An article by Jerome Vitenberg

The Muslim Brotherhood’s presence in France, dating to the 1980s with groups like the Union of Islamic Organizations of France (UOIF), now “Musulmans de France” (FMF), has long raised concerns about political Islamist influence over both Muslim communities and the institutions of the French Republic.^[1] Previous government reports, such as the 2004 Obin report^[2], identified similar issues in schools but lacked focus on “entryism” detailed in the French Ministry of Interior’s report, “Frères musulmans et islamisme politique en France,” released in May 2025^[3].

This report outlines the Brotherhood’s covert, long-term strategy to infiltrate public institutions, schools, and local governments to implement Sharia law, distinct from separatism’s parallel societies. It highlights their aim to undermine France’s secularism and gender equality. The report provides specific evidence of this strategy through the activities of the FMF, identified as the Brotherhood’s national branch, linked to approximately 200 mosques attracting nearly 100,000 weekly worshippers, 300 associations across religious, charitable, educational, and professional sectors, and roughly 20 private schools enrolling over 4,200 students. It also notes a rise in veiling, beards, and fasting, including among young girls, signaling cultural shifts.

Crucially, the report exposes the Brotherhood’s “subversive” goal: a state governed by Islamic law. It details their use of anti-Islamophobia narratives to deflect criticism, promote a belief in “state-sponsored Islamophobia” to mobilize support, and leverage social media and influencers to portray France as Islamophobic to undermine secularism and appeal to young Francophone Europeans.

This Islamist strategy clashes with France’s core principles. France’s approach to its Muslim minority, shaped by post-colonial immigration from North Africa, is defined by laïcité—a strict secularism mandating state neutrality and separation of church and state, contrasting with Anglo-Saxon multiculturalism. This principle, central to the French Fifth Republic’s identity, creates tensions with jihadist groups viewing France’s policies as hostile^[4].

The 2021 “separatism law”^[5] aimed to counter Islamist separatism by reinforcing republican values^[6]. The current report, commissioned by former Interior Minister Gérald Darmanin and declassified by his successor, Bruno Retailleau, defines “entryism” as the Brotherhood’s covert strategy to infiltrate public institutions, schools, and local governments to impose Sharia law, distinct from separatism.

Political Context

The report’s conclusions echo long-standing claims by academics and politicians, mainly from the Right. As Eric Zemmour aptly notes, “They’ve just discovered hot water.”^[7] Its value lies in pushing the boundaries of public discourse, turning a once-taboo “red line” into an acceptable “green line” for discussing the Islamist threat to the French Republic. The report’s timing is strategic, as it aligns with heightened political focus on security issues ahead of the 2026 municipal elections, where right-wing parties are gaining ground: Marine Le Pen’s RN polls above 30%, and Bruno Retailleau, recently elected head of LR, likely benefits from the report to boost his conservative credentials and attract voters from RN and Reconquête.^[8] The report underscores a hardline stance ahead of the 2026 municipal and 2027 presidential elections, serving as both an intelligence assessment and a political tool to shape public opinion. This potential instrumentalization raises questions about the reliability of French intelligence on Islamist groups and complications in counter-extremism cooperation due to domestic political calculations.

Methodological Concerns

The report’s credibility is under scrutiny due to questions about its authorship and methodology. Its main authors—Prefect Pascal Courtade (a role comparable to that of a regional governor in the U.S.) and Ambassador François Gouyette—are both deeply embedded in the French establishment.

In 2016, Mr. Courtade co-authored a book on the expression of religion in the public sphere. The book was commissioned by the French Ministry of the Interior, with a preface by Mr. Bernard Cazeneuve, reflecting official support for its exploration of religious expression in public spaces.^[9]

Mr. Gouyette, a veteran diplomat with over 40 years of service in the Arab world and a recognized specialist at the French Foreign Ministry, also recently headed the Arab World Institute in Paris—a prestigious institution promoting Arab culture and spirituality, funded by several Arab nations.^[10]

While the professionalism and objectivity of these two lead authors might be acknowledged, the report does not disclose the identities of 45 contributing “specialists,” which include academics, Muslim leaders, and intelligence officers. In light of some of the report’s recommendations, this raises significant concerns regarding its objectivity.

Foreign Influence Oversight

A key critique is what the report omits. While detailing the Brotherhood’s alleged “entryism,” it downplays foreign financial influence, particularly from Qatar. This omission is significant given Qatar’s documented role in shaping Islamist networks. The report briefly acknowledges Qatar and Turkey as backers of European Islamist networks, noting the Brotherhood’s shift toward Europe as its Middle Eastern influence wanes. However, Qatar’s extensive funding of French mosques, Islamic centers, and cultural initiatives, part of a broader soft power strategy via Al Jazeera, ownership of Paris Saint-Germain, and investments in French real estate and energy sectors, is not thoroughly explored. A 2022–23 French National Assembly report on foreign interference highlighted Qatar’s billions in French investments, including stakes in companies like TotalEnergies and Vinci, raising concerns about economic leverage^[11]. French politicians have criticized Qatar’s impact on sovereignty, citing its diplomatic ties and energy dependence. The report’s limited focus suggests a geopolitical blind spot or deliberate omission, likely due to these ties, creating tension between national security and economic interests.

Academic Freedom Concerns

The report’s recommendations reveal flaws in its analysis, objectivity, and methodology. The chapter on “developing contemporary Islamic studies” notes a lack of French research and a divided academic landscape on the subject. One academic group views the local Brotherhood as disconnected from the global Islamist organization, integrated into French culture, and posing no threat. Another group, more critical, sees the local organization’s moderate tone as “taqiyya” to conceal steps toward an Islamic state. The report’s ambiguous wording suggests that the Brotherhood seeks to Islamize academia under the guise of combating “Islamophobia” and delegitimizing the academics suspicious of the Brotherhood’s political goals. It calls for a “more objective, less ideological” academic branch—a “third university path”—implying that critics of political Islam are as problematic as those supporting it. This recommendation, sidelining critical researchers, undermines academic freedom and objective inquiry into the Brotherhood’s influence.

Misaligned Burial Recommendation

The recommendation to facilitate Muslim burial sectors through legislation —ostensibly due to space constraints—, to prevent Islamists from politicizing the issue, is inappropriate. Burial is a sensitive, emotional, and religious matter, universally significant across cultures. While respecting this issue is valid, addressing it in a report on Islamist groups exploits a cultural issue and makes it more political, which is inappropriate and undermines the report’s focus. Today, French minorities, under specific interpretations of the law allowing the implementations of regulations related to private concessions^[12], can bury their dead in dedicated sectors if needed. There’s no need to escalate the issue into a cultural war with Islamist groups.

Language Education Gaps

The report notes that Arabic and Turkish are primarily taught in Quranic schools, exposing students to potential Islamist influence. It recommends teaching these languages in public schools—a logical step^[13]. However, it raises questions: Why the 15-year delay in implementing an idea long recognized as necessary? Why not pair this with efforts to enhance French language and cultural education among Muslim minorities to support better integration?

Foreign Policy Missteps

The report’s suggestion that France’s perceived pro-Israel stance fuels a “state Islamophobia” narrative among Muslims is questionable. Interviewees claim France’s position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, exploited by Islamists, drives this perception. The report suggests recognizing a Palestinian state to reduce tensions. However, France’s policy has not favored Israel in decades; it has consistently criticized Israel’s actions in the Middle east^[14] and pushed for a Palestinian state, including at an upcoming New York conference^[15].

This recommendation seems to cater to domestic identity politics, with Macron’s rhetoric aimed at appeasing the Left and anti-Israel voters. It could be seen as a sacrifice of the Jewish state, aligning with an appeasement policy toward an Islamist agenda.

Conclusion

For years, France’s political spectrum has debated countering Islamist groups, from hardline right-wing proposals to nuanced centrist approaches. Figures like Philippe de Villiers^[16] and Eric Zemmour^[17], once labeled racist, are gaining traction as their warnings resonate in public discourse. The report raises awareness of “entryism” and sets the stage for government consultations in June 2025. However, its methodological weaknesses, reliance on anonymous secondary authors, and conflation of cultural practices with extremism undermine its credibility. Its limited focus on foreign financing, particularly from Qatar and Turkey, reflects geopolitical blind spots driven by France’s economic and diplomatic ties. Troubling recommendations—like sidelining critical academics labeled “pessimistic” and proposing a Palestinian state to appease minority frustrations^[18]—suggest a risky trend of appeasement. Future policy should better balance robust counter-extremism measures with preserving France’s secular and democratic principles.

1. Adriano Tiniscopa, “Le prix de la Revue des Deux Mondes 2023 revient à l’anthropologue Florence Bergeaud-Blackler”, Livres Hebdo, https://www.livreshebdo.fr/article/le-prix-de-la-revue-des-deux-mondes-2023-revient-lanthropologue-florence-bergeaud-blackler, October 29, 2023. ↑

2. “Les signes et manifestations d’appartenance religieuse dans les établissements scolaires”, Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, https://www.education.gouv.fr/les-signes-et-manifestations-d-appartenance-religieuse-dans-les-etablissements-scolaires-8888, June 2024. ↑

3. “Publication du rapport “Frères musulmans et islamisme politique en France”, Ministère de l’Intérieur, https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/actualites/dossiers-de-presse/publication-du-rapport-freres-musulmans-et-islamisme-politique-en, May 21, 2025 ↑

4. “Rapport d’information sur les ingérences étrangères”, Assemblée nationale, https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/12/rapports/r1275-t2.asp, December 4, 2023. ↑

5. “Loi n° 2021-1109 du 24 août 2021 confortant le respect des principes de la République”, Legifrance, https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jorf/id/JORFTEXT000043964778. ↑

6. “Loi séparatisme : respect des principes de la République”, Vie publique, https://www.vie-publique.fr/loi/277621-loi-separatisme-respect-des-principes-de-la-republique-24-aout-2021. ↑

7. “Entretien avec Éric Zemmour”, Radio Europe 1, YouTube, https://youtu.be/-k9HTw21kac?si=DI4phrb_svBci8Az, May 23, 2025. ↑

8. “Sondage Toluna Harris Interactive pour LCI”, Commission des sondages, https://www.commission-des-sondages.fr/notices/files/notices/2025/mai/9942-p-toluna-hi-lci-20-mai.pdf, May 2025. ↑

9. Courtade, Pascal, Isabelle Saint-Martin, Louis Hourmant, and Bernard Cazeneuve. L’expression du religieux dans la sphère publique: Comparaisons internationales. Paris: La Documentation Française, 2016. ↑

10. Since June 2024, François Gouyette has been advising the Chairman of Diot-Siaci, a leading insurance, consulting, and brokerage firm with significant business interests in the Arab world, with revenues in excess of one billion USD, per a company press release of April 2025. In 2024, Fitch reported that approximately 70% of the company’s gross commissions from direct broking were derived from the UAE and Saudi Arabia. (https://www.fitchratings.com/research/corporate-finance/fitch-affirms-diot-siaci-idr-at-b-downgrades-tlb-to-b-rr4-15-04-2024) ↑

11. “Commission d’enquête sur les ingérences étrangères”, Assemblée nationale, https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/16/organes/autres-commissions/commissions-enquete/ce-ingerences-etrangeres, May-June 2023. ↑

12. Louis Dall’aglio , “Laïcité et cimetières municipaux”, Géoconfluences, https://geoconfluences.ens-lyon.fr/informations-scientifiques/a-la-une/image-a-la-une/laicite-cimetieres-municipaux, December 5, 2022. ↑

13. Brigitte Perucca , “La langue arabe chassée des classes”, Le Monde, September 8, 2009, https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2009/09/08/la-langue-arabe-chassee-des-classes_1237507_3224.html. ↑

14. Renée Fregosi, “Cette passion dévastatrice anti-Israël est aussi un crime contre la raison”, Revue des Deux Mondes, October 24, 2023, https://www.revuedesdeuxmondes.fr/cette-passion-devastatrice-anti-israel-est-aussi-un-crime-contre-la-raison/. ↑

15. AFP, “France could recognise Palestinian state in June: Macron”, France 24, April 9, 2025, https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20250409-france-could-recognise-palestinian-state-in-june-macron. ↑

16. Benoit Rayski, “Les mosquées de Roissy : en 2006, personne n’a voulu écouter Philippe de Villiers”, Atlantico, November 29, 2015, https://atlantico.fr/article/decryptage/les-mosquees-de-roissy-en-2006-personne-n-a-voulu-ecouter-philippe-de-villiers-benoit-rayski. ↑

17. Reuters, “Les médias appelés à écarter Eric Zemmour”, December 18, 2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/world/les-mdias-appels-carter-eric-zemmour-idUSKBN0JW223/ ↑

18. AFP, “France could recognise Palestinian state in June: Macron”, France 24, April 9, 2025, https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20250409-france-could-recognise-palestinian-state-in-june-macron ↑