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Will the Akuyu nuclear power plant eventually make Turkey a nuclear power?

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Will the Akuyu nuclear power plant eventually make Turkey a nuclear power?

Turkey plans to build a nuclear plant with the help of Russia. Both states are known for their disregard of international law and the use of illegal force to further their international aims. The history of how Pakistan became a nuclear power may be a sign of things to expect from Turkey which does not hide its Neo-Ottoman aspirations, thus destabilizing the region and maiming the NATO alliance.

In 1972, the construction of the first nuclear power plant in Pakistan began. Two years later, in 1974, the Muslim government of Pakistan created the first uranium enrichment program, codenamed ‘Project-706’. In less than ten years, in 1983, Pakistan made its first atomic bomb. On May 28, 1998, Pakistan conducted its first nuclear bomb test, after 5 underground nuclear tests (Chagai-I) in response to the nuclear bomb test by India almost 20 days earlier.

Despite a much more underdeveloped economy that Pakistan had in comparison to Turkey today, it was able to create the bomb in just 10 years.

Although the U.S. imposed economic sanctions against Pakistan, Turkey was among 4 states that congratulated the Pakistani government for this move.
Today Turkey is planning to build a nuclear power plant.
It can be said that Turkey is more developed than Pakistan of that era and may be able to develop the bomb faster. Its history of genocide makes the prospect of developing an atomic bomb from this imperialist country with Neo-Ottoman aspirations a nightmare.

What could be more dangerous is a point of contention. The construction of the Akuyu nuclear power plant and the possibility of an earthquake, or that Turkey will gradually become a nuclear power?

A public debate should be initiated and focused mainly on the issue of the Akkuyu nuclear power plant in Turkey, with a view to analysing issues related to the role of the intelligence services, such as:

  1. Understanding the level of risk that the project poses to Hellenism (Greece-Cyprus)
  2. Understanding the timeline of the project and therefore the time constraints for its possible treatment.
    From the operational point of view, as far as Hellenic national defence is concerned, it must be immediately dealt with, in order to ensure defence against a possible nuclear strike.
    Especially aware of the history of genocide, the ruthless imperialist role of Turkey, the impossibility of listening ears on the part of the neighboring country and the danger that Hellas will very soon be threatened by the development of nuclear weapons that may even hit its urban centers, a dialogue should address, directly, in this context, issues such as:
  3. Set out to do new operational planning and execution of exercises
  4. Assessment of risks and reactions in a preventive stroke operation
  5. Campaign, in all forums to build international legitimacy.
    It is important to recognize that intelligence operations do not end with the discovery of the opponent’s intention. Intelligence services have to face two specific challenges. First, at the strategic level, they need to assess the type of response – or lack of response – to an attack that is likely to come from Turkey.
    In this context, the development of the idea of “area of denial” would constitute a conceptual innovation. As for the challenge, namely the attack itself, the intelligence services must provide accurate information about preparation, concentration of forces and planning. The execution of a possible attack requires close cooperation between the tactical intelligence units and the operational and investigative bodies. It also seems important that the join operations of the secret services, in its various elements, can be able to unite its efforts and operate with a high level of “community”, regarding threat assessment and possible responses to the attack.




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