Kobi Michael and Ori Wertman

The Hamas terrorist attack carried out on October 7, 2023, is a seminal event that will be remembered in the collective Jewish consciousness and in the history of the State of Israel.^[1] Hamas’ brutal massacre greatly influenced Israel’s national security perceptions, as it is now clear to everyone that a terrorist organization that insists on destroying the Jewish state should not be allowed to establish a semi-state terrorist entity on its borders. The war against Hamas in the Gaza Strip clearly illustrates this understanding, as for Israel the main goal of the war, alongside the release of the Israeli hostages who were brutally kidnapped by the Palestinian terrorist organization, is to overthrow the Hamas rule in the Gaza Strip by dismantling it as an organized and effective governmental and military entity and preventing any future security threat from the Gaza Strip.^[2]

Investigations are currently being published about the events of October 7, which clearly illustrate the systemic collapse that the IDF experienced that day. The main conclusion from all of those reports is that the IDF failed in its mission to protect Israel’s southern border, when thousands of Hamas terrorists effectively occupied the regional division compound and a region of land, massacred 1,200 of its inhabitants, including around 900 civilians who were left almost defenseless and abducted 251 hostages. In this context, there are many claims that if the IDF had been prepared during routine days for a Hamas terror attack, as befits an army that must be prepared for a situation in which a terrorist organization located on the country’s border might one day attack, the Hamas attack would have been thwarted, or perhaps would not even have taken place. ^[3] The evidence that Mohammed Dief even considered calling off the attack on the morning of the attack for fear that the IDF was preparing an ambush, poses a substantial proof that if the IDF had been properly prepared on the Gaza Strip border, and not necessarily in an emergency times, the Hamas attack would not have taken place at all.^[4] The investigation conducted by the IDF clearly illustrates the extent of the IDF’s Intelligence Branch (AMAN) failure to identify the threat posed by Hamas and its intentions to carry out a surprise attack.^[5] An investigation conducted by the Shin Bet (The Israeli Security Service) also clearly illustrates the organization’s failure on the eve of the Hamas attack, which, like the IDF, did not assess that Hamas was capable of and interested in carrying out a terrorist attack of this magnitude.^[6]

In addition to the IDF and Shin Bet’s failure on the eve of the attack, the question of Israel’s conception and settlement policy towards Hamas has once again arisen.

Within its framework, Israel believed that the Palestinian terrorist organization Hamas would become established and institutionalized, would prioritize improving the economic reality and the well-being of its citizens, and would therefore also be restrained in exchange for a series of civil and economic steps towards the Gaza Strip, and would be deterred by the fear of losing those assets.

Also, the question of the Qatari money transferred to Hamas, which undoubtedly helped it build a terrorist army that was finally deployed against Israel on October 7, has resurfaced.^[7]

The conception regarding Hamas was formulated and prevailed in the IDF Military Intelligence Directorate (AMAN). The conception of Hamas was well illustrated by its research division chief, Brigadier General Amit Sa’ar, who was considered the top expert of the Palestinian arena in the IDF, and by virtue of his position had more influence than any other position holder in AMAN on its intelligence assessment considered as the National Intelligence Assessment. Sa’ar stated that Hamas is deterred and that the economic situation in the Gaza Strip is at the forefront of his mind: “Hamas has no interest in a confrontation with Israel. It is deterred. What worries it the most is the economic situation in the Gaza Strip… The state component in Hamas’ concept is getting stronger… From the beginning, Hamas had two identities, that of a religious resistance organization and that of a national movement. From 2007 (Hamas’ violent takeover of the Gaza Strip and the expulsion of the Palestinian Authority) it also has the identity of the sovereign in Gaza, and is measured against it every day. The main shaper that determines the reality of Hamas is the economy. It’s the first thing both the leaders and the public get up with in the morning, and the last thing they go to bed with at night”.^[8]

In Sa’ar’s view, unlike other totalitarian leaders in the Arab world, the leaders of Hamas actually care about their people and are bothered by the economic situation. According to Sa’ar, Hamas operates in the method of signaling to Israel through violence that includes confrontations on the border fence, explosive balloons and more. Thus, when Hamas believes that the economic situation in the Gaza Strip is suffocated and on the verge of collapse, it signals to Israel through limited violence, which indicates that Hamas’s decision-making is motivated by a desire to reach a calm settlement with Israel. Sa’ar also believed that Israel and Hamas have a common interest in improving life in the Gaza Strip, and that Israel’s mission is to make Hamas have something to lose, by creating constraints on it to keep the peace when the economy plays a central role:

“As long as it feels there is progress – projects, international money – Hamas will bite its lips. And if it thinks there is no progress or that he is being played with, it will signal… As long as it thinks there is a chance and conditions for a settlement, it has an interest in keeping the peace. In the meantime, it survives, and as long as it survives, it’s fine”.^[9]

In this context, the Israeli strategy was clear in light of the desire to concentrate on existential threats such as the Iranian nuclear program and Hezbollah’s precision missile project,^[10] while at the same time keeping the Hamas threat under control.

The assumption and organizing logic in Israel were that preventing a humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip and improving the economic reality in the shadow of Hamas’ institutionalization process could ensure the preservation of deterrence against the organization and the establishment of a settlement with it if Israel will be able to strengthen the facilitators of the process and weaken the accelerators of continue using violence.^[11] Israel indeed strengthened some of the facilitators but neglected the weakening of the accelerators. In this way, Israel believed that they would be able to neutralize the Gaza arena in a way that would allow for necessary intelligence and operational focus on the other threatening arenas, such as Iran, Syria, and Lebanon. The focus on the issue of Qatari money should be understood as one of several moves aimed at establishing and institutionalizing the arrangement with Hamas and the deterrence that comes with it. Eventually, Israel addicted to calm in any price.

There is no dispute about the problematic significance of that conception with regard to Hamas. It is assumed that the prevailing perception in Israel also influenced the IDF’s operational conduct, which was derived from the conditions of the comfort and security zone in which the organization was immersed. The preoccupation and focus on the conception of institutionalizing Hamas, regulation, and deterrence undoubtedly diverted attention from the plausible possibility of thwarting or preventing the attack through proper operational preparation by the IDF on the border of the Gaza Strip.^[12] But at the same time, the importance of the unasked question becomes more acute: “Would the conception of regulation and deterrence against Hamas have been challenged in Israel at some point even if the IDF had been adequately prepared for the possibility of the October 7 attack and it had been thwarted, or had not even been carried out?” It is likely that the answer to the unasked question is negative, especially in light of Israel’s accumulated historical experience with Hamas since the latter took control of the Gaza Strip. After all, since its takeover of the Gaza Strip in June 2007 and after each round of violence against Hamas (2008, 2012, 2014, 2018 – the fence events, 2021), Israel has returned to the path of “dialogue” with the Palestinian terrorist organization and attempts to reach a settlement with it. Therefore, it seems that if the October 7 attack had been thwarted by the IDF or had been prevented due to more proper IDF preparation, Israel would have continued to operate with the same policy against Hamas. Thus, Israel’s policy was part of the conception that effectively led to the “containment” of the Palestinian terrorist organization and the terrorist army it built on the border of Israel. And if an attack had not been carried out, the recognition that Hamas was deterred would have been strengthened, hence the effectiveness of deterrence. If the attack had been thwarted, it would have been treated as another round of confrontations, such as Israel had known in the past, and which were not capable of changing the conception regarding Hamas. Tragically and painfully, the conception led to a painful and humiliating failure that exacted a very heavy price from Israeli society. On the other hand, it’s scary to think that if the attack had been thwarted or avoided, the conception would probably have deepened its roots in Israel. Thus, Israel would certainly have felt the October 7 attack in an even more powerful and dangerous manner, in a more widespread and coordinated multi-front manner, and at a much more problematic and dangerous timing.

Prof. Kobi Michael is a senior research fellow at the INSS and Strategy International and a visiting professor at the International Center for Policing and Security the University of South Wales

Dr. Ori Wertman is a research fellow at the University of South Wales, UK, and a research fellow at The Israel Centre for Grand Strategy- ICGS. 

1. References

   Ynet, “Dozens killed, abducted as Israel comes under surprise Hamas attack”, October 7, 2023, https://www.ynetnews.com/article/rysg8i0l6 ↑

2. Eitan Shamir, “Not an End State but a Long Game: Israel’s Strategic Goals in the Iron Swords War”, BESA, October 14, 2024, https://besacenter.org/not-an-end-state-but-a-long-game-israels-strategic-goals-in-the-iron-swords-war/ ↑

3. Emanuel Fabian, “IDF’s Oct. 7 probes show it misread Hamas for years, left southern Israel utterly vulnerable”, Times of Israel, February 27, 2025, https://www.timesofisrael.com/idfs-oct-7-probes-show-it-misread-hamas-for-years-left-southern-israel-utterly-vulnerable/ ↑

4. The New Arab, “Al-Aqsa Flood mastermind nearly called off 7 October attack”, February 21, 2025, https://www.newarab.com/news/al-aqsa-flood-mastermind-nearly-called-7-october-attack ↑

5. Yoav Zitun, “How Hamas outsmarted Israel: The deception that led to the October 7 intelligence breakdown”, Ynet, February 27, 2025, https://www.ynetnews.com/article/bkd8rnrqkl#autoplay ↑

6. Emanuel Fabian, “Shin Bet probe: Oct. 7 would have been prevented if we’d acted differently”, Times of Israel, March 4, 2025, https://www.timesofisrael.com/shin-bet-probe-oct-7-would-have-been-prevented-if-wed-acted-differently/ ↑

7. Nima Elbagir, Barbara Arvanitidis, Alex Platt, Raja Razek, Nadeen Ebrahim, and Uri Blau, “Qatar sent millions to Gaza for years – with Israel’s backing. Here’s what we know about the controversial deal”, CNN, December 12, 2023, https://edition.cnn.com/2023/12/11/middleeast/qatar-hamas-funds-israel-backing-intl/index.html ↑

8. Ori Wertman, “Aman is responsible for instilling the ‘Hamas is deterred’ conception”, Israel Center for Grand Strategy, July 23, 2024, https://icgs.org.il/en/publications/amans-responsibility-for-the-conception/ ↑

9. Ibid. ↑

10. Yehoshua Kalisky, “Precision missiles, UAVs, and tens of thousands of-fighters Hezbollah’s order of battle”, INSS, October 19, 2023, https://www.inss.org.il/social_media/precision-missiles-uavs-and-tens-of-thousands-of-fighters-hezbollahs-order-of-battle/ ↑

11. Kobi Michael and Omer Dostri (2018), “The Hamas Tightrope: Between Political Institutionalization and Armed Struggle”, Strategic Assessment, 21(3), pp. 35-46. https://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Michael-Dostri.pdf ↑

12. Kobi Michael, “Israel’s Moment of Truth in Dealing with Hamas”, INSS, December 23, 2021, https://www.inss.org.il/publication/hamas-israel/ ↑