“Peace, harmony, security, social inclusion, and prosperity”[1] in the Pacific Ocean are facing headwinds and tailwinds that likely will be revealed at the upcoming 52nd Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) Leaders Meeting.

The site of the 6-10 November 2023 meeting is significant: Rarotonga, the largest of the Cook Islands, was also where the treaty bearing its name and officially identified as the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, was opened to signature in 1986. (The treaty went into force in December of that year, establishing an area in which nuclear explosive devices are renounced and in which such devices are neither to be stationed nor tested in the jurisdictions (at least) of parties to the treaty.)

Moreover, it is at this venue where two important security-related topics will be discussed: a proposal for a Pacific Zone of Peace and the implementation plan for the 2050 Blue Pacific Strategy.

Ocean of Peace or Stormy Ocean?

What does security in the Pacific region look like, and will the Pacific Peace Zone/Ocean of Peace be successful? Briefly, the region lacks a security architecture and can be fully described neither as a regional security complex nor a security community.[2] As much as there has been an effort to establish a unified Pacific regional voice in all matters, including security, by adopting a “Blue Pacific” identity, arranging a peace zone will not be fully met.

The idea of such a zone has not been concretized, and so its final dimensions cannot be analyzed. Yet it has been described as being built on “seven key pillars,”[3] which may include:

(1) “mutual respect for each other’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence,

(2) “a robust ‘Dispute Resolution Mechanism,’

(3) “a clear ‘Arms Control and Non-Proliferation’ arrangement,

(4) “a well-articulated framework for environmental conservation,

(5) “the need to enhance and nurture Regional Cooperation, such as by having ‘Pacific nations with military forces doing more heavy lifting to help regional states deal with internal issues’[4]

(6) “Pacific Island nations agreeing to refrain from jeopardizing the international order”[5]

(7) “major powers and Pacific island nations agreeing to ‘(refrain) from actions that may jeopardize regional order and stability’”[6]

Nevertheless, the end-product may be left wanting and/or not obtain the endorsement of all Pacific Island Countries (PICs) because of the different (non-)relationships, and degrees thereof, that islands have with external global powers.

Analysis

One way to examine both questions is by reviewing the speech that Lourdes “Lou” Leon Guerrero, the governor of the U.S. Pacific Island territory of Guam, gave at the 2023 Pacific Defense Contracting Summit that took place in Hawaii from 17-19 October.

The governor began her address by showcasing Guam as having historical links to “trade and cultural exchange” due to its “strategic location.”[7] She then mentioned the Spanish and Japanese occupations of the island (explicitly mentioning the former country but not the latter).

1. Pacific Regional Security

Governor Leon Guerrero’s speech reveals or reflects aspects of security in the Pacific. The first is that Pacific islands since 2018 (at least) have been aware of “an increasingly complex regional security environment driven by multifaceted security challenges, and a dynamic geopolitical environment leading to an increasingly crowded and complex region.”[8] These words are written in the Boe Declaration on Regional Security, the fifth declaration on regional security since the 1992 Honiara Declaration.

Secondly, her remarks point to the strong influence of metropolitan and external powers in the Pacific; the United States applies in her case. She stated: “I persistently collaborate with the leadership at the Pentagon, the Indo Pacific Command, Joint Region Marianas, and the United States Congress to address these emerging threats.”[9] U.S. military engagement is not limited to Guam, but most profoundly spans the Pacific Island Countries of Palau, Federated States of Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands. (The first and second countries are closest to Guam, and Palau is the PIC closest to the People’s Republic of China (PRC).) In 2023 these three countries renewed their compacts of free association with the U.S. The compacts give the U.S. “exclusive rights to maintain defense assets in the territorial lands and waters of these nations. In exchange, these countries receive a variety of funding and services…from the U.S. government, including the provision of their security.”[10]

Besides the U.S., France, Japan, and the PRC are significant military players in the Pacific. Australia and New Zealand, PIF members, are also key to understanding regional security dynamics, especially because the former “is by far the largest security assistance donor”[11] therein.

In August 2023, Fiji signed a Status of Forces Agreement with France, which has also expressed an intent to increase the size of its military presence in the Pacific region. As for Japan, which also works with Fiji, “the Pacific Islands appeared for the first time in the annual Defense of Japan report and longer-term Defense Guidelines, which note that ‘Japan will promote port and airport visits by SDF as well as exchanges and cooperation.’”[12] PRC People’s Liberation Army Navy “ships have visited Oceania ports on at least 54 occasions…The frequency and consistency increased markedly starting in 2010. [And] PLAN ships have visited Fiji 20 times—more than any other country in Oceania.”[13] Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese visited Washington D.C. in the latter half of October 2023; security cooperation was one of the topics discussed. 

(On an aside,[14] a U.S.-led Pacific security framework has been evolving in the past years: The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (or Quad) is a grouping, and not an alliance, that was formed in 2004. Japan pushed for the first Quad gathering of senior officials in 2007; it then sat largely inactive for around a decade before its revival. It consists of the U.S., India, Japan, and Australia. The Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) partnership of 2021 enables the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines to Australia, in addition to collective engagement in eight “advanced capabilities.” Finally, the U.S.-Japan-South Korea trilateral partnership, announced in August 2023, foresees security cooperation among the countries, for example in relation to the PICs.[15])

Thirdly, external powers are a source of needed financing, which enables them to influence island decisions. Additionally, and given the geopolitical competition, PICs have greater leverage to acquire funds to further their economic development. “Indeed, island states on both sides of the geopolitical fault line have used ‘tactical, shrewd and calculating approaches’ to exploit strategic competition to pursue their own priorities…”[16]

Finally, the governor of Guam suggests that security is broader than the traditional notions thereof that emphasize military hardware and capabilities, such as “missile defence.”[17] She points to “human health security,”[18] economic development/infrastructure construction, cybersecurity, sustainability, climate, and digitalization as contributors to and/or components of security. The conception she puts forth mirrors the broad definition of security that the PICs have been supporting for decades. The Pacific notion of security is fundamentally human/people-oriented, which creates a divergence between external powers and their PIC counterparts. “The region…recognizes the expanded concept of security that includes human security, economic security, humanitarian assistance, environmental security, cyber security and transnational crime, and regional cooperation to build resilience to disasters and climate change.”[19] Security and ocean governance overlap in multiple ways.

2. Regional Nonalignment

Leon Guerrero’s speech portrays one Pacific islander perspective of regional security. There are other perspectives though. This should not be a surprise considering that only three PICs have militaries, and a significant portion do not have a published national security strategy (and most of those who do only published them within the past years). Pacific islands have “differing security challenges…: PNG is much larger than other island states and shares a land border with Indonesia; Niue is by far the least populous; some states, such as Kiribati, have large maritime domains; low-lying atolls like Tuvalu and RMI face climate change impacts more regularly; Melanesian states with large young urban populations face demographic challenges; some state have tumultuous political histories, such as Fiji and Solomon Islands; and some territories are seeking independence, such as the Bougainville region of PNG and New Caledonia.”[20]

Arguably the most important difference between the view the governor advanced and that of other Pacific leaders is her lack of emphasis on climate change being the biggest security threat to the region, which was reaffirmed in the 2018 Boe Declaration. (However, in conjunction with that declaration, she did prioritize human security.)

The governor also valorizes the notion of “a Free and Open Indo-Pacific,”[21] a term that clashes with the Blue Pacific identity that has been widely adopted among PICs. Guam is a U.S. territory, and thus its values are largely aligned with those of the mainland. Given her island’s proximity to Japan, not only did she not explicitly mention Japan as a previous occupying power on Guam, but she utilized the very term it coined. Relatedly, the term implicitly accepts the view that the PRC is a threat/enemy. However, “[t]his perspective of China as a threat has been challenged by Pacific island leaders, who instead see opportunities for development assistance, security cooperation and market access.”[22]

Finally, the governor seems to diminish Pacific regionalism by identifying the region with the U.S. state of Hawaii, U.S. commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, U.S. territory of Guam, and the three PICs that have a Compact of Free Association with the U.S. In fact, there are four main sub-regional groupings that have formed, the most advanced being the Melanesian Spearhead Group (founded in 1988 and made a formal institution in 2007), whose “members have agreed to create…a regional security strategy.”[23] The other three are the Polynesian Leaders Group, the Micronesian Presidents’ Summit, and the Micronesian Chief Executives’ Summit, the first of which includes the U.S. territory of American Samoa and the last of which Guam is a part.

Territories allow “former colonial powers—the United States, France, Australia, United Kingdom, and New Zealand–…to exert considerable influence on [the Pacific] agenda through what is resourced and what is not.”[24] Dame Meg Taylor, former PIF Secretary-General, also writes that the U.S. presence in what it terms the Indo-Pacific is largely propagated by defense engagements—one need only notice the venue where Leon Guerrero spoke–and other actions that seek to exclude the PRC. The Indo-Pacific is based on imagination, as are PRC initiatives.[25]

Conclusion

Six of twelve PICs had had formal diplomatic relations with the PRC before Kiribati and Solomon Islands cut such ties with the Republic of China/Taiwan in 2019. (Solomon Islands then went on to sign a security deal with the PRC in 2022, in addition to a police arrangement in July 2023 that occurred in the context of boosting ties to a “comprehensive strategic partnership.”[26] However, Australia has had a bilateral security treaty with the PIC since 2017.) The influence of Taiwan persists in four PICs, as well as in the region as manifested by its provision of funds to the PIF in June 2023.[27]

Even so, “[t]he PIF Post-Forum Dialogue Partners’ Meeting is one of the very few international fora that both Taiwan and China attend, although Taiwan meets with its partners at separate venues.”[28] The fact that China was represented at the 25th Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense conference that took place in Fiji, which co-hosted the event with the U.S.,[29] may show the potential of the region playing the role of a peaceful meeting grounds for East and West, which is related to what Fijian Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka has stated.[30]

If the Pacific Zone of Peace were to involve a mechanism that generated a formalized dialogue between the PICs and/or the PIF and external powers and other countries, then perhaps would success be more likely. The mechanism would be “akin to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) for the island states to ‘collectively relate to external actors’ on security issues…in the Pacific Islands.”[31] Nevertheless, the disunity concerning the PRC among ASEAN actors themselves may not bode well for a PIF version.

The success of the design, acceptance, and implementation of a Pacific Zone of Peace may largely hinge upon the extent to which the international system is characterized by multipolarity, not just a Western and China/Russia-led camp. More fundamental will be the unity of PICs especially because Pacific Zone of Peace proponent-Fiji has security links to France and Australia.

REFERENCES

[1] PIF. “Boe Declaration on Regional Security.” Pacific Islands Forum, 2018. https://www.forumsec.org/2018/09/05/boe-declaration-on-regional-security/.

[2] Wallis, Joanne, McNeill, Henrietta, Batley, James, and Powles, Anna. Security cooperation in the Pacific Islands: architecture, complex, community, or something else?, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Volume 23, Issue 2, May 2023, Pages 263–296, https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcac005

[3] Daucakacaka, Jale. “PM Underscores Significance of Pacific ‘Zone of Peace.’” fbcnews.com, September 26, 2023. https://www.fbcnews.com.fj/news/pm-underscores-significance-of-pacific-zone-of-peace/.

[4] Brennan, Dechlan. “During Australia Visit, Fijian Prime Minister Calls for ‘Ocean of Peace.’” thediplomat.com, October 19, 2023. https://thediplomat.com/2023/10/during-australia-visit-fijian-prime-minister-calls-for-ocean-of-peace/.

[5] Daucakacaka, Jale. “PM Underscores Significance of Pacific ‘Zone of Peace.’” fbcnews.com, September 26, 2023. https://www.fbcnews.com.fj/news/pm-underscores-significance-of-pacific-zone-of-peace/.

[6] Dziedzic, Stephen. “Fiji’s PM Once Led a Coup and Was Known as ‘Rambo’. He’s Now Calling for a ‘zone of Peace’ in the Pacific.” abc.net.au, October 17, 2023. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-10-17/fiji-pm-sitiveni-rabuka-delivers-major-speech-in-canberra/102985840.

[7] Leon Guerrero administration. “Remarks for Governor Lou Leon Guerrero Defense Leadership Forum 2023 Pacific Defense Contracting Summit October 17-19, 2023 Honolulu, Hawaii.” Honolulu: Leon Guerrero administration, 2023. https://bloximages.newyork1.vip.townnews.com/postguam.com/content/tncms/assets/v3/editorial/5/b0/5b04ed48-7168-11ee-988a-dbe28855c5b1/65360a1f40ce8.pdf.pdf

[8] PIF. “Boe Declaration on Regional Security.” Pacific Islands Forum, 2018. https://www.forumsec.org/2018/09/05/boe-declaration-on-regional-security/.

[9] Leon Guerrero administration. “Remarks for Governor Lou Leon Guerrero Defense Leadership Forum 2023 Pacific Defense Contracting Summit October 17-19, 2023 Honolulu, Hawaii.” Honolulu: Leon Guerrero administration, 2023. https://bloximages.newyork1.vip.townnews.com/postguam.com/content/tncms/assets/v3/editorial/5/b0/5b04ed48-7168-11ee-988a-dbe28855c5b1/65360a1f40ce8.pdf.pdf

[10] Smith, Angela. “US Compacts of Free Association Are Key to Deterring a Taiwan Contingency.” thediplomat.com, August 23, 2022. https://thediplomat.com/2022/08/us-compacts-of-free-association-are-key-to-deterring-a-taiwan-contingency/.

[11] Wallis, Joanne, McNeill, Henrietta, Batley, James, and Powles, Anna. Security cooperation in the Pacific Islands: architecture, complex, community, or something else?, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Volume 23, Issue 2, May 2023, Pages 263–296, https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcac005

[12] Pajon, Céline. “Japan and the Pacific Islands Countries: Longstanding Strategic

Interests, Recent Strategic Engagement”, Asie.Visions 134, Ifri, March 2023.

[13] Orchard, Andrew. “China’s Navy in Pacific Island Ports.” thediplomat.com, September 19, 2023. https://thediplomat.com/2023/09/chinas-navy-in-pacific-island-ports/.

[14] Friedhoff, Karl, Green, Michael, Shackelford, Elizabeth. “Could an Asian NATO be in the Cards?” October 26, 2023. Deep Dish on Global Affairs Podcast. Published by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. Audio. 29:37. https://globalaffairs.org/commentary-and-analysis/podcasts/could-asian-nato-be-cards

[15] Briefing Room, and Briefing Room, The Spirit of Camp David: Joint Statement of Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States § (2023). https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/08/18/the-spirit-of-camp-david-joint-statement-of-japan-the-republic-of-korea-and-the-united-states/.

[16] Wallis, Joanne, McNeill, Henrietta, Batley, James, and Powles, Anna. Security cooperation in the Pacific Islands: architecture, complex, community, or something else?, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Volume 23, Issue 2, May 2023, Pages 263–296, https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcac005

[17] Leon Guerrero administration. “Remarks for Governor Lou Leon Guerrero Defense Leadership Forum 2023 Pacific Defense Contracting Summit October 17-19, 2023 Honolulu, Hawaii.” Honolulu: Leon Guerrero administration, 2023. https://bloximages.newyork1.vip.townnews.com/postguam.com/content/tncms/assets/v3/editorial/5/b0/5b04ed48-7168-11ee-988a-dbe28855c5b1/65360a1f40ce8.pdf.pdfhttps://bloximages.newyork1.vip.townnews.com/postguam.com/content/tncms/assets/v3/editorial/5/b0/5b04ed48-7168-11ee-988a-dbe28855c5b1/65360a1f40ce8.pdf.pdf

[18] Ibid.

[19] PIF Secretariat. “2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continentpdf.” Suva: PIF Secretariat, 2022. https://www.forumsec.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/PIFS-2050-Strategy-Blue-Pacific-Continent-WEB-5Aug2022.pdf

[20] Wallis, Joanne, McNeill, Henrietta, Batley, James, and Powles, Anna. Security cooperation in the Pacific Islands: architecture, complex, community, or something else?, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Volume 23, Issue 2, May 2023, Pages 263–296, https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcac005

[21] Leon Guerrero administration. “Remarks for Governor Lou Leon Guerrero Defense Leadership Forum 2023 Pacific Defense Contracting Summit October 17-19, 2023 Honolulu, Hawaii.” Honolulu: Leon Guerrero administration, 2023. https://bloximages.newyork1.vip.townnews.com/postguam.com/content/tncms/assets/v3/editorial/5/b0/5b04ed48-7168-11ee-988a-dbe28855c5b1/65360a1f40ce8.pdf.pdfhttps://bloximages.newyork1.vip.townnews.com/postguam.com/content/tncms/assets/v3/editorial/5/b0/5b04ed48-7168-11ee-988a-dbe28855c5b1/65360a1f40ce8.pdf.pdf

[22] Tarte, Sandra. ‘Reconciling regional security narratives in the Pacific’, Regional Outlook Paper No. 65, 2021.

[23] Wallis, Joanne, McNeill, Henrietta, Batley, James, and Powles, Anna. Security cooperation in the Pacific Islands: architecture, complex, community, or something else?, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Volume 23, Issue 2, May 2023, Pages 263–296, https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcac005

[24] Taylor, Meg. “Pacific-Led Regionalism Undermined.” asiasociety.org, September 2023. https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/pacific-led-regionalism-undermined.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Reuters. “China, Solomon Islands Sign Policing Pact in Upgrade of Ties.” reuters.com, July 11, 2023. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-solomon-islands-agree-strategic-partnership-2023-07-10/.

[27] PIF Secretariat. “PIF: Regional Governance, 2050 Boost from Taiwan/Republic of China Support.” forumsec.org, 2023. https://www.forumsec.org/2023/06/29/release-regional-governance-2050-boost-from-taiwan-republic-of-china-support/.

[28] Wallis, Joanne, Henrietta McNeill, James Batley, and Anna Powles. “Mapping Security Cooperation in the Pacific Islands.” Canberra: Department of Pacific Affairs, 2021. https://dpa.bellschool.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/2021-06/mapping_security_cooperation_in_pacific_islands_dpa_research_report_2021_joanne_wallis_henrietta_mcneill_james_batley_anna_powles.pdf

[29] Reuters. “Fiji Prime Minister Warns against US and China Attempts to ‘Polarise’ Pacific.” theguardian.com, August 25, 2023. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/aug/25/fiji-prime-minister-warns-against-us-and-china-attempts-to-polarise-pacific.

[30] Editor. “Fiji PM Rabuka to Propose a Peace Zone Vision at PIF Meeting.” pina.com.fj, October 2, 2023. https://pina.com.fj/2023/10/02/fiji-pm-rabuka-to-propose-a-peace-zone-vision-at-pif-meeting/.

[31] Wallis, Joanne, McNeill, Henrietta, Batley, James, and Powles, Anna. Security cooperation in the Pacific Islands: architecture, complex, community, or something else?, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Volume 23, Issue 2, May 2023, Pages 263–296, https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcac005