouGov”, The Guardian, 03 June 2025, https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2025/06/03/most-people-across-24-surveyed-countries-have-negative-views-of-israel-and-netanyahu/. Laura Silver, “Most people across 24 surveyed countries have negative views of Israel and Netanyahu”, Pew Research Center, 03 June, 2025, https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2025/06/03/most-people-across-24-surveyed-countries-have-negative-views-of-israel-and-netanyahu/. ↑

8. [9] [9]Ben Norton, “Poll: 82% of Israelis want to expel Palestinians from Gaza; 47% want to kill every man, woman, child”, Geopolitical Economy, 30 May, 2025, https://geopoliticaleconomy.com/2025/05/30/poll-israelis-expel-palestinians-gaza-genocide/. ↑

9. [10] [10]Jeffrey Karam, “Staging the Past: Archives, Intelligence, and the Eli Cohen Diplomacy Play”, Daraj, 23 May 2025, https://daraj.media/en/staging-the-past-archives-intelligence-and-the-eli-cohen-diplomacy-play/. ↑

10. [11] [11]Gavin Blackburn, “Israel recovers archive belonging to spy Eli Cohen, hanged in Syria in 1965”, Euronews, 19 May, 2025, https://www.euronews.com/2025/05/19/israel-recovers-archive-belonging-to-spy-eli-cohen-who-was-hanged-in-syria-in-1965. ↑

11. [12] [12]Shoon Murray, “The “Rally-‘Round-the-Flag” Phenomenon and the Diversionary Use of Force”, Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, June 2017, DOI: 10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.518. ↑

12. [13] [13]Lev Luis Grinberg, “Political Crisis in Israel: a Military Regime within a Democratic State?”, European Institute of the Mediteranean, 2016, https://www.iemed.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Political-Crisis-in-Israel-a-Military-Regime-within-a-Democratic-State.pdf. ↑

13. [14] [14]Eyal Zisser, “Trends in Middle East Politics and their Implications for Israel”, Israel Affairs, vol. 12, no. 4, 684–697, 2006, doi:10.1080/13537120600889910. Eyal Zisser, “Israel and the Arab World: Breaking the Glass Ceiling”, Strategic Assessment, vol. 23, no. 3, July 2020, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/346025618_Israel_and_the_Arab_World_Breaking_the_Glass_Ceiling. Eyal Zisser, “Modern Europe and Traditional Islamic Views of Jews and Judaism.” The Journal of the Middle East and Africa, vol. 16, no. 2, 173–176, 2025, https://doi.org/10.1080/21520844.2025.2492927. ↑

14. [15] [15]Rivka Tuval-Mashiach, “The Psychological Impact of the Hamas Attack in Israel”, Psychiatric Times, 24 October, 2023, https://www.psychiatrictimes.com/view/the-psychological-impact-of-the-hamas-attack-in-israel. Jessica Stern & Bessel van der Kolk, “The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict and the Psychology of Trauma”, 07 December, 2023, Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/israel/psychology-israeli-palestinian-conflict-trauma-bessel-van-der-kolk. Tamar Hermann, Or Anabi, Yaron Kaplan, & Inna Orly Sapozhnikova, “The Israeli Democracy Index 2023”, Viterbi Family Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research, 2023, https://en.idi.org.il/media/24389/the-israeli-democracy-index-2023-english.pdf. Tamar Hermann, Lior Yohanani, Yaron Kaplan, & Inna Orly Sapozhnikova, “The Israeli Democracy Index 2023”, Viterbi Family Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research, 2024, https://en.idi.org.il/media/27509/israel-democracy-index-2024-e_for_web_17-2-2025.pdf. ↑