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Climate Change in and around the Pacific Ocean

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Climate Change in and around the Pacific Ocean

This article uncomprehensively considers the possible consequences of potential climate changes in the future upon human and hard security in countries bordering, along, or within the surrounds of the Ring of Fire and Pacific Ocean.

International affairs are experiencing a seismic shift in power and influence whose epicenter consists of countries that border or have relatively easy access to the western Pacific Ocean; other relevant countries in this seismic shift are found along the earthquake-prone Pacific Ring of Fire and the various Pacific islands. (Of course, the shockwaves have already extended to and will continue to reach distant reaches of the world.)

Among the various factors shaping the trajectory and degree of the power and influence of these countries is and will be climate, which is invariably related to oceans (in this case the Pacific Ocean). Climate-induced phenomena will reinforce and/or impinge upon the physical territories, human well-being, economic development, and political stability of these countries. This article uncomprehensively considers the possible consequences of potential climate changes in the future upon human and hard security in countries bordering, along, or within the surrounds of the Ring of Fire and Pacific Ocean.

Environmental Consequences of Climate Change

The World Meteorological Organization (WMO) has pronounced 2023 as “the warmest year on record, with the global average near-surface temperature at 1.45°Celsius (with a margin of uncertainty of ± 0.12 °C) above the pre-industrial baseline.”[1] It has also determined that the ten years from 2011 to 2020 were the warmest decade (at 1.09°Celsius in a range of  0.95 to 1.20°Celsius[2]). In multiple instances, global average temperatures have approached and exceeded the 1.5°Celsius threshold that the Paris Agreement set as a global target not to be crossed. However, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) deems the threshold will be crossed at the mid-point of a span of 20 years in which the average temperature is above 1.5°Celsius.[3]

Having said that, the IPCC criteria for that threshold may be fulfilled as early as the 2030s. Nevertheless, temperatures continuing to rise toward 1.5°Celsius alone would cause loss to biodiversity, natural processes, and human lives and livelihoods. The extent of consequences “will depend on concurrent near-term trends in vulnerability, exposure, level of socioeconomic development and adaptation”[4] and the occurrence of weather phenomena that are projected to be more intense.

Oceans are essential to regulating global climate patterns, for example, due to the continuous movement of water (currents) that transports cool and warm water to warmer and cooler regions respectively. Sea surface wind and temperature are two causes of currents. [5] Both are affected by absorbed atmospheric heat (elevated by greenhouse gases), which in turn alters sea circulations and disrupts established climate patterns;[6] thus there is a feedback loop.

The Pacific Ocean has a particularly important role in global climate and environmental health as it is the largest body of water on the planet, covering around 30 percent of its surface. The ocean is the setting of two natural climate patterns that make up the El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO): El Niño and La Niña. These two ENSO phases involve the circulation of waters and shifts in the atmosphere, the former broadly leading to warm temperatures and/or dry conditions in the western Pacific (Australia and Southeast Asia), eastern Pacific (North, Central, and South America) and even as far as India and eastern Africa; pockets or larger zones of mainly wet weather are also present. The latter pattern generally sees cool temperatures and wet conditions in the same regions, but also in western Africa; there are also warm and/or dry zones too. [7] El Niño (La Niña) leads to higher (lower) global temperatures overall.

Although “[the] variable nature of ENSO means it is difficult for scientists to confidently connect the intensity of ENSO phases with climate change […], the [IPCC] predicts the frequency of strong El Niño and La Niña events is likely to increase throughout the next century.”[8] More severe El Niño phases would be manifested by more extreme weather events such as typhoons/cyclones built by greater ocean evaporation and droughts and fires due to the shift in rainfall patterns. [9]

With high confidence, climate changes overall (not just those directly related to the Pacific Ocean and ENSO) have already “caused substantial damages, and increasingly irreversible losses, in terrestrial, freshwater and coastal and open ocean marine ecosystems […] The extent and magnitude of climate change impacts are larger than estimated in previous assessments.”[10] Impacts on the ocean include acidification because of carbon (from CO2) absorption and higher temperatures of seawater in addition to sea level rise (SLR). In fact, the “mean temperature [of seawater has risen] at an average rate of 0.11°C per decade since 1970.”[11] Irreversibility of changes despite achieving targets in the Paris Agreement may entail ocean levels continuing to rise at least until the end of the century. [12]

The interdependence of humans and nature is an increasingly recognized notion in mainstream discourse and knowledge circles. (Of course, this has been realized and respected by indigenous groups long before modern times.) The Pacific Ocean, for example, has large stocks of fish and other marine life that provide a source of food and income to hundreds of millions of people. As for El Niño, “[e]stimates from the UN suggest that [its 2015-2016] phase significantly impacted the lives of over 60 million people via socioeconomic damage, migration, disease outbreaks, and food insecurity.”[13] El Niño has been shown to have caused trillions of dollars in losses globally in the years following the 1982-1983 and the 1997-1998 events. [14] Another study calculates the trillions of additional dollars that could be lost over the remainder of this century. [15]

Security (Human and Hard) Implications of Climate Change, SLR, and a Strengthening El Niño

As noted above, climate change is more than just an environmental issue. It has implications on matters such as “access to and availability of natural resources,” “food price spikes and food insecurity,” “livelihoods and criminality,” “displacement and migration” (both intra- and extraterritorial, but mainly internal, rural-urban movement), and “social contracts.”[16] Given that climate change is a “threat multiplier,” it interacts with other factors and trends in complex ways. While it may affect individual lives, it may be difficult to clearly connect those impacts to larger disturbances at higher levels. Stresses will become more acute with further increases in global temperature and the various ways that climate change, its effects, and human and animal responses thereto interact with each other. [17]

Some climate change-induced stresses stream from warming oceans, seas, and atmospheres, which directly generates SLR. The relationship between the two follows from this: “As temperatures rise during warm or interglacial periods, seawater expands, and the ice covering Antarctica, Greenland, and the mountain glaciers of the planet melts, increasing sea levels globally.”[18] SLR, together with “changes in wind patterns, wave power, extreme waves and sea levels,“[19] causes coastal zone erosion and recession, jeopardizing lives, properties, and assets along the seashore and further inland. Between 1880 and 2000, the global average sea levels increased by approximately 16 centimeters; the rate of SLR has grown within the past decades. [20] Strengthened El Niño cycles would exacerbate disturbances in these zones, especially as they themselves raise sea levels. [21]

Humans have a long history of living by the sea and using its resources. Today, around one billion people live within 10 kilometers of the sea. [22] All or vast proportions of nations on small island developing states do not have anywhere else to go. Worryingly, over 485 million urban dwellers (in 2015) and more than 66 percent of all megacities (as of 2013) are found in coastal areas with low elevation. [23] Recent urbanization trends make this figure more alarming. SLR may regularly flood cities and other settlements, and its encroachment upon the land will increase the salinity thereof, damaging agricultural products and water tables. Not only that, fisheries are diminishing and/or migrating from areas where they commonly have been seen; this hurts livelihoods and nutritional intake. [24]

“Global distribution of low-lying islands and coasts” from Magnan, A.K., Oppenheimer, M., Garschagen, M. et al. Sea level rise risks and societal adaptation benefits in low-lying coastal areas. Sci Rep 12, 10677, p.2 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-022-14303-w

The negative economic consequences of SLR are numerous. “On the coastlines of developed countries, changes in weather and climate extremes and sea level rise may impact the demand for housing, recreational facilities, the capacity of the urban drainage systems to absorb stormwater, the construction of renewable energy infrastructure, and critical infrastructures such as transportation, ports, […]”[25] “Without adaptation, flood damage under higher-end sea-level rise (1.3 met[ers]) would be approximately 4% of world GDP annually (USD 50 trillion annually).”[26]

Political positions and geopolitical maneuvers already take into account climate change and SLR and will increasingly need to address their causes and effects. Countries request and deliver on climate-related services and infrastructure projects; they will continue to do so. Humanitarian and disaster relief operations will be subject to influences from those governments seeking greater international legitimacy and support. [27] Perhaps most drastically, the concept of state sovereignty is (and will be) challenged as territory is lost to the sea.

Downscaled Reality and Future Outlook

This section considers possible climate change-induced situations in regions bordering, along, and/or within the Pacific Ring of Fire and Pacific Ocean. It also weighs potential geopolitical occurrences that may arise in the context of a shifting climate.

Generally speaking, forecasts and projections must take into account growth in sub-national, national, and international GDP, population, energy use and source, technology innovation, and greenhouse gas emissions, which is a complicated task. They are also constrained by limitations in scientific predictive power for scenarios at and above a 2°Celsius rise in temperatures, which may not be reached in the first place. Moreover, sub-regional and sub-country differences in “climatologies and socioeconomic contexts” (particularly in Northeast and Southeast Asia, the Pacific Islands region, and Central and South America)[28] exist but will not be translated into the outlooks below. Finally, there is a “paucity of adequately downscaled climate projections, with […] the resulting few numbers of impact and risk projections for different warming levels.”[29]

Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) make up an analytical tool that the IPCC uses to present potential global scenarios at different degrees of warming. [30] They have also been tied to a previously created Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs) framework, which specifically shows varying rates of greenhouse gas emissions and other radiative forcing over time. [31] RCP2.6 is equivalent to a global mean temperature increase of 1.7-1.8°Celsius, RCP4.5 to an increase of 2.5-2.7°Celsius, and RCP6.0 to that of a 3.2-3.3°Celsius rise.

“Radiative forcing (W m–2) time series for historical data (1765–2004), and for future scenarios from the Representative Concentration Pathways (RCP; 2005–2100) and their continuation as the extended RCPs (2100–2500), and the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSP; 2005–2100).” From Abram, N., J.-P. Gattuso, A. Prakash, L. Cheng, M.P. Chidichimo, S. Crate, H. Enomoto, M. Garschagen, N. Gruber, S. Harper, E. Holland, R.M. Kudela, J. Rice, K. Steffen, and K. von Schuckmann, 2019: Framing and Context of the Report Supplementary Material. In: IPCC Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate [H.-O. Pörtner, D.C. Roberts, V. Masson-Delmotte, P. Zhai, M. Tignor, E. Poloczanska, K. Mintenbeck, A. Alegría, M. Nicolai, A. Okem, J. Petzold, B. Rama, N.M. Weyer (eds.)]. In press. Accessed April 27, 2024. https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/3/2019/11/SROCC_Ch01-SM_FINAL.pdf

As for outlooks that are more downscaled, SLR is due to take place across all or nearly all land areas along and within the Pacific Ocean, from Northeast Asia (eastern Russia, Japan, the Korean Peninsula, China, and Taiwan), to Southeast Asia (the Philippines, Indonesia, and Papua New Guinea), down to Australasia (Australia and New Zealand), across the Pacific Island Countries (PICs), over to the western coastal areas of North, Central, and South America.

In Asia (and globally), China and Indonesia are among the countries (1) with the highest numbers of coastal populations exposed to SLR and related flooding and (2)who will face the most direct damage to their GDP from SLR. (Japan, South Korea, and Russia also rank with them.) Together with Japan and the Philippines, and four other Asian countries, they are home to 70% of all people who are “exposed to SLR and land subsidence.”[32] Guangzhou, Tianjin, Zhanjiang, Xiamen (the four of which are in China), and Jakarta (in Indonesia) join the 15 other “largest coastal cities with the highest flood losses by 2050.”[33] Guangzhou, one of the most important trade, transport, and technology centers in China, “is estimated to be the most economically vulnerable city in the world to SLR by 2050, with estimated losses of [US$] 254 million [per year] under [an SLR of 0.2 meters].”[34]

Possible Rates of Sea-level Rise from OECD Environment Directorate. “Responding to Rising Seas OECD Country Approaches to Tackling Coastal Risks.” OECD, p.3. Accessed April 28, 2024. https://www.oecd.org/environment/cc/policy-highlights-responding-to-rising-seas.pdf

Tropical cyclones, which will be intensified during El Niño phases, already cause Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, China, and Taiwan to be five of the top ten places with the highest average annual loss associated with them. [35] The Philippines does not have much resilience given the poor ratio of losses from wind and storm surge (features of cyclones) to existing capital stock. [36] These cyclones will have greater strength and/or will be present in northwest portions of the Pacific Ocean (relatively near Taiwan and Japan) in the coming years.

Moving on to Australasia and the Pacific Islands, the vast majority of people live on the coast. SLR is not distinguishable now in the former region. [37] However, in the event of a “0.5 meter [SLR], the value of buildings in New Zealand exposed to 1-in-100-year coastal inundation could increase by NZ$12.75 billion and the current 1-in-100-year flood in Australia could occur several times a year.”[38]

Unlike their Australasian counterparts, the Pacific Islands are much more vulnerable to SLR and El Niño-worsened weather events. This is particularly so for Kiribati, Marshall Islands, and Tuvalu, where over 95 percent of their infrastructure is located in coastal areas with low elevation. [39] Economic damages from tropical cyclones have equated to more than 20 percent of the GDP of Fiji in 2018 (in the case of Cyclone Winston in 2016)[40] and around 64 percent of the GDP of Vanuatu (for Cyclone Pam in 2015). [41] Ocean warming and ENSO will also figure in the migration of tuna such that “the total tuna catch within the combined Exclusive Economic Zones of the 10 Pacific Island Countries and territories […] where most purse-seine activity occurs [will decrease] by approximately 10% by 2050.”[42]

“Across North America, high population density and concentrated development along the coast generates exposure to SLR impacts.”[43] The state of California in the US has already had to address damages from elevated sea levels from El Niño cycles: “Recent El Niños along the US West Coast and Coast and Pacific have also set new records and caused widespread flooding and erosion Pacific have also set new records and caused widespread flooding and erosion.”[44] Below is a sampling of settlements on the Pacific coast of Canada, the US, and Mexico and the projected SLR they will have to address at three different periods.

Heading south to the Pacific borderlands of Central and South America, where “ENSO is the dominant phenomenon affecting weather conditions”[45] from the Northern Triangle of Central America to around upper Chile, El Niño has also elevated sea levels above normal in the southwest portion of the southern continent. [46] However, in that same portion “[t]here is low evidence on shoreline retreat attributed to climate change,”[47] although SLR forecasts under RCP4.5 and RCP8.5 show tens of centimeters of ocean level increase by 2100.

Returning to Central and Northwest South America, SLR will continue to take place. [48] [49] Coastal livelihoods will be disrupted by the migration of fisheries, which will transpire due to more intense ENSO cycles. [50]

Risks from SLR and stronger El Niño events will largely depend on the extent of national and sub-national governance in countries explicitly mentioned above and those that make up the regions that were examined. Governance pertains to the delivery of public services, disaster risk management and relief, environmental conservation, energy systems (seeing that greenhouse gas emissions must be lowered), and multistakeholder engagement. The countries (or parts thereof) in Southeast Asia and Central and South America, as well as the PICs, are at greater risk from SLR than the more developed states that make up Northeast Asia and North America. In fact, “[g]lobal hotspots of high human vulnerability are found particularly in […] Central and South America [and] Small Island Developing States […]”[51]

“Sea level rise projections for 2050, 2100 and 2150 for selected North American cities.” From IPCC, 2022: Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [H.-O. Pörtner, D.C. Roberts, M. Tignor, E.S. Poloczanska, K. Mintenbeck, A. Alegría, M. Craig, S. Langsdorf, S. Löschke, V. Möller, A. Okem, B. Rama (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA, p. 1965, doi:10.1017/9781009325844.

Traders and militaries will have to contend with the implications of SLR. “Coastal inundation due to long-term sea level rise will be a significant problem for coastal populations, activities, and infrastructure/assets at low elevation coastal zones, particularly in metropolitan areas that also experience coastal land subsidence (e.g. Jakarta (Indonesia), […]). Seaports in such areas are particularly sensitive, requiring costly technical responses […]”[52] Militaries, in turn, will need to balance the traditional deterrence and war-fighting capabilities with those of humanitarian operations following coastal flooding and tropical cyclones. They will also have to upgrade their infrastructure such as wharfs and consider how to reduce carbon emissions. [53]

SLR and wider climate change are occurring in a world where geopolitics is creating many waves, such as the strengthening of military and economic cooperation among like-minded countries. Geopolitics will likely become a stronger force animating international relations. As a result, PICs, the Philippines, and Indonesia will likely experience more concerted efforts on the parts of China, Australia, and the US to have them join agreements in which they will receive infrastructure, humanitarian, and/or financial support to counter SLR and/or its socioeconomic impacts in return for economic or military partnership.

PICs will possibly be the most hard-pressed given their location in the middle of the three powers. (Australia and Tuvalu recently signed the Falepili Union Treaty, which is underpinned by the negative effects of climate change and SLR on the latter. It stipulates Australian assistance to enhance Tuvaluan climate security and livelihood-promoting mobility while also connecting the military futures of the two countries. [54]) Yet, these island states will also hedge between geopolitical competitors and themselves make the most of increased attention, especially because many have deep connections to their islands. (Strong people-to-people ties between PICs and Australia and the US, as seen in the high numbers of Pacific Islanders who have emigrated to those two countries, could influence them to be more favorable towards them.)

At the same time, the allocation of international climate-related assistance may become strained as funds are redirected to build up domestic adaptation measures. Moreover, the US will face a lot of pressure from migration from PICs, particularly in the Micronesian sub-region, and Central America.

Recommendations and Conclusion

“In the near term [2021-2040], climate-associated risks to natural and human systems depend more strongly on changes in their vulnerability and exposure than on differences in climate hazards between emissions scenarios.”[55] In this context, mitigation and adaptation measures (but more so the latter at this point) must be implemented to reduce those vulnerabilities and exposure. “Without adaptation, expected direct annual losses due to coastal floods could amount to 0.3%–9.3% of global GDP by 2100.”[56] The same study notes that hard coastal protection would dramatically lower the number of people who suffer from those floods. [57]

Crafting responsive and preventative policies and projects must be done in a manner that takes account of the need for smaller-scale climate projections (which is lacking for PICs, Asia, and Central and South America[58]), and, while being time-sensitive, also making sure that appropriate data is sought, collected, and used. [59] [60] Such measures should also be directed toward the fulfillment of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs): “Progress towards meeting the SDGs has been recognized to be able to reduce global disparities and support more climate-resilient development pathways.”[61] International assistance must effectively collaborate with regional bodies such as ASEAN and PIF. (There is no equivalent in Central and South America.)


[1] WMO. “State of the Global Climate 2023.” wmo.int, March 19, 2024. Accessed April 24, 2024. https://wmo.int/publication-series/state-of-global-climate-2023.

[2] IPCC, 2022: Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [H.-O. Pörtner, D.C. Roberts, M. Tignor, E.S. Poloczanska, K. Mintenbeck, A. Alegría, M. Craig, S. Langsdorf, S. Löschke, V. Möller, A. Okem, B. Rama (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA,

p. 16, doi:10.1017/9781009325844.

[3] WMO. The Global Climate 2011-2020. Rep. Library.Wmo.Int, 2023. Accessed April 24, 2024. https://library.wmo.int/idurl/4/68585.

[4] IPCC (p. 13).

[5] NOAA. “How Does the Ocean Affect Climate and Weather on Land?” NOAA Ocean Explorer. Accessed April 23, 2024. https://oceanexplorer.noaa.gov/facts/climate.html.

[6] McMonigal, Kay, Sarah Larson, Shineng Hu, and Ryan Kramer. “Historical Changes in Wind-Driven Ocean Circulation Can Accelerate Global Warming.” Geophysical Research Letters 50, no. 4, p. 1 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1029/2023GL102846.

[7] McGregor, Glenn R., and Kristie Ebi. 2018. “El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) and Health: An Overview for Climate and Health Researchers” Atmosphere 9, no. 7: 282, Figures 7 and 8. Accessed April 26, 2024. https://doi.org/10.3390/atmos9070282

[8] Grantham Institute Imperial College London. “What Is El Niño and How Is It Influenced by Climate Change?” Imperial College London. Accessed April 23, 2024. https://www.imperial.ac.uk/grantham/publications/climate-change-faqs/what-is-el-nino/.

[9] The University of Arizona WRRC. “The Global Impacts of El Niño.” Water Resources Research Center | The University of Arizona. Accessed April 24, 2024. https://wrrc.arizona.edu/Impacts-of-El-Nino.

[10] IPCC (p. 9).

[11] De Melo Viríssimo, Francisco, Georgina Kyriacou, and Elizabeth Robinson. “How Is Climate Change Affecting the Oceans and What Are the Impacts for People?” Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, February 28, 2023. Accessed April 25, 2024. https://www.lse.ac.uk/granthaminstitute/explainers/how-is-climate-change-affecting-the-oceans-and-what-are-the-impacts-for-people/.

[12] De Melo Viríssimo, Kyriacou, and Robinson (2023).

[13] Grantham Institute Imperial College London (2024).

[14] U.S. National Science Foundation. “In Years after El Niño, Global Economy Loses Trillions.” NSF, July 5, 2023. https://new.nsf.gov/news/years-after-el-nino-global-economy-loses-trillions.

[15] Liu, Y., Cai, W., Lin, X. et al. Nonlinear El Niño impacts on the global economy under climate change. Nat Commun 14, 5887, p.1. (2023). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-023-41551-9

[16] Vivekananda, Janani. “Reimagining the Human-Environment Relationship: Why Climate Change Matters for Human Security.” UNU, pp. 4-8, 2022. Accessed April 26, 2024. https://collections.unu.edu/eserv/UNU:8836/UNUUNEP_Vivekananda_RHER.pdf

[17] Petzold, Jan, and Jürgen Scheffran. “Climate Change and Human Security in Coastal Regions.” Cambridge Prisms: Coastal Futures 2 (2024): e5. Accessed April 27, 2024. https://doi.org/10.1017/cft.2024.2.)

[18] Gary Griggs, and Borja G. Reguero. “Coastal Adaptation to Climate Change and Sea-Level Rise.” Water 13, no. 16, p.1. (2021): 2151. https://doi.org/10.3390/w13162151.

[19] Griggs and Reguero (p. 2).

[20] The Royal Society. “14. How Fast Is Sea Level Rising?” The Royal Society. Accessed April 28, 2024. https://royalsociety.org/news-resources/projects/climate-change-evidence-causes/question-14/#:~:text=Long%2Dterm%20measurements%20of%20tide,(0.14%20inches%20per%20year).

[21] NASA Sea Level Change. “How Does El Niño Fit into the Sea-Level Rise Picture?” NASA Sea Level Change | NASA EarthData. Accessed April 27, 2024. https://sealevel.nasa.gov/faq/10/how-does-el-nino-fit-into-the-sea-level-rise-picture/.

[22] Reimann, Lena, Athanasios T. Vafeidis, and Lars E. Honsel. “Population Development as a Driver of Coastal Risk: Current Trends and Future Pathways.” Cambridge Prisms: Coastal Futures 1 (2023): e14. https://doi.org/10.1017/cft.2023.3.

[23] Reimann, Vafeidis, and Honsel (2023).

[24] McKie, Robin. “How Warming Seas Are Forcing Fish to Seek New Waters.” The Guardian, January 8, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/jan/08/fish-ocean-warming-migration-sea.

[25] Laino, Emilio, and Gregorio Iglesias. “Scientometric Review of Climate-Change Extreme Impacts on Coastal Cities.” Ocean and Coastal Management 242, p.9. (2023). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ocecoaman.2023.106709.

[26] OECD Environment Directorate. “Responding to Rising Seas OECD Country Approaches to Tackling Coastal Risks.” OECD, Accessed April 28, 2024. https://www.oecd.org/environment/cc/policy-highlights-responding-to-rising-seas.pdf

[27] Glasser, Robert, Cathy Johnstone, and Anastasia Kapetas. “The Geopolitics of Climate and Security in the Indo-Pacific.” Barton: Australia Strategic Policy Institute, 2022. Accessed April 26, 2024. https://ad-aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/2022-02/Climate%20and%20security%20in%20the%20Indo-Pacific_0.pdf?VersionId=qP0ZzIQQiSLU1ymakusX2a9NrL2R6Jf_

[28] IPCC (p. 17).

[29] Ibid.

[30] IPCC. “Sixth Assessment Report FACT SHEET.” WMO, 2022. Accessed April 27, 2024. https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2022/04/IPCC_Factsheet_April_2022.pdf

[31] Hausfather, Zeke. “Explainer: How ‘shared Socioeconomic Pathways’ Explore Future Climate Change.” Carbon Brief, April 19, 2021. https://www.carbonbrief.org/explainer-how-shared-socioeconomic-pathways-explore-future-climate-change/

[32] IPCC (p.1499).

[33] Ibid.

[34] Ibid.

[35] IPCC (p.1500).

[36] Ibid.

[37] IPCC (p.1621).

[38] IPCC (p.1584).

[39] IPCC (p.2064).

[40] Ibid.

[41] World Bank Group. “$50 Million to Improve Roads, Schools and Buildings in Vanuatu.” World Bank, June 17, 2016. https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2016/06/17/50-million-to-improve-roads-schools-and-buildings-in-vanuatu#:~:text=Total%20economic%20damage%20and%20losses,Nations%20University%20World%20Risk%20Index.

[42] IPCC (p.2070).

[43] IPCC (p.1963).

[44] Griggs and Reguero (p. 7).

[45] IPCC (p.1700)

[46] IPCC (p.1713)

[47] IPCC (p.1716)

[48] IPCC (p.1698).

[49] IPCC (p.1700).

[50] IPCC (p.1701).

[51] IPCC (p. 12).

[52] Asariotis, Regina, Hassiba Benamara, and Viktoria Mohos-Naray. “Port Industry Survey on Climate Change Impacts and Adaptation.” UNCTAD, p. 11, 2017. https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/ser-rp-2017d18_en.pdf

[53] Glasser, Johnstone, and Kapetas.  (pp. 74-75, accessed April 20, 2024).

[54] See: https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/tuvalu/australia-tuvalu-falepili-union-treaty (accessed April 29, 2024)

[55] IPCC (p. 13).

[56] Schinko, Thomas, Laurent Drouet, Zoi Vrontisi, Andries Hof, Jochen Hinkel, Junko Mochizuki, Valentina Bosetti, Kostas Fragkiadakis, Detlef van Vuuren, and Daniel Lincke. “Economy-Wide Effects of Coastal Flooding due to Sea Level Rise: A Multi-Model Simultaneous Treatment of Mitigation, Adaptation, and Residual Impacts.” Environmental Research Communications 2, no. 1 (2020): 15002, p. 2. https://doi.org/10.1088/2515-7620/ab6368.

[57] Ibid.

[58] IPCC (p. 17).

[59] See: McGregor and Ebi (2018).

[60] Celia McMichael, Shouro Dasgupta, Sonja Ayeb-Karlsson, and Ilan Kelman. “A Review of Estimating Population Exposure to Sea-Level Rise and the Relevance for Migration.” Environmental Research Letters 15, no. 12 (2020): 123005, p. 18. https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/abb398.

[61] IPCC (p. 2479).




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